

European Center of Democracy Development

XENOPHOBIA, MINORITY RIGHTS AND RADICALISATION IN THE OSCE AREA

2020-2022

Report

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The European Center of Democracy Development offers yet another analytical report by an international team of leading experts on minority rights and manifestations of hatred, this time from 2020-22. The study covers 13 OSCE countries, including the United States and Canada. Of course, this set of monitoring countries does not cover all states that are members of this international organisation, but it allows us to trace general trends in lawmaking, law enforcement practice, and other areas of government and public life that affects the situation with extremism. The paper analyses the factors influencing the formation of public demand for radicalism, manifestations of xenophobia and racism, provides statistics on hate crimes, and analyses the activities of radical and extremist organisations. The analysis is based on the examples of the UK, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria, Serbia, Poland, and France, as well as the USA, Canada, Russia, and Ukraine.

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PREDICTION

The coronavirus pandemic and the outbreak of war in eastern Europe have become serious challenges for monitoring countries in protecting human rights in general and minorities in particular. Despite preliminary conclusions by a number of experts, quarantine measures and restrictions on movement in 2020-21 did not lead to a reduction in the number of hate crimes. Moreover, they increased by an average of 25-30% in the monitored countries during the period under review, with the bulk of this increase coming from the spread of hate speech online. With a few exceptions (France, Germany, and Italy), we also recorded an increase in violent bias-motivated crimes. The number of court convictions increased during this period, and this increase was also mainly due to online hate crime cases. Most of these offenses were committed during the pandemic when people were forced to stay at home and spent time primarily in the online environment. Domestic violence against women and children also increased during that time.

The sharp increase in hate crime could not have happened without the aggravation of xenophobic attitudes, which was influenced by the social processes caused by both COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. We observe this process in practically all countries of Europe, the USA, and Canada.

As for the legislative process, it should be noted that during the period under review, almost no new anti-immigration laws were adopted in the monitoring countries. On the contrary, several significant legislative initiatives protecting the rights of migrants appeared. There was also a streamlining and liberalisation of general migration legislation, with the exception of France, where the course of restrictive measures remained the same, and Greece, where the rules for granting citizenship were tightened. However, even in France, the anti-immigration reform remains stalled: the discussion has been postponed until the end of 2023.

Contrary to predictions, the influx of several million Ukrainian military refugees into the monitoring countries did not cause mass violations of migrants' rights and did not lead to the collapse of social services and the labour market in the recipient countries. The extraordinary measures made it possible not only to provide support to people fleeing the war zone in Ukraine but also to avoid serious social upheavals. At the same time, as almost all experts point out, these measures do not compare to the steps taken during the migration crises of 2015 and 2021, when hundreds of thousands of Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans were forced to flee their countries to Europe and America. All of this suggests that contemporary migration processes in OSCE countries are the product of political decisions.

Anti-extremist legislation in the monitoring countries has made significant progress in moving away from the model of violent extremism to a model that includes measures to combat the spread of hatred against social groups, including on the Internet. The legislation of countries such as Britain (Scotland), Canada, Germany, Greece, Russia, and a number of others has moved in this direction. Thus, in the old legislative conflict between democratic values and security interests, security interests are gaining the upper hand.

It is also worth noting the advancement of an anti-discrimination agenda against racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities in the legislatures of OSCE countries. At the same time, recent initiatives, including in the United States, regarding the right to gender self-identification have provoked strong opposition not only from the political opposition but also from part of the LGBT community. It seems that the long-standing process of legal emancipation of sexual minorities is gradually coming to naught, having reached a certain stage where the rights of other social groups are affected.

Several important laws were also noted that were discriminatory in nature. For example, the waiver of the right to abortion in the United States has indeed posed a serious threat, for the first time in decades, to women, especially those from the poorest segments of the population.

In law enforcement practice, monitoring states continued to be guided by national plans to combat discrimination and extremism, which tended to identify ethnic, religious, sexual minorities, migrants, and other groups as the most vulnerable. A number of countries have introduced various forms of training for police officers to improve their effectiveness in countering hate crimes. However, racial and religious profiling in law enforcement, and in general in government agencies, remained a serious problem. The tendency to violate the rights of refugees from Asian and African countries when they crossed the borders of the EU and the United States also persisted.

The analysis of the activities of radical and extremist organisations has shown that Islamism has ceded leadership to right-wing extremism in most of the countries targeted by our research, both in terms of the number of crimes committed and respondents' assessments. Left-wing radicalism should still be regarded as a phenomenon that poses less danger than the first two factors. Nevertheless, Islamist extremism still holds the lead in most countries in terms of the number of terrorist acts.

CHAPTER 1. LEGISLATION

1.1. Development of Anti-Discrimination Legislation

In a number of monitoring countries, anti-discrimination legislation was further developed, covering the areas of labour relations, education, and identity. In addition, it is important to emphasise that certain discriminatory initiatives concerning the rights of religious minorities were not adopted by the legislative authorities or were adjusted.

Thus, the General Equality Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG) was amended in 2022 in **Germany**.¹ It was adopted in 2006 and replaced the Employee Protection Act (Beschäftigungsschutzgesetz, BeschSchG), which had been in force since 1994. The law designates 10 categories: gender, ethnic origin, racist or anti-Semitic prejudice, religion and worldview, disability, chronic illness, age, language, sexual and gender identity, and social status. The latest changes were initiated by the ruling coalition of the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP in April 2022.² They were adopted by the Bundestag in three readings in the same month.³ Subsequent additions were approved by the country's parliament in May⁴ and December 2022.⁵

All the adopted amendments (§§4, 25-30) relate in one way or another to the activities of the Federal Office for Combating Discrimination. The functions of the Office have been extended. It can now be contacted by employees who feel aggrieved by maternity leave, the combination of work with caring for a child and/or a seriously ill family member, or problems with the performance of work duties due to illness, disability, accident, or difficult family circumstances. The agency's responsibility to provide specific legal support to persons who have been discriminated against has been strengthened.

The head of the agency is now elected in the Bundestag, and the Act emphasises its independence. The Federal Commissioner for Discrimination has not only more competences but also a stronger political position. In the Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, an expert council of up to 16 specialists was envisaged, but this has been taken out of the

¹ Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz vom 14.08.2006, zuletzt geändert am 19.12.2022, URL: <https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/agg/>

² Änderung des Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes, URL:

<https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2022/kw14-de-gleichbehandlungsgesetz-887866>

³ https://www.antidiskriminierungsstelle.de/SharedDocs/aktuelles/DE/2022/20220407_BT_Debatte_Aenderung_AGG.html#:~:text=Der%20Deutsche%20Bundestag%20hat%20eine,des%20Bundes%20gest%C3%A4rkt%20werden%20soll .

⁴ Synopse zu §25 AGG für Änderung vom 28.05.2022, Rechtsportal Rewis, URL:

<https://rewis.io/aktuell/synopsen/agg/9630/>

⁵ Synopse zu §27 AGG für Änderung vom 25.12.2022, Rechtsportal Rewis, URL:

<https://rewis.io/aktuell/synopsen/agg/10840/>

ministry. All of these steps indicate that the actors of anti-discrimination policy are becoming stronger players in the political field of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Regional anti-discrimination legislation was amended even earlier, especially in the Länder where left-wing parties were in power. In the period 2020-2022, existing laws in the various federal states were amended, which do not directly contain the word "discrimination" in their title and do not deal with this issue directly, but contain paragraphs prohibiting discriminatory practices. It would be beyond the scope of this report to list the laws in all regions of the Federal Republic of Germany, so one of the laws of the state of Berlin is cited as an example. In June 2020, the Berliner Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz (Berliner Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz, LAFG) was passed in Berlin by the votes of the state's governing coalition of the SPD, the Greens, and the Left Party.⁶ According to the author of the report, it is the most comprehensive of the laws currently adopted in Germany and provides the most effective legal framework to protect against discriminatory practices. It provides a much broader interpretation of different types of discrimination than the current federal AGG, even with the 2022 amendments. It is also important that the LAFG aims to protect specifically against discrimination by legal persons, mainly government agencies.

When the bill was being considered by the Berlin parliament, it provoked fierce public debate. The main stumbling blocks in the LAFG were two provisions: the delegation of the power to sue to a public organisation and the need for police officers to prove non-discrimination in their actions in case of complaints. Opponents of the law (MPs and ministers from the CDU/CSU and FDP at various levels and police unions at the time) believed that such a rule violated the presumption of innocence of a police officer, forcing him or her to find excuses, including when acting within the law. In 2020, some state interior ministers and local police chiefs emotionally declared their refusal to send police units to the German capital to assist Berlin's law enforcement forces at public events because they did not want to create difficult legal situations for their subordinates. Certain media outlets have openly questioned whether this law is a "law against the police?"⁷ In June 2021, summing up a year of the law, the Berlin newspaper Tagesspiegel, which cannot be blamed for sympathising with the centre-left, noted that "fears of Berlin's anti-discrimination law proved unfounded." According to the article, this was also recognised by the Metropolitan Police.⁸

⁶ Berliner Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz vom 04.06.2020, URL: <https://www.berlin.de/sen/lads/recht/ladg/materialien/>

⁷ Annelie Kaufmann, Antidiskriminierungsgesetz Berlin. Ein Anti-Polizei-Gesetz? Legal Tribüne Online, 04.06.2020, URL: <https://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/antidiskriminierungsgesetz-berlin-polizei-kritik-vermutungsregelung-gerichte/>

⁸ Andrea Dernbach, Ein Jahr Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetz. Menschenwürde, die konkret wird, Tagesspiegel, 20.06.2021, URL: <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/meinung/menschenwuerde-die-konkret-wird-4257529.html>

In addition, in the process of putting the law into practice, an ombudsman's office for the protection against discrimination and compliance with the principles of equality was established in Berlin.⁹ Importantly, the office accepts complaints under both the state (LAFG) and federal (AGG) anti-discrimination law. From 1.7.2021 to 31.12.2021, the office received 295 state and 159 federal complaints. In the LAFG part, the most common complaints were related to discrimination on the principles of "ethnic origin," "racist prejudice," "disability and chronic illness." In the AGG part, it was discrimination on the basis of gender.¹⁰

The law elicited a positive reaction from anti-discrimination specialists from other federal states. For example, the head of Saxony's Anti-Discrimination Bureau noted that the state needs a "land anti-discrimination law modelled on Berlin."¹¹

It has to be said that Berlin has been a leader in terms of the legislative fight for equality during the monitoring period. Thus, in September 2021, the 2011 Higher Education Act (BerlHG) was amended. Clauses on gender equality in admission and in the process of study were added, the position of the Commissioner for Diversity and Anti-Discrimination was introduced, and it was established that Berlin's higher education institutions would strive for diversity in the ranks of students.¹²

In 2021, Germany also passed the Child Sexual Abuse Act¹³ (approved in the Bundestag in March, approved by the Bundesrat in May, and signed by the Federal President in June). The bill was initiated by the CDU/CSU faction and supported by the then coalition partner, the SPD, as well as the then opposition. Within the meaning of this report, the law is important because it contains, among other things, a list of measures to protect persons who were sexually abused as minors and to prevent discrimination and stigmatisation of victims in society. At the same time, the German Criminal Code (StGB) and the Family Measures Act (FamFG) were amended and supplemented.

⁹ Landesstelle für Gleichbehandlung - gegen Diskriminierung, Ombudsstelle, Berlin, URL: <https://www.berlin.de/sen/lads/recht/ladg/ombudsstelle/>

¹⁰ Senatsverwaltung für Justiz, Vielfalt und Antidiskriminierung, Folgebericht zur Umsetzung des Landesantidiskriminierungsgesetzes (LADG) und des Allgemeinen Gleichbehandlungsgesetzes (AGG) in der Berliner Verwaltung, 0189, vom 18.03.2022, URL: <https://www.parlament-berlin.de/adosservice/19/Haupt/vorgang/h19-0189-v.pdf>

¹¹ Antidiskriminierungsbüro Sachsen, Mehr gemeldete Fälle, Merkur, URL: <https://www.merkur.de/deutschland/sachsen/antidiskriminierungsbuero-sachen-mehr-gemeldete-faelle-zr-92116739.html>

¹² Gesetz über die Hochschulen im Land Berlin (Berliner Hochschulgesetz - BerlHG) vom 26.7.2011, Fassung vom 14.09.2021, URL: <https://gesetze.berlin.de/bsbe/document/jlr-HSchulGBE2011V27IVZ>

¹³ Gesetz zur Bekämpfung sexualisierter Gewalt gegen Kinder vom 16.06.2021, URL: https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav#_bgbl_%2F%2F%5B%540attr_id%3D%27bgbl121s1810.pdf%27%5D_1677769568777

In December 2021, the Italian Parliament adopted Law No. 238/2021, which establishes **Italy's** obligation to implement European Union law into Italian law.¹⁴ Among other things, this law amended the Legislative Decree of 06.02.2003 and implemented Law 2000/78, which added the term “nationality” to the prohibited factors of discrimination. It also extended the scope of the Legislative Decree beyond the field of employment, which constituted the original scope of application of such directive, including access to housing, social, and tax benefits.

In 2020, the Parliament of the Italian Republic began debating a bill on preventing and combating discrimination. It focused on combating discrimination on the grounds of gender, sexual orientation, and disability, as well as on improving the already existing aggravating grounds provided for in the Italian Criminal Code (Articles 604 bis and 604 ter) for offences of discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic origin. The bill was approved by the Chamber of Deputies in November 2020. However, on 27 October 2020, the legislative debate was suspended by the Italian Senate. At the time of writing, there is no evidence that the Discrimination Bill has been debated or presented in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. Undoubtedly, the Discrimination Bill seems to be very important as it expanded the category of vulnerable persons by obliging the judiciary to adopt procedural safeguards to avoid secondary victimisation.

In the **United States**, on his first day in office on 20 January 2021, the new Democratic President Joe Biden issued Executive Order 13988 on preventing and combating discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation.¹⁵ In many ways, this executive order restored the situation prior to the Trump presidency, which restricted, among other things, the rights of transgender people. In June 2022, Biden signed another executive order promoting equality for LGBTQIA+ people, which was received extremely negatively by Republicans in Congress and a number of state legislatures (see below).¹⁶

On 22 February 2023, Biden signed the executive order, "Further Advancing Racial Equity and Supporting Low-Income Communities Through the Federal Government," which calls for each federal agency to establish a department of equity and diversity. The order mentions ethnic and religious minorities, women, sexual minorities, people with disabilities, people living in rural areas, and "persons otherwise affected by persistent poverty or inequality." The executive order

¹⁴ LEGGE 23 dicembre 2021, n. 238, Disposizioni per l'adempimento degli obblighi derivanti dall'appartenenza dell'Italia all'Unione europea - Legge europea 2019-2020. (22G00004) (GU Serie Generale n.12 del 17-01-2022). URL: <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2022/01/17/22G00004/sg>

¹⁵ Executive Order on Preventing and Combating Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity or Sexual Orientation, January 20, 2021//The White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-preventing-and-combating-dismission-on-basis-of-gender-identity-or-sexual-orientation/>.

¹⁶ Executive Order on Advancing Equality for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex Individuals, June 15, 2022//White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/06/15/executive-order-on-advancing-equality-for-lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender-queer-and-intersex-individuals/>

empowers federal government agencies, but not local ones. The order affects employees of the Department of Labour, Health, Human Services, and Education.¹⁷

In January 2023, legislation was reintroduced in the Senate calling for the creation of a Commission to study and develop an African American Reparations Act.¹⁸ The San Francisco Legislature has supported reparation proposals and even proposes to pay a lump sum of \$5 million to eligible black adults.¹⁹ If passed, this legislation would make San Francisco the first city to pay reparations. In 2020, California was already the first US state to create a reparations task force,²⁰ and Evanston, Illinois, was the first US city to fund reparations through taxes in 2021.²¹ Boston also established a task force the same year.²²

On 13 December 2022, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted Law No. 8224 "On national minorities (communities) in Ukraine."²³ The bill, which was one of the main conditions for the country's accession to the European Union, proposes to establish that a national minority of Ukraine is a group of Ukrainian *citizens* who are not ethnic Ukrainians, who traditionally reside on the territory of Ukraine, who are united by common ethnic, cultural, historical, linguistic or religious features, who are aware of their belonging to it, and who show a desire to preserve and develop their linguistic, cultural, and religious identity.

National minorities are guaranteed the rights to self-identification, to peaceful assembly, and to use the national minority language, including in education. National minorities are given the opportunity to publish media in their own language, duplicate signboards and election campaigning, posters, and cultural events. It is also proposed to provide for the establishment of consultative bodies to deal with national minority issues. Direct and indirect discrimination against

¹⁷ FURTHER ADVANCING RACIAL EQUITY AND SUPPORT FOR UNDERSERVED COMMUNITIES THROUGH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. EXECUTIVE ORDER 14091, February 16, 2023/National Archives and Records Administration. URL: <https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2023-03779.pdf>

¹⁸ Booker Reintroduces Legislation to Form Commission for Study of Reparation Proposals for African Americans//Cory Booker, January 24, 2023. URL: <https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-reintroduces-legislation-to-form-commission-for-study-of-reparation-proposals-for-african-americans>

¹⁹ Nicole Chavez and Justin Gamble, San Francisco reparations committee proposes a \$5 million payment to each Black resident//CNN, January 19, 2023. URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/01/19/us/san-francisco-reparations-proposal-reaj/index.html>

²⁰ Taryn Luna, California task force will consider paying reparations for slavery/Los Angeles Times, September 30, 2020. URL: <https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-09-30/california-task-force-reparations-slavery-gavin-newsom-shirley-weber>

²¹ Evanston, Illinois, becomes first U.S. city to pay reparations to Black residents/NBC News, March 21, 2023. URL: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/evanston-illinois-becomes-first-us-city-pay-reparations-blacks-n1261791>.

²² MEMBERS OF REPARATIONS TASK FORCE ANNOUNCED//CITY OF BOSTON, FEBRUARY 07, 2023. URL: <HTTPS://WWW.BOSTON.GOV/NEWS/MEMBERS-REPARATIONS-TASK-FORCE-ANNOUNCED>

²³ Закон України «Про національні меншини (спільноти) України», 13.12.2022//Верховна Рада України. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2827-20#Text>

persons belonging to national minorities is also prohibited. In the event of infringement of the rights of minorities, their representatives may apply to the courts or seek protection of their rights by other legal means.

The adopted draft law on national minorities has become somewhat better than the initial versions. Some amendments to the law of national minorities and expert organisations have been taken into account. Nevertheless, the law does not address the issues of the full-fledged study of the language of national minorities, the use of their language in the judicial system and in the mass media, and the issue of ensuring compact residence. All the restrictions that are present in the already existing legislation, in particular, in the law "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language" and the law "On Education," have been retained. In addition, the law contains clear discriminatory provisions. In particular, Article 5.6 enshrines the possibility to restrict "the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to national minorities (communities) in accordance with the law, if such restriction is necessary in a democratic society," which contradicts Art. 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Thus, the law does not reach the level of protection and opportunities for national minorities and the possibility of their development, especially national languages, which was prescribed in the Constitution of Ukraine and in the cancelled 2018 Law of Ukraine "On the Fundamentals of State Language Policy."

On 20.06.2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law of Ukraine No. 2319-IX "On ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence."²⁴ Its main meaning is the obligation to protect women from violence and various forms of discrimination. Opponents of the convention draw attention to the fact that the document implies protection, among other things, from discrimination on the basis of gender. That is, it will be another reference in Ukrainian legislation to gender, which is perceived by opponents as a broader concept than male and female sex. Ratification of this convention was one of the requirements for Ukraine's candidate status to the European Union.

The Istanbul Convention is an international agreement of the Council of Europe. It is signed by 45 countries and the European Union. Ukraine joined it in 2011, but the convention has not yet been ratified by the Rada.

On 15 February 2022, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Law No. 5110²⁵ "On Amending Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine to Implement the Provisions of the Law of Ukraine 'On

²⁴ Про ратифікацію Конвенції Ради Європи про запобігання насильству стосовно жінок і домашньому насильству та боротьбу із цими явищами, 20.02.2022// Верховна Рада України. URL: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2319-20#Text>

²⁵ Евгения Луценко, В Украине появится уголовная ответственность за антисемитизм. Рада приняла законопроект//Hromadske, 15 февраля 2022 г. URL: <https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/v-ukraine-poyavitsya-ugolovnaya-otvetstvennost-za-antisemitizm-rada-prinyala-zakonoproekt>

Preventing and Combating Anti-Semitism in Ukraine'." The amendments introduced by the new law concern Article 161 of the Criminal Code on violation of equal rights of citizens depending on their race, nationality, religious beliefs, disability, and other characteristics. Now the article is to be supplemented with words for "manifestations of anti-Semitism."

According to the document, anti-Semitism will be punishable by a fine of 200 to 500 tax-free minimum incomes of citizens from 3,400 to 8,500 hryvnias (85 to 212 euros at the NBU exchange rate), or the restriction of freedom for up to 5-8 years, and the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to 3 years or without such. The law also penalises violence, deception, and threats. For this, one can be fined from UAH 8,500 to UAH 17,000 (EUR 212 to EUR 425 at the NBU exchange rate) or face imprisonment from 2 to 5 years with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions. If the actions envisaged by parts one and two were committed by an organized group or entailed grave consequences, it is punishable by imprisonment from 5 to 8 years.

At the same time, it is still unclear whether the law was signed by the President after its adoption; the map of the bill's passage at the time of writing the report did not mention anything about it.²⁶ Accordingly, at the time of writing the Report, this law has not yet entered into force, which is probably due to the fact that in the conditions of war, the authorities do not want to further "irritate" the so-called national-patriotic part of society.

In February 2022, **Serbia** adopted the Law on Social Entrepreneurship, which improved the situation of Roma and other vulnerable persons.²⁷

During the monitoring period, legislators and courts in a number of countries worked to block or correct discriminatory laws and draft laws to varying degrees of effectiveness. The first place to mention is **France**, whose parliament rejected all discriminatory initiatives of the Rassemblement Nationale (Rassemblement Nationale). All the laws drafted by the 89 deputies of this faction since their election in June 2022 have been rejected by the committees of the National Assembly.²⁸ Law No. 3844, put forward by Marine Le Pen with the aim of "fighting Islamic ideologies," but actually aimed at restricting the civil liberties of Muslim believers, also failed to

²⁶ Проект Закону про внесення змін до статі 161 Кримінального кодексу України для реалізації положень Закону України "Про запобігання та протидію антисемітизму в Україні"
<https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/CardByRn?regNum=5110&conv=9>

²⁷ New Law on Social entrepreneurship in Serbia/Social Economic News. URL: <https://www.socialeconomynews.eu/en/new-law-on-social-entrepreneurship-in-serbia/>

²⁸ Maxence Kagni, Niche Parlemetaire du Rassemblement National: Les Propositions de Loi du RN Rejetrees par le Commissions de L'Assemblee//LCP, 14 décembre 2022. URL: <https://lcp.fr/actualites/niche-parlementaire-du-rassemblement-national-les-propositions-de-loi-du-rn-rejetees-par>

reach the floor as it was rejected at committee level on 9 February 2021.²⁹ Thus, the ban on the hijab in public space and the ritual slaughter of livestock, favoured by the RN and Reconquête, the party of Eric Zemmour, were not voted on.

The bill was not only directed against Muslims, but also affected the interests of religious Jews, as its ban also applied to the Jewish kippah. However, in an interview with the German weekly *Die Zeit*, published on 6 May 2021, Marine Le Pen said that the French government had to violate the rights of Jews because the hijab is "an expression of Islamism" that must be eradicated" and "it is impossible to issue a law targeting a specific religion in France." According to Le Pen, this would not be too great a sacrifice for the Jews of France because "in any case [Jews] can no longer wear yarmulkes because they are constantly attacked [by Islamists]."³⁰ For the same reason, the Rassemblement Nationale intends to ban the slaughter of kosher meat in France.

On 20 April 2021, the Supreme Court of the **Canadian** province of Quebec found undue harm to individuals who wear religious symbols and struck down certain parts of Bill 21 or the Secularism of the State Act (*Loi sur la laïcité de l'État*), passed in 2019, as unconstitutional. This bill prohibits certain public servants in senior positions from wearing religious symbols such as the turban, kippah, and hijab at work. This group includes teachers, police officers, and judges. In practice, the law discriminates against and encourages the harassment of religious people, especially Hindus, Muslims, and Jews. Meanwhile, civil society institutions, together with scholars specialising in Islamophobia, have proven that there is a direct link between Quebec's Bill 21, and the rise in hate crimes. Women (especially those who wear hijabs) have become, since the adoption of this law, the first and most frequent victims of microaggressions (negative comments and degrading attitudes, whether intentional or not) in everyday life.³¹

Nevertheless, the court upheld many of the recognised violations, most notably the ban on the *display of* religious symbols in public service in the performance of their civil duties. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association has already filed new lawsuits against the bill in December 2021. At the time of this report, the restrictions remained in place.

On 14 January 2020, the Constitutional Court of the **Russian Federation** issued a ruling on a complaint filed by the Association of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Russia (Mormons). The CC confirmed the right of religious organisations to hold religious services in

²⁹ N° 3844, PROPOSITION DE LOI *visant à combattre les idéologies islamistes*//ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE. CONSTITUTION DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958. QUINZIÈME LÉGISLATURE, 9 février 2021. URL: https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/textes/l15b3844_proposition-loi

³⁰ Marine Le Pen voudrait interdire le voile et la kippa dans l'espace public, 07/05/21. URL: <https://www.reforme.net/actualite/2021/05/07/marine-le-pen-voudrait-interdire-le-voile-et-la-kippa-dans-lespace-public/>

³¹ Islamophobia in Canada//Canadian Encyclopedia, January 26, 2023. URL: <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/Islamophobia>

administrative buildings - both those belonging to the religious organisation and those provided to it by the owners. It also confirmed the right of the owner to provide his residential premises to a religious organisation for the holding of religious services.³²

On 3 November 2020, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation issued a ruling on the case concerning the verification of the constitutionality of part 3 of Art. 3 of Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences and paragraph 8 of Article 8 of the Federal Law "On Freedom of Conscience" in connection with a complaint by the Word of Life Church of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Dolgoprudny). According to the court, if the services of a religious organisation are held in only part of a building, rather than the entire building, and there are appropriate signs within the building indicating the full name of the organisation and entrance to the service premises, these organisations should not be held administratively liable for the absence of their name on the façade of said building. A religious organisation should also not be held liable if no divine services are held in a residential building whose address is indicated in the registration certificate as the address of the religious organisation.³³

On 28 October 2021, a meeting of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Russia was held, at which Resolution No. 32 "On Amendments to Certain Resolutions of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in Criminal Cases" was adopted. The Plenum decided that only direct intent and a special purpose should be identified for extremist offences. The expression of judgements in scientific or political discussions and texts that are not related to the intention to incite others to extremism does not qualify as extremism. If a religious organisation is found to be extremist, its members may exercise their rights to freedom of religion alone, but only if they do not attempt to continue the activities of the banned organisation.³⁴

These decisions are important in light of Russian criminal practice, where members of banned religious organisations (e.g. Jehovah's Witnesses) have been prosecuted under heavy anti-extremist articles of the Criminal Code, although their actual activities consisted only of religious ceremonies. On 9 February 2022, during a meeting of judges of courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts, Supreme Court Chairman Vyacheslav Lebedev stressed that religious rites and ceremonies cannot be considered extremist crimes. "Higher standards of protection of the

³² Конституционный Суд РФ подтвердил право религиозных организаций проводить богослужения в административных зданиях//Религия и право, 6 февраля 2020 года. URL: http://www.sclj.ru/news/detail.php?SECTION_ID=519&ELEMENT_ID=8208

³³ Постановление Конституционного суда РФ от 3 ноября 2020 г. № 45-П//RGRU, 13 ноября 2020 г. URL: <https://rg.ru/documents/2020/11/13/ks-rf-dok.html>

³⁴ ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ПЛЕНУМА ВЕРХОВНОГО СУДА РФ ОТ 28 ОКТЯБРЯ 2021 Г. N 32 "О ВНЕСЕНИИ ИЗМЕНЕНИЙ В НЕКОТОРЫЕ ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЯ ПЛЕНУМА ВЕРХОВНОГО СУДА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ ПО УГОЛОВНЫМ ДЕЛАМ"//ИНФОРМАЦИОННО-ПРАВОВОЙ ПОРТАЛ «ГАРАНТ.РУ». URL: <HTTPS://WWW.GARANT.RU/HOTLAW/FEDERAL/1492885/>

constitutional rights of citizens are ensured by the Supreme Court's clarifications that actions that do not contain signs of extremism and consist solely in the exercise of the right to freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, including through the performance of religious rites and ceremonies, do not form a corpus delicti," he said.³⁵

1.2. Legislation - Discriminatory Trends

First of all, it is necessary to mention the abolition of the right to abortion in the United States, which was introduced back in 1973. On 22 June 2022, the United States Supreme Court overturned the 50-year-old Roe v. Wade case, in which states were not allowed to prohibit abortion for women in the first three months of pregnancy. In fact, various court cases over the years have negated the standards of the 1973 decision, until finally, in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organisation), the Supreme Court completely overturned Roe v. Wade, returning full authority to state governments to regulate abortion.³⁶ As a result, in less than a year after this decision almost half of the states in the U.S. banned abortion and forced people to travel to states where abortion is legal. Thus, as of 4 April 2023, only six states (Alaska, Oregon, Colorado, New Mexico, Vermont, and New Jersey) do not limit the deadline for when abortion is still legal; and fourteen states now ban abortion at any stage.³⁷

This is the first time in U.S. history that a court has taken away a fundamental right, since the 14th Amendment to the country's Constitution implicates the right to privacy, which, as SC Justice Harry Blackmun pointed out in his 1973 opinion, "is broad enough to also encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy." It is clear that the decision discriminates against primarily poor women, especially women of colour, African Americans and, Latinas.

During the monitoring period, some Republican-dominated state legislatures passed discriminatory laws that curtailed some diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives, including banning the teaching of Critical Racial Theory in schools (a measure that, at the time of this writing, has been implemented in sixteen states, including Texas and Florida)³⁸ and removing

³⁵ В ВС заявили, что религиозные обряды не могут считаться экстремизмом//ТАСС, 9 февраля 2022 г. URL: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/13659017>

³⁶ U.S. Supreme Court Takes Away the Constitutional Right to Abortion/Center for Reproductive Rights, 06.24.2022. URL: <https://reproductiverights.org/supreme-court-takes-away-right-to-abortion/>

³⁷ Julia Haines, Kaia Hubbard, and Christopher Wolf, Where State Abortion Laws Stand Without Roe//U.S. News, June 6, 2023. URL: <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/a-guide-to-abortion-laws-by-state>

³⁸ States That Have Banned Critical Race Theory//Wisevoter. URL: <https://wisevoter.com/state-rankings/states-that-have-banned-critical-race-theory/>

some "progressive" books from libraries.³⁹ These measures will inevitably lead to further discrimination. According to conservatives, DEI initiatives have been manipulated "to promote policies that clearly favour some demographic groups to the detriment of others."⁴⁰

Anti-DEI legislation is the result of the culture war of "woke" (woke) versus "anti-woke" (anti-woke) that began during the Trump presidency and culminated under Biden. In April 2021, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed the Stop WOKE Act into law. It is now illegal in Florida to teach that members of one identity group are morally superior or, conversely, inherently racist, sexist and oppressive, or privileged or oppressed (former slaves) because of their identity.

On 22 July 2021, President of Ukraine V. Zelensky signed the Law "On Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine." The law defines an indigenous people, fixes which peoples are recognised as indigenous, and what advantages they receive in the cultural, educational, informational, and political spheres.⁴¹ According to the new law, the indigenous peoples of Ukraine are "an autochthonous ethnic community that was formed on the territory of Ukraine, is the bearer of a distinctive language and culture, has traditional, social, cultural or representative bodies, self-identifies as the indigenous people of Ukraine, constitutes an ethnic minority within its population and does not have its own state formation outside of Ukraine." Thus, Russians, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Jews, etc. were outside the law. As a result, the list of indigenous peoples includes Crimean Tatars, Krymchaks, and Karaites, i.e., those peoples who live in Crimea. (on the territory not actually controlled by Ukraine).

Interestingly, the Karaites are an ethnic group living not only in Ukraine, but also in Lithuania and Israel. In Israel they are considered Jews because they practice non-Talmudic Judaism and are subject to the Law of Return. The Crimeans in general are a Jewish ethnolinguistic Turkic-speaking group practising Talmudic (traditional) Judaism. Almost the entire community of the Krymchaks was completely destroyed in the fire of the Holocaust. Only a few hundred representatives of this people remain, who live mostly in Israel. In other words, historically for Karaites and Krymchaks, as well as for Jews, the historic homeland is still the territory of the current Jewish state. However, the Ruthenians, for example, who self-identify as a separate ethnic community with no state entity of their own in the world, obviously fit the definition of indigenous and live in western Ukraine, but are not included in the list of indigenous peoples.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Kate McGee, Gov. Greg Abbott tells state agencies to stop considering diversity in hiring//The Texas Tribune, Feb.7, 2023. URL: <https://www.texastribune.org/2023/02/07/greg-abbott-diversity-equity-inclusion-illegal/>

⁴¹ Проект Закону про корінні народи України// Верховна Рада України. URL: http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=71931

Indigenous peoples of Ukraine are guaranteed special rights. Firstly, they include financing of their representative bodies from the state budget, the possibility to establish public schools with instruction in their native language,⁴² national mass media with broadcasting in their native language and state support, permanent representation in government bodies, and so on. Secondly, it is the right to observe, revive, and develop their spiritual, religious and cultural traditions and customs, to preserve their tangible and intangible cultural heritage and even their toponymy. Thirdly, legal protection against discrimination, primarily forced eviction, forced assimilation, and incitement to racial, ethnic and religious hatred directed against them (it must be assumed that similar rights are not guaranteed to other national minorities in Ukraine). Fourthly and finally, Article 2 of the Law guarantees them protection "against acts of genocide or any other acts of collective coercion or violence," which again raises the question of whether similar guarantees exist for other national minorities.

Given that Ukraine does not control the territory of Crimea, where most of the indigenous peoples live, the rights given to them remain on paper, and the law itself has primarily political declarative purposes. In addition, the law objectively introduces an element of inter-ethnic tension, as it singled out and endowed only three national minorities with fundamental rights, effectively declaring the absence of such rights for other ethnic minorities in the country.

A traditional problem remains the refusal of states to recognise their national minorities (e.g. the Ruthenians in Ukraine). This process was set in motion with the signing of the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Rights of National Minorities, when a number of countries adopted reservations as to which peoples should be considered national minorities. In 2021, **Poland** held a census that revealed a significant decrease in the number of Silesians and Wilamians, ethnic minorities that the official authorities had not recognised as such for many years on the grounds that their language was recognised as a "dialect of Polish."

According to Article 8.4 of the Law on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language of 6 January 2005, they are guaranteed the right to be taught in their mother tongue. Article 9 regulates the use of a minority language as an auxiliary language at the commune level if the number of inhabitants belonging to the minority is at least 20 per cent. Article 14 further clarifies that the ratio of the number of inhabitants of the commune belonging to different national and ethnic groups shall be recorded according to the results of the population census.

In the 2011 National Population and Housing Census, more than 840,000 people indicated their Silesian ethnic identification either as the only one (more than 370,000 respondents) or as co-

⁴² The law "On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as a State Language" and the law "On Education" abolished state schools for ethnic minorities - *eds.*

existing with others (including Polish). This fact has been essentially ignored by the Polish state - so far, despite the fact that more than 10 years have passed since the census, the state authorities have not taken any action that could lead to granting the Silesian community the right to preserve and develop its own identity, similar to that enjoyed by national and ethnic minorities under the above-mentioned law and Article 35 of the Constitution.⁴³ According to the results of the 2021 census, the number of people who called themselves Silesians had fallen to 585,700, indicating strong assimilationist tendencies towards that people. In fact, the Polish Government directly opposes the cultivation of the Silesian identity as an ethnic identity, recognising the Silesian speech as a dialect of the Polish language and the Silesians themselves as a regional community - an integral part of the Polish nation.

Poland also does not recognize the now small Vilam community and does not support its initiatives to revitalise the Vilam language and related culture. The de facto preserved identity of the Vilamovians also requires guarantees under the provisions of the Law on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language.⁴⁴

The granting of minority status requires amendments to the Law on Minorities and depends entirely on the political will of the authorities. Political will is also required to grant regional status to a language used by a certain community, which, on the basis of the Minorities Act, leads to the granting of specific rights and guarantees. In the period after the adoption of the law, several bills on amending it were submitted to the Parliament, proposing either to add the Silesian community to the catalogue of ethnic minorities or to recognise Silesian as well as Vilamian as a regional language. Work on these proposals at various stages ended in failure. The 2021 census showed that there was inaction on the part of the legislators, which could soon lead to the disappearance of two ethnic minorities as a result of forced assimilation processes.

During the monitoring period, amendments to the **German** Basic Law, which may indirectly have discriminatory consequences for racial and ethnic minorities, were actively discussed in Germany. This is the intention to exclude from Article 3 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany the reference to race as a ground on which no discrimination can take place. The proponents of amending the constitution cite the following arguments: the definition of "race" is outdated in itself and even racist. Modern science denies the existence of "races" as understood in the 18th and 20th centuries. The mentioning of this word, albeit with a positive context, a prohibition of discrimination, is unacceptable.

⁴³ A. Skóra, The language problem of minorities in a homogeneous state. Comments on the example of the legal status of the Silesian, Kashubian and Wymysorys languages in Poland, "Studia Prawnoustrojowe" 2021, nr 54, s. 563. 563.

⁴⁴ Kurzyńska-Chmiel D. Aktualna sytuacja prawna mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem praw w dziedzinie oświaty // Studia Prawnoustrojowe. 2022. № 55.

In June 2020, the then Minister of Justice, Christine Lambrecht, declared her support in principle for such changes. The signal from the Green Party was also positive.⁴⁵ In November 2020, they released their version of the bill, in which they proposed not only to strike out the word "race" but also to introduce a new concept, "group harm to human dignity."⁴⁶ The Left Party was also in favour and filed its own version of the bill in July 2020.⁴⁷ At the same time, the first preliminary hearings were held in the Bundestag, which indicated a steady majority in favour of the changes.

The matter was still under consideration. The Federal Commissioner against Discrimination, Ferda Ataman, regretted that the amendment of the Basic Law had not yet been implemented.⁴⁸ The fact that there are no amendments does not indicate that the deputies are unwilling to accept them. In the current coalition consisting of the SPD, the Greens, and the FDP, there is a solid majority in favour of change. To this majority can be added the opposition votes of the CDU/CSU and the Left Party. Of the parliamentary parties, only the Alternative for Germany is opposed. The problem lies in the very high barriers to changing the country's Basic Law and the difficulty of finding the right wording that will not be discriminatory, but will at the same time make discrimination inadmissible. Similar processes at the land level are proceeding at a markedly faster pace. In August 2022, the ruling coalition in the state of Hamburg decided to remove the word "race" from the text of land laws.⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the forthcoming constitutional amendments are not harmless, but entail serious problems in terms of protection against discrimination. After all, you can remove the word "race" from the legislation, but it will not affect the colour of a person's skin. The point is that without the noun "race" the adjective "racist" loses its meaning, which will make it more difficult to define racism and prosecute the corresponding violations and discriminatory practices. Moreover, the authors of the Basic Law in the late 1940s obviously intended the word to have a very different meaning, in the spirit of democracy and equality, rather than racism and even Nazism, as some proponents of the changes claim.

⁴⁵ Constanze von Bullion, Grüne wollen das Wort "Rasse" aus dem Grundgesetz streichen, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.06.2020, URL: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/rassismus-rasse-verfassung-gruene-1.4933809>

⁴⁶ Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 3 Absatz 3 - Ersetzung des Wortes Rasse und Ergänzung zum Schutz gegen gegen gruppenbezogene Menschenwürdeverletzungen) // Deutscher Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 19/24434. URL: <https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/244/1924434.pdf>

⁴⁷ Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Änderung des Artikels 3 Absatz 3 - Streichung des Begriffs Rasse)// Deutscher Bundestag, 19. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 19/20628. URL: <https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/19/206/1920628.pdf>

⁴⁸ Dritter Jahrestag von Hanau. Ataman bescheinigt Deutschland Rassismus-Problem, Tagesspiegel, 18.02.2023, URL: <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/dritter-jahrestag-von-hanau-ataman-bescheinigt-deutschland-rassismus-problem-9373250.html>

⁴⁹ Auswechslung des Begriffs "Rasse" in Hamburger Landesgesetzen, Legal Tribüne Online, 23.08.2022, URL: <https://www.lto.de/recht/nachrichten/n/hamburg-justiz-gesetzesentwurf-begiff-rasse-rassismus-rassistisch-diskriminierung/>

1.3. Anti-Extremist Legislation

There is no single, globally accepted definition of extremism. There are three main models that guide countries. These are the so-called "American" model, which recognises only violent extremism, i.e. terrorism and everything related to it, including propaganda, justification, training of terrorists, etc., as subject to criminal prosecution. The "European" model, which criminalises not only violent extremism, but also so-called "hate extremism," meaning the spread of hatred towards not only individuals, but also social groups, as well as the similar "Shanghai" model of extremism.

The "European" model of extremism is based on a number of European international documents. This is Article 13 of the 2003 PACE Resolution No. 1344 "On the threat to democracy from extremist parties and movements in Europe," which calls on the member states of the Council of Europe to "provide in their legislation for the possibility of *restricting freedom of expression, assembly and association for the purpose of combating extremism,*" while respecting the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights. This is PACE Resolution No. 1754 (2010), which identifies several forms of extremism that it is proposed to combat - racism, xenophobia, and intolerance, "including in light of the growing popularity among voters of parties professing racist ideas,"⁵⁰ as well as Muslim fundamentalism.⁵¹ This is also Article 10(2) of the ECHR, which, as mentioned above, states that the exercise of the freedom to hold opinions and the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas "may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or sanctions as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public order, for the prevention of disorder."


The provisions of these instruments are based on Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), which states that States parties condemn the dissemination of hatred and "declare as an offence punishable by law any dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred" and "declare illegal and prohibit organisations and organised and all other propaganda activities that promote and incite racial discrimination and recognize participation in such activities."

⁵⁰ Fight against extremism: achievements, deficiencies and failures. Resolution 1754 (2010) // Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe. URL: <https://pace.coe.int/pdf/53f0236cc815b3e4910d3adf1628681fc418a4620b2a2ca7da2cb9ee27a8e2af/res.%201754.pdf>

⁵¹ Ibid, point 3.

The "Shanghai" definition is similar to the "European" definition, but contains a number of differences. It was formulated on 15 June 2001 at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) conference in the Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism signed by the participating countries, and then modernised in the SCO Convention on Countering Extremism on 9 June 2017. The Shanghai model views extremism as a "violent and unconstitutional" way of resolving "political, social, racial, national and religious conflicts." Unlike the European definition, the Shanghai model declares extremism not only incitement of racial, ethnic, and religious hatred, but also political and social discord.

Diagram #1. Ratio of violent and hate extremism ("American," "European," and "Shanghai" models)



Each of them has its own shortcomings. The "American" model is absolutely concrete, emphasising violence but overlooking the activity that leads to it, i.e. the spread of hatred. The

“European” model is rather vague, as it does not contain a clear definition of “hate speech,” etc., which poses a threat to democratic freedoms, but it allows the situation not to escalate to violence. The “Shanghai” model of extremism is criticized both for its even broader formulation, especially in terms of inciting political discord, and for the lack of a unified approach to the principle of “constitutionality,” which is interpreted differently in each country depending on the specifics of national legislation.

In fact, the choice of definition, and consequently the model of countering extremism on which anti-extremism legislation is based, is primarily determined by the conflict between the principles of democracy and security interests, which is influenced by political traditions, the level of terrorist risks of a particular country and the mood of the electorate.

The trend of choosing security at the expense of democratic values over the last 20 years has encompassed more and more countries. These include all the republics of the former Soviet Union, including the Baltic States and Ukraine, the SCO countries, France, Italy, Germany, partly Greece, Poland and Britain (Scotland), Spain, Canada, and others. These countries are moving away from the violent extremism model by criminalising the incitement and spread of hatred, although they often do not use the term "extremism" itself.

The position of the above-mentioned countries was most clearly expressed by Ms Sarah Khan, the British government's independent advisor on extremism, who introduced the very term "hate extremism" into legal usage. In 2019, she produced her findings in a report entitled "Countering Hate Extremism," in which she described it as a behavior:

- which may *incite and intensify hatred*, or manifest persistent hatred, or allow for *ambiguous language* about violence and the *presentation of moral justifications for violence*;
- which is based on hateful, hostile or racist beliefs directed against an alien *group* that is perceived as a threat to the well-being, survival or success of the internal group (defined as the victim);
- that causes or is likely to cause harm to individuals, *communities* or *society as a whole*.⁵²

Importantly, in justifying the need for a broader interpretation of the term "extremism," the British Commission on Counter Extremism has determined that examples of incitement to hatred of others can include active hate propaganda against minorities "from far-right demonstrations in Sunderland or activists from Hizb ut-Tahrir, to spreading hate-filled views on LGBTQ people."⁵³ In other words, we are not talking about threats to specific individuals, which fits perfectly into

⁵²GOV.UK, official website of the UK Government. "Independent adviser calls for overhaul of extremism strategy."
"URL: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/independent-advisor-calls-for-overhaul-of-extremism-strategy>

⁵³ Ibid.

the "American" model of violent extremism, but about *provoking hatred towards* social groups (and not only on ethnic grounds). In fact, this is the *main difference between the two models*.

During the period under review, changes in anti-extremist legislation took place in a number of monitoring countries. First of all, it is necessary to mention a sensational event that most clearly demonstrates the development of a trend in favour of legislators choosing security interests over freedom of speech and expression, even in such citadels of Anglo-Saxon law as the **United Kingdom**. There, in March 2021, the Scottish Parliament passed the Hate Crime and Public Order Bill.⁵⁴ The law was promoted very long and painfully because of fears of an attack on one of the fundamental freedoms - freedom of speech.⁵⁵ However, the legal threshold for hate crimes - through the new offence of "incitement to hatred" - has now been lowered.

In 2021, **Canada** passed Bill C-36, which declared online hate speech a form of discrimination.⁵⁶ The law defines hate speech as "content that expresses disgust or vilification of a person or *group of persons*," including online, which significantly changes the country's model for countering extremism.

In 2021, a new law against right-wing extremism and hate crimes (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der Hasskriminalität) came into force in **Germany**.⁵⁷ Its main novelty is that, for the first time, threats and hate speech on the Internet, including against social groups, are emphasised. In addition, the law increased the level of protection for *municipal* politicians, who are the most frequent targets of threats, libel and slander but, unlike major federal politicians, had not previously been in the public spotlight.

Dissemination of deliberately false information to discredit a politician at all levels has become a criminal offence, and liability for such actions has now been increased. Insult, including in writing, disturbing public peace by threatening to use violence, violent acts and threats to commit such acts against family members and property of socially active figures (murder, kidnapping, injury, etc.), approval of violent actions in public space, and a number of other offences are also now more strictly punishable. Threats of murder or rape on social media are now punishable by up to three years' imprisonment, while insult is punishable by up to two years' imprisonment. Anti-Semitic motivation has been recognised as an aggravating factor in the

⁵⁴ Hate Crime and Public Order (Scotland) Act 2021. URL:

<https://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2021/14/enacted/data.pdf>

⁵⁵ Brian Monteith, Changes to Scottish Hate Crime Bill 'under active consideration'//The Scotsman, 27th Oct. 2020. URL: <https://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/changes-to-scottish-hate-crime-bill-under-active-consideration-3016666>

⁵⁶ Bill C-36. House of Commons of Canada, June 23, 2021. URL: <https://parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/bill/C-36/first-reading>

⁵⁷ Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der Hasskriminalität vom 30.03.2021, URL: <https://dejure.org/BGBl/2021/BGBl. I S. 441>

commission of offences. The protection of representatives of emergency services, such as ambulance personnel and rescue workers, has been strengthened. The liability of social network administration companies has been sharply increased for insufficient fight against extremist appeals and the use of hate speech, for the publication of banned symbols, incitement of ethnic hatred, distribution of child pornography, and a number of other offences.⁵⁸ Facebook, Whatsapp, Gmail, Tinder, and other social networks have been granted a transitional period until 1 February 2022, after which they are obliged to register and hand over criminal content and information about its authors, including IP address, to law enforcers.⁵⁹

The law has received support from various sectors of society. Lawyers and journalists felt it was right to provide a better level of protection for potential victims of verbal abuse, simplifying the mechanisms for investigative procedures and the possibility of punishing perpetrators - however, commentators stressed the need to strike a balance and not to confuse offences with freedom of expression, although it is clear that any restrictions on online expression inevitably affects freedom of speech and expression.⁶⁰ In December 2022, the Civil Servants' Association called it "a step in the right direction" and emphasised that civil servants are a segment of the population that often has to face insults and threats.⁶¹ In February 2022, the adaptation of other legislation to the new law was customized, including the amendment of seven paragraphs of the German Criminal Code (increased liability).

On 20 February 2021, the **Greek** Parliament passed Law No. 4779/2021, which transposes the amended EU Directive 2018/1808/EC (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) into Greek law. The law regulates audiovisual media in all forms of promotion and reproduction; namely, traditional television, customised audiovisual services, video sharing platforms, and social media services exclusively in relation to their user-generated audiovisual content. Article 8 of Law 4779/2021 provides that audiovisual media services shall not contain incitement to violence or hatred against a group of people or a member of a group, as defined by race, colour, national or

⁵⁸ Manfred Pühl, Neue Gesetze gegen Rechtsextremismus und Hasskriminalität. Was steht drin. DEMO, 14.07.2021, URL: <https://www.demo-online.de/blog/neue-gesetze-gegen-rechtsextremismus-hasskriminalitaet-steht-drin>

⁵⁹ Rechtsextremismus und Hass im Netz. BKA rechnet mit 150.000 Strafverfahren, Heise online, 11.01.2022, URL: <https://www.heise.de/news/Rechtsextremismus-und-Hass-im-Netz-BKA-rechnet-mit-150-000-Strafverfahren-6323020.html>

⁶⁰ Schacrzad Osterer, Was bringt das neue Gesetz gegen Hasskriminalität im Netz? BR, 08.04.2021, URL: <https://www.br.de/nachrichten/netzwelt/was-bedeutet-das-neue-gesetz-gegen-hasskriminalitaet-im-netz,SUOFH2J>

⁶¹ Gespräch im Bundesjustizministerium. Pakt für den Rechtsstaat: dbb drängt weiter auf Verstetigung, DBB, 13.12.2022, URL: <https://www.dbb.de/artikel/pakt-fuer-den-rechtsstaat-dbb-draengt-weiter-auf-verstetigung.html>

ethnic origin, ancestry, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity, or sex characteristics.⁶²

In December 2022, following a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ordering **Bulgaria** to pay compensation to the mother of a young man murdered on homophobic grounds in 2008, the country's Council of Ministers proposed amendments to the Criminal Code that would make homophobia an aggravating circumstance for certain crimes against the person, including murder. Until then, aggravating circumstances in the law had been exclusively racial and ethnic hatred or hatred based on nationality. The law provided for increased penalties for murder or physical assault on these grounds alone, but not on grounds such as disability, gender, etc. Now a homophobic motive has been added to the criteria for hate crimes. Bulgarian anti-extremist legislation does not criminalise the spread of hatred.

On 18 February 2021, the European Commission found that **Poland had** failed to comply with EU law by incorrectly transposing Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain forms and manifestations of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. According to the Commission, the provisions of Polish criminal law incorrectly transpose the provisions of the Decision concerning incitement to racist and xenophobic hate speech and limit the scope of criminalisation of incitement to hatred.⁶³ The Decision states that the lack of clear qualification in the nature of hate crime offences creates abuses in the registration of reports, police intervention, acceptance of statements by courts, and even in the court process itself.

The Russian Federation adopted the most anti-extremist laws during the period under review. On 8 December 2020, the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) and the Criminal Code (CC) of the Russian Federation were amended to address responsibility for separatism and calls for it.

Also, in Russia during the period under review, a number of laws were adopted restricting the rights of individuals previously convicted of extremism, including a ban on being elected to the legislature (4 June 2021).⁶⁴ In addition, individuals who are known to be involved in extremist and terrorist activities and whose details are on the relevant official list were banned from holding positions in the aviation sector.

⁶² Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era. Country Report: Greece/EUI - Center for media pluralism and media freedom (Robert Schuman Centre), June 2022. URL:

<https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/74691/MPM2022-Greece-EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

⁶³ Krzysztof Sobczak, Walka z mową nienawiści w Polsce wciąż bez strategii, 23.03.23. URL:

<https://www.prawo.pl/prawnicy-sady/strategia-przeciwdzialania-mowie-nienawisci-w-polsce-nie,507239.html>

⁶⁴ Путин запретил экстремистам участвовать в выборах//Право RU, 4 июня 2021 года. URL:

<https://pravo.ru/news/232252/>

On 30 December 2021, a law was adopted amending Article 15.3 of the federal law "On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection," according to which information containing calls for mass disorder and extremist activity, as well as information materials of organisations prohibited under the law "On Countering Extremist Activity" or "On Countering Terrorism," and "information that allows obtaining information about the activities of extremist organisations" will be subject to out-of-court blocking at the request of the Prosecutor General's Office.⁶⁵

On 5 April 2021, the Russian Federation adopted amendments to the federal law "On Education" that prohibit "the use of educational activities to incite social, racial, national or religious discord, for agitation promoting exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of citizens on the grounds of social, racial, national, religious or linguistic affiliation, their attitude to religion, including by means of reporting false information about historical, national, religious and cultural traditions of peoples."⁶⁶

On the same day, amendments were made to the federal law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations." It established that the leader and participant of a religious group may not be a foreign citizen or stateless person, in respect of whom a decision has been taken on undesirability of stay in the Russian Federation, as well as a person included in the official list of extremists and terrorists (Rosfinmonitoring list). Also, according to the amendments, clergymen and religious personnel of religious organisations who have completed training programs for those in foreign educational organisations, and for the first time begin to perform divine services, rituals, missionary work, or teaching activities in Russia, "receive additional professional education in the sphere of the basics of state-confessional relations in the Russian Federation."⁶⁷

On 14 July 2022, the country announced the creation of an official databank of extremist materials.⁶⁸

During the monitoring period, the Russian Federation also adopted a number of laws aimed at combating the rehabilitation of Nazism. In particular, on 27 April 2020, Russian President

⁶⁵ Федеральный закон от 27.07.2006 N 149-ФЗ (ред. от 29.12.2022) "Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации" (с изм. и доп., вступ. в силу с 01.03.2023). Статья 15.3. Порядок ограничения доступа к информации, распространяемой с нарушением закона//Консультант Плюс. URL: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_61798/34547c9b6ddb60cebd0a67593943fd9ef64ebdd0/

⁶⁶ Федеральный закон от 05.04.2021 № 85-ФЗ

"О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон "Об образовании в Российской Федерации"// Официальное опубликование правовых актов. URL: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202104050036>

⁶⁷ Внесены изменения в закон о свободе совести и о религиозных объединениях//Сайт Президента РФ, 5 апреля 2021 года. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/65302>

⁶⁸ Федеральный закон от 14.07.2022 № 303-ФЗ "О внесении изменений в статью 265-10 Кодекса административного судопроизводства Российской Федерации и статьи 13 и 15 Федерального закона "О противодействии экстремистской деятельности"//Официальное опубликование правовых актов. URL: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202207140065?index=2&rangeSize=1>

Vladimir Putin signed a law amending the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation. The Criminal Code was supplemented with Article 243.4 (destruction or damage to military burial grounds, as well as monuments, steles, obelisks, other memorial structures or objects commemorating those who died in defense of the Fatherland or its interests or dedicated to the days of Russia's military glory). The article provides for impressive monetary fines and forced labour. Moreover, it refers to objects located both in Russia and abroad. At the same time, part 3 of article 354.1 of the Criminal Code introduced a new crime - "insulting the memory of defenders of the Fatherland and humiliation of the honour and dignity of veterans of the Second World War." Also, Article 13.15 of the Code of Administrative Offences (abuse of freedom of mass information) was supplemented with part. 4.1, according to which "public dissemination of information denying the facts established by the verdict of the International Military Tribunal for the trial and punishment of the main war criminals of the European Axis countries, or approving the crimes established by the said verdict, as well as public dissemination of deliberately false information about the activities of the USSR during the Second World War and about veterans of the Great Patriotic War, including those committed with the use of mass media and (or) information and telecommunication networks (including, inter alia, information and telecommunication networks)."

On 1 July 2021, amendments were introduced to the federal laws "On Commemorating the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" and "On Countering Extremist Activity." According to these amendments, the definition of extremist materials includes "speeches, images of leaders of groups, organisations or movements recognised as criminals in accordance with the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal" and "speeches, images of leaders of organisations that cooperated with the said groups, organisations or movements," as *well as a ban on displaying images of Nazis and collaborators recognised as extremist materials.*⁶⁹ However, a few months later, on 6 October 2021, Rossiyskaya Gazeta published official explanations of the Russian Ministry of Justice on the application of this law.⁷⁰ In particular, it was stated that "scientific, cultural, educational, and bookselling activities are not extremist activities and, accordingly, works of science, literature, art, media products, feature and documentary films

⁶⁹ Федеральный закон от 1 июля 2021 г. N 280-ФЗ "О внесении изменений в статью 6 Федерального закона "Об увековечении Победы советского народа в Великой Отечественной войне 1941 - 1945 годов" и статью 1 Федерального закона "О противодействии экстремистской деятельности""//RG RU, 06.07.21. URL: <https://rg.ru/documents/2021/07/06/fz280.html>

⁷⁰ Рекомендации по применению норм Федерального закона от 1 июля 2021 г. N 280-ФЗ "О внесении изменений в статью 6 Федерального закона "Об увековечении Победы советского народа в Великой Отечественной войне 1941 - 1945 годов" и статью 1 Федерального закона "О противодействии экстремистской деятельности""// RG RU, 06.10.2021. URL: <https://rg.ru/documents/2021/10/06/recomendacii-dok.html>

(including chronicles), educational, scientific, popular science publications, images (illustrations and photographs) in these publications, at exhibitions, in libraries, museums and in databases of the information and telecommunications network "Internet" and educational programs created for educational purposes, implemented by educational organizations, in the event that their use forms a negative attitude towards the ideology of Nazism and extremism and there are no signs of propaganda or justification of Nazi and extremist ideology".⁷¹

On 14 July 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law providing for changes in legislation in the area of state security. The law introduces a new Article 282.4 into the Criminal Code (repeated propaganda or public demonstration of Nazi attributes or symbols, or attributes or symbols of extremist organisations, or other attributes or symbols, the propaganda or public demonstration of which is prohibited by federal laws). According to this article, propaganda or public display of Nazi or similar paraphernalia and symbols, as well as paraphernalia and symbols of other extremist organisations, the propaganda or display of which is prohibited by federal laws, is punishable by a fine of between 600,000 and one million roubles (€6,000-10,000) or in the amount of income for a period of two to three years, compulsory labour for up to 480 hours, correctional labour for a period of one to two years, compulsory labour for up to four years, or deprivation of liberty for the same period. The same punishment is provided for the manufacture or sale for the purpose of propaganda, the acquisition for the purpose of sale, or propaganda of all the above-mentioned paraphernalia or symbols.⁷²

Thus, Russia has definitively equated to hate crimes any statements contrary to the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal, as well as any actions that can be interpreted as propaganda of Nazism and collaborationism.

1.4. Development of Migration Legislation

In general, there were positive developments in migration legislation during the monitoring period. After a long period of offense against the rights of migrants in the OSCE area, it can be stated that the pendulum has swung the other way. This is due to the change of administration in Washington, the Ukrainian migration crisis, and the correction of the general course of the EU

⁷¹ Рекомендации по применению норм Федерального закона от 1 июля 2021 г. N 280-ФЗ "О внесении изменений в статью 6 Федерального закона "Об увековечении Победы советского народа в Великой Отечественной войне 1941 - 1945 годов" и статью 1 Федерального закона "О противодействии экстремистской деятельности"// RG RU, 06.10.2021. URL:

<https://rg.ru/documents/2021/10/06/recomendacii-dok.html>

⁷² "Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации" от 13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (ред. от 13.06.2023) (с изм. и доп., вступ. в силу с 24.06.2023)//Консультант Плюс. URL:

https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_10699/e81ee63e1fcbf5e90a4db1f109adf1068b06b0d0/

with regard to migrants, which was reflected, inter alia, in the adoption of a number of positive judicial decisions for migrants.

The first goal of the new US administration after the change of the White House master was the cancellation of decisions made by his predecessor on migration issues. A number of Trump's executive orders were cancelled on Biden's first day in office.⁷³ These include ending deportations during the first 100 days of his new presidency;⁷⁴ lifting the travel ban that restricted travel to the US from fourteen, mostly Muslim, countries;⁷⁵ halting the construction of a border wall between Mexico and the US from 20 January 2021;⁷⁶ restoring protections for immigrant children, including undocumented children (DACA);⁷⁷ and ending deportations by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that put security above human rights.

Biden, however, failed to implement all the promised changes. In April 2021, the NO BAN (Combating Discrimination Against Nonimmigrant Aliens Based on National Origin) Act⁷⁸ was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives,⁷⁹ but failed to pass the Senate. As a result, the Immigration and Nationality Act (the McCarran-Walter Act), which was passed in 1952, remains unchanged and contains no guarantees based on religious affiliation.⁸⁰ For the time being, Section 212(f) of the Act, which authorises the President to restrict the entry into the United States of "any alien or any class of aliens" whose entry "would be detrimental to the interests of the United States," remains in force.

⁷³ Executive Order on the Revision of Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities, January 20, 2021//White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-the-revision-of-civil-immigration-enforcement-policies-and-priorities/>

⁷⁴ Review of and Interim Revision to Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities, January 20, 2021/Homeland Security. URL: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0120_enforcement-memo_signed.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1_3OJluWv0GzmC2sgRNqjscrFRMn65skMo1OI88xgT0zlxalGXqP6_Gus

⁷⁵ Proclamation on Ending Discriminatory Bans on Entry to The United States, January 20, 2021//White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/proclamation-ending-discriminatory-bans-on-entry-to-the-united-states/>

⁷⁶ Proclamation on the Termination Of Emergency With Respect To The Southern Border Of The United States And Redirection Of Funds Diverted To Border Wall Construction, January 20, 2021//White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/proclamation-termination-of-emergency-with-respect-to-southern-border-of-united-states-and-redirection-of-funds-diverted-to-border-wall-construction/>

⁷⁷ Preserving and Fortifying Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), January 20, 2021//White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/preserving-and-fortifying-deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals-daca/>

⁷⁸ H.R.1333 - NO BAN Act (Introduced 02/25/2021)//Congress.Gov. URL: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1333>

⁷⁹ House Passes NO BAN Act to Prevent Future Muslim Bans//Ilhan Omar, April 21, 2021. URL: <https://omar.house.gov/media/press-releases/house-passes-no-ban-act-prevent-future-muslim-bans>

⁸⁰ Immigration and Nationality Act//U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. URL: <https://www.uscis.gov/laws-and-policy/legislation/immigration-and-nationality-act>

In January 2021, Biden also introduced the "U.S. Citizenship Act of 2021,"⁸¹ which opened up the possibility of citizenship to undocumented immigrants currently living in the United States. The bill was rejected at the end of the 117th Congress because it failed to pass the Senate for a vote. Currently, record numbers of migrants are reaching the southern border (US-Mexico).⁸² Nevertheless, there is still a severe labour shortage in the US that can be filled by migrant workers.⁸³ Initially, Biden sought to increase refugee admissions to 125,000 per year.⁸⁴ The administration reaffirmed those intentions for 2023. However, at the time of writing, only 12,307 refugees have been resettled, and a total of 29,537 people are expected to be resettled this year, far short of the US President's stated figure.⁸⁵

In February 2021, several restrictions were imposed on the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As a result, its agents were prohibited from deporting individuals for offences considered "petty" (drug-related offences, simple assault, DUI, money laundering, property crimes, fraud, tax crimes, extortion, etc.).⁸⁶

In August 2021, Obama's policy, which allowed migrants fleeing domestic or gang violence to remain in the US while their asylum case was being processed, was re-enacted by another executive order.⁸⁷

Importantly, Biden failed to rescind the use of Section 42,⁸⁸ imposed by Trump under the auspices of medical restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The measure allows for the swift removal of migrants apprehended at US-Mexico border crossings, including some asylum seekers, and controls all other border measures. In 2021, there were more than 1.7 million arrests

⁸¹ Fact Sheet: President Biden Sends Immigration Bill to Congress as Part of His Commitment to Modernise our Immigration System, January 20, 2021//White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/20/fact-sheet-president-biden-sends-immigration-bill-to-congress-as-part-of-his-commitment-to-modernize-our-immigration-system/>

⁸² John Gramlich, Monthly encounters with migrants at U.S.-Mexico border remain near record highs/Pew Research Center, January 13, 2023. URL: <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/01/13/monthly-encounters-with-migrants-at-u-s-mexico-border-remain-near-record-highs/>

⁸³ Stephanie Ferguson, Understanding America's Labour Shortage: the most impacted Industries//U.S. Chamber of Commerce, June 09, 2023. URL: <https://www.uschamber.com/workforce/understanding-americas-labor-shortage-the-most-impacted-industries>

⁸⁴ Statement by President Joe Biden on Refugee Admissions, May 03, 2021//White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/03/statement-by-president-joe-biden-on-refugee-admissions/>

⁸⁵ <https://immigrationforum.org/article/statement-for-the-record-us-senate-committee-on-the-judiciary-hearing-on-living-up-to-americas-promise-the-need-to-support-us-refugee-admission-programme-march-22-2023/>

⁸⁶ Ted Hesson, U.S. moves to speed up releases of unaccompanied migrant children//Reuters, February 25, 2021. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-moves-speed-up-releases-unaccompanied-migrant-children-2021-02-25/>

⁸⁷ Asylum Eligibility for Applicants Fleeing Gang and Domestic Violence: Recent Developments//Congressional Research Service, August 6, 2021. URL: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10617>

⁸⁸ 42 U.S.C. Part G-Quarantine and Inspection. The Public Health and Welfare//GOVINFO.GOV. URL: <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title42/html/USCODE-2011-title42-chap6A-subchapII-partG.htm>

of migrants along the U.S.-Mexico border who attempted to enter the U.S. illegally,⁸⁹ or four times as many as in 2020, the largest number ever.⁹⁰

In response to the Afghan refugee crisis, the Biden administration attempted to pass the Afghanistan Settlement Act as part of a major omnibus spending bill. This initiative would have authorised evacuated Afghans to apply for permanent residency after spending 1 year in the US. However, this bill was blocked in Congress in 2022 by Republicans over the issue of the growing national debt.⁹¹ As of September 2022, only about 4,500 Afghans have been granted permanent resident status under the SIV program.⁹²

However, the United States has introduced a simplified admission process for refugees from Ukraine, which allowed them to bypass Section 42 and obtain not only a humanitarian corridor but also a work permit.⁹³ Similar rules were also previously introduced for persons arriving from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.

Overall, the **Ukrainian refugee crisis** has had a significant impact on the changing migration climate in the West. Almost all NATO countries have granted them unprecedented conditions of access and stay. In early March 2022, the EU adopted Regulation 2022/382 on the granting of temporary asylum to Ukrainian citizens fleeing hostilities. An Act of the European Council of 4 March 2022 (382/2022) activated EU Directive no. 55/2001, which was not activated even during the 2015/16 migration crisis. It was also not activated in August 2021, after the withdrawal of the Americans and their allies from Afghanistan, resulting in a refugee emergency for all those Afghans who fled the country after the return of the Taliban.

Directive no. 55/2001/EC provides for the adoption of an immediate and temporary protection scheme in the event of a "mass influx" of refugees into the EU following emergencies caused by war, violence, or human rights violations in countries of origin. Temporary protection involves the issuance of a 12-month visa, which can be extended for a further year by a decision of the European Council. Under such a directive, persons with this type of visa have the right to

⁸⁹ Kristina Cook, Biden under pressure as U.S.-Mexico border arrests reach record highs//Reuters, October 20, 2021. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-under-pressure-us-mexico-border-arrests-reach-record-highs-2021-10-20/>

⁹⁰ Ana Gonzales-Barrera, After surging in 2019, migrant apprehensions at U.S.-Mexico border fell sharply in fiscal 2020//Pew Research Center, November 4, 2020. URL: <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/11/04/after-surfing-in-2019-migrant-apprehensions-at-u-s-mexico-border-fell-sharply-in-fiscal-2020-2/>

⁹¹ Robbie Gramer, Bill That Would Provide Lifeline to Afghan Refugees Blocked in Congress//FP, December 20, 2022. URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/20/afghanistan-refugees-afghan-adjustment-act-congress-omnibus-bill/>

⁹² Operation Allies Welcome Announces Departure of All Afghan Nationals from the National Conference Centre Safe Haven in Leesburg, VA, September 27, 2022/Homeland Security. URL: <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/09/27/operation-allies-welcome-announces-departure-all-afghan-nationals-national>

⁹³ Uniting for Ukraine//U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Jan. 6, 2023. URL: <https://www.uscis.gov/ukraine>

work, to use the national health care system of the European country to which they have arrived, and children have the right to attend the local school system.

Some European countries have taken additional legislative measures to implement these decisions. To ensure the legal status of refugees from Ukraine, for example, the **Federal Republic of Germany** has invoked §24 of the Act on the Residence of Foreigners (AufenthG), which regulates temporary protection on the basis of the 2001 EU Directive.⁹⁴

In addition, in March 2022, the German authorities simplified migration legislation for German resettlers with Ukrainian citizenship. After entering the country as a Ukrainian refugee, they were granted the right to apply for recognition of the late migrant status not in the country of origin, as is the usual procedure, but directly at the Land Office for the Reception of Foreigners.⁹⁵ Jewish migrants with Ukrainian passports were also entitled to apply in Germany.⁹⁶

On 12 March 2022, a Special Act was adopted in **Poland**, which allowed legal residence and extensive financial and social assistance to Ukrainian citizens and included the newcomers in the already existing system of health care, education or labour legislation on an equal footing with Polish citizens. Also important was the activity of local authorities (especially in Poland's largest cities, where the vast majority of Ukrainian refugees - over 70% - found shelter) and non-governmental organisations, business support, and unprecedented mobilisation of Polish society. It is worth mentioning here the phenomenon of private "housing sponsorship," which avoided the creation of special centres for refugees.⁹⁷

On 29 May 2023, President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda signed the proposed amendments to the Special Act. The legal stay of Ukrainians in Poland was extended until 4 March 2024. The amendments also extended the validity of national visas, Pole cards, Polish identity documents, and documents on authorised stay. The amendment to the Special Law entitles a citizen of Ukraine to cross the border multiple times within a short period of time - for example, for family reasons, to obtain documents, or to solve professional issues.

It is true that social benefits cease while the refugee is out of Poland, but they are resumed if the refugee returns within 30 days (the mechanism of this process has not yet been explained in detail). If a refugee stays outside Poland for more than 30 days, he/she loses his/her special status

⁹⁴ Gesetz über den Aufenthalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet (Aufenthaltsgesetz, AufenthG), vom 25.02.2008, §24, Aufenthaltsgewährung zum vorübergehenden Schutz, URL: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/aufenthg_2004/_24.html

⁹⁵ Land Niedersachsen. Informationen und Unterstützung für Geflüchtete und Helfende, URL: <https://www.niedersachsen.de/ukraine/krieg-in-der-ukraine-fragen-und-antworten-209095.html>

⁹⁶ Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat, Meldung vom 24.30.2022. Anordnung für vereinfachte Zuwanderungsregeln für ukrainische Juden, URL: <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2022/03/besuch-felix-klein.html>

⁹⁷ Grzymała-Kazłowska A., Stefańska R., Ziółkowska P. (2022). Learning from refugee sponsorship: how to host refugees fleeing from Ukraine to Poland? CMR Spotlight 5 (40), May.

and all related privileges, including the right to assistance and social benefits. However, this status can be restored if the person is forced to seek asylum again and ends up in Poland. In order to strengthen control over Ukrainian citizens (recipients of social benefits travelling from Poland), the amendment to the law introduces legal grounds for the social insurance body to obtain information from the register of border crossings by Ukrainians from the Border Guard Service.

According to an amendment to a special law, the conditions for providing assistance to Ukrainians living in collective housing centers will also change. The amendment stipulates that a Ukrainian citizen who came to Poland fleeing hostilities and settled in mass accommodation centers will be able to stay there free of charge for 120 days. From 1 May 2023, Ukrainian citizens who will stay in Poland as refugees for more than 180 days are obliged to cover 75% of the costs of accommodation in mass accommodation centers (but not more than PLN 60 per day). The most vulnerable categories of Ukrainian citizens (disabled, pregnant women, pensioners, etc.) are exempted from the obligation to pay for accommodation even after 120 days.⁹⁸

All these steps are unprecedented against the background of previous migration crises in Europe. Nevertheless, certain positive changes have also taken place in other areas of migration policy in OSCE countries. For example, there have been significant improvements in **Hungary's** migration legislation since the pandemic. These changes were partly driven by a ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in May 2020, which labelled the practice of detaining asylum-seekers in transit zones for excessively long periods of time as deprivation of liberty. Following that ruling, the court recognised transit zones as legal but limited the maximum period of detention in them to four weeks, leading Hungary to close them altogether at the border with Serbia.

In August 2021, the **Federal Republic of Germany** made it easier for Nazi victims and their descendants to obtain and regain German citizenship.⁹⁹ Refugees with different statuses were extended the additional support measures that other German residents also receive. Here are some of them: additional bonus payments to regular child allowances, a free set of protective masks against COVID-19, an increase in the level of tax-free compensation for social activities, extraordinary cash payments to mitigate the effects of pandemic and lockdown inflation, etc. A package of sanitation and hygiene measures for hostels for migrants and asylum seekers was also adopted.

Some progress can be noted in the migration legislation of **Greece**, which, in 2015-20, experienced a migration crisis due to the influx of refugees from Asia and Africa. Law 4686/20,

⁹⁸ The term of the legal stay for refugees from Ukraine in Poland has extended: details//Visit Ukraine today, 14 June.2023. URL: <https://visitukraine.today/blog/2049/the-term-of-legal-stay-for-refugees-from-ukraine-in-poland-has-been-extended-details>

⁹⁹ Flüchtlingsrat Berlin. Gesetzgebung Asyl- und Migrationsrecht 2020/21, URL: https://fluechtlingsrat-berlin.de/recht_und_rat/asylg-2020/#ueberblick

"Improvement of immigration legislation, modification of the provisions of Laws 4636/2019 (A ' 169), 4375/2016 (A ' 51), 4251/2014 (A ' 80) and other provisions," provided full health care to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. Such care includes children who have been refused asylum until their return to their home country.¹⁰⁰

In 2022 and 2023, Greece concluded inter-governmental agreements with Pakistan and Bangladesh, the main countries from which labour migrants come to Greece. Citizens of these countries will now be able to apply for a Greek visa for the purpose of employment for a maximum of five years in the agricultural sector. This allows Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals, including those already in Greece, to regularise their stay for the period specified in bilateral agreements, even though the conditions are somewhat restrictive (e.g. exclusion of residence permits for family members). In 2016, the Ministry of Agriculture introduced a voucher system in the agricultural sector, aimed at farmers wishing to hire migrants without residence permits. To date, some 13,000 irregular migrants have benefited from this scheme, which expired in July 2022. Through this procedure, irregular migrants working in agriculture could temporarily regularise their status for a six-month period with the possibility of renewal. In order to hire irregular migrant workers, the employer had to provide the police with identification documents.

At the same time, Greece has tightened the rules for obtaining citizenship. In particular, Law No. 4735/2020 provides for such changes. Now a Greek passport applicant will have to prove that he/she has a stable job in Greece, and he/she will also have to demonstrate a thorough knowledge of Greek history, language, etc.¹⁰¹ The Law also increased from 3 to 7 years the period of residence for refugees seeking Greek citizenship.

France continues on the path of tightening immigration conditions. On 15 September 2022, President Emmanuel Macron announced a reform of immigration policy, which is now scheduled to be debated in Parliament in autumn 2023. The aim of this reform is to curb illegal immigration by making it easier for French authorities to deport illegal immigrants, especially those who have been convicted by a court. It also wants to stipulate stricter conditions on employment and French language skills. This reform was announced after several horrific offences involving a foreigner who should have been deported but managed to stay despite a court ruling. In 2021, only 5.67 per cent of deportation orders came into force in the country, meaning that the remaining 95 per cent

¹⁰⁰ Law 4686/2020 "Improvement of migration legislation, amendment of law provisions 4636/2019 (A" 169), 4375/2016 (A" 51), 4251/2014 (A" 80) and other provisions" was published in the Official Government Gazette/MZ. URL: <https://milazosimidou.com/2020/05/14/law-46862020-improvement-of-migration-legislation-amendment-of-law-provisions-46362019-a-169-43752016-a-51-42512014-%CE%B1-80-and-other-provisions-was-published-i/>

¹⁰¹ Thodoris Chondrogiannos, New naturalisation process creates legal uncertainty and excludes many from acquisition of Greek citizenship/Govwatch, 25.04.2021. URL: <https://govwatch.gr/en/finds/aystiropiisi-kai-anasfaleia-dikaioy-stin-apoktisi-ellinikis-ithageneias/>

of those ordered to leave the country actually remain illegally, sometimes because their home countries, especially those in the Maghreb and West Africa, refuse to accept them.

The reform to be presented in Parliament by the French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin, a conservative, aims to deport 100 per cent of illegal immigrants with criminal convictions. It also strips illegal immigrants of the minimum health insurance they have been given by the state and wants to make it harder to reunite families with a member already in France. The reform was scheduled to be discussed in the spring of 2023 but was postponed due to demonstrations against the new pension reform.

1.5. Legal Regulation of LGBT People

Over the last 20 years, the world has paid increased attention to the situation of people who identify themselves as LGBT. The struggle for their rights, from the right to same-sex marriage to the right to self-identification, has become the narrative of the last decade not only in human rights organisations, but also in the authorities. An analysis of lawmaking in relation to sexual minorities during the period under review suggests that the process of their legal emancipation is slowing down. Moreover, reverse trends are gradually developing in a number of countries, not only in Russia, which officially declares the priority of traditional values, but also in a number of other countries with a strong reputation for supporting LGBT communities.

Thus, despite the fact that U.S. President Biden, upon coming to power, took a number of priority steps aimed at dismantling the "homophobic system of D. Trump," whose presidency was indeed marked by a number of restrictions on the rights of sexual minorities, mainly transgender people, he did not manage to go far enough. For example, as noted above, on the day of his inauguration, 20 January 2021, Biden signed Executive Order 13988 on preventing and combating discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. Six months later, in June 2022, a new Executive Order on Advancing Equality for LGBTQIA+ was published on the White House website to "prevent 'conversion therapy,' attempts to suppress or change an individual's sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression; to protect health; and to protect youth in other ways." As we can see, both times the president exercised his right to issue executive orders rather than trying to pass these decisions through Congress, as they had no chance of success as legislative initiatives due to the opposition of the Republicans in the Senate.

Both decrees have provoked a negative reaction from Republicans, who accuse transgender people (which is what the presidential administration's initiatives were aimed at expanding their

rights) of posing a threat to non-transgender women.¹⁰² Meanwhile, at the time of this report, 560 anti-LGBTQIA+ bills have been introduced in 49 state legislatures, 85 have passed, 352 are pending, and 123 have been rejected.¹⁰³

Thus, a new legal trend is gaining momentum at the local level in the United States against sexual minorities and, above all, against transgender people, who now face not only opposition from people of traditional orientation, but also from a part of the LGBT community that does not recognise them as a sexual minority.¹⁰⁴ These people believe that the expansion of the rights and freedoms of transgender persons, which is expressed, for example, in allowing them to use locker rooms in school gyms and fitness clubs, as well as public toilets in accordance with their gender identity, will lead to restrictions on the freedoms of other social groups.

As a result, many transgender people are being forced to leave states that have imposed legal restrictions against them,¹⁰⁵ and the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), America's largest LGBTQ+ rights NGO, has declared a state of emergency for sexual minorities in general in the United States. "The multiple threats facing millions of people in our community - they are real, tangible and dangerous," HRC President Kelly Robinson said in a statement. "In many cases, they lead to violence against LGBTQ+ people, forcing families to fundamentally change their lives and leave their homes in search of safer states, and they cause a tidal wave of rising homophobia and transphobia that threatens the safety of each and every one of us."¹⁰⁶

Events in the **UK** were no less dramatic. During the period under review, debates raged in Parliament about legislation that would have given transgender people the right to officially register their gender on the basis of self-identification.¹⁰⁷ However, after a period of public consultation, no legislation was passed and transgender people in the UK will still need medical evidence to legally confirm a gender reassignment.¹⁰⁸ Interestingly, on 22 December 2022, the

¹⁰² Why is the GOP escalating attacks on trans rights? Experts say the goal is to make sure evangelicals vote/PBS News Hour, May 20, 2022. URL: <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/why-is-the-gop-escalating-attacks-on-trans-rights-experts-say-the-goal-is-to-make-sure-evangelicals-vote>

¹⁰³ 2023 anti-trans bills tracker//Trans Legislation Tracker. URL: <https://translegislation.com/>

¹⁰⁴ Nyx McLean, Thurlo Cicero, Interrogating Transphobia Within the LGBTQIA+ Community//GenderIT.Org, 10th February, 2023. URL:

<https://genderit.org/articles/interrogating-transphobia-within-lgbtqia-community>

¹⁰⁵ Kiara Alfonseca, 'Genocidal': Transgender people begin to flee states with anti-LGBTQ laws//ABC News, June 11, 2023. URL: <https://abcnews.go.com/US/genocidal-transgender-people-begin-flee-states-anti-lgbtq/story?id=99909913>

¹⁰⁶ Kiara Alfonseca, 'State of emergency' issued for LGBTQ community by Human Rights Campaign// ABC News, June 6, 2023. URL: <https://abcnews.go.com/US/state-emergency-issued-lgbtq-community-human-rights-campaign/story?id=99866895>

¹⁰⁷ Gender Recognition and the Rights of transgender people. Research Briefing, 16 July, 2023//UK Parliament. URL: <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8969/>

¹⁰⁸ UK government drops gender self-identification plan for trans people//The Guardian, 22 Sept., 2020. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/sep/22/uk-government-drops-gender-self-identification-plan-for-trans-people>

Scottish Parliament passed a law allowing self-recognition of gender without medical evidence.¹⁰⁹ However, using section 35 of the UK Scotland Act 1998, the Westminster government blocked the bill's passage, citing the law's implications for the operation of equality protections in the UK.¹¹⁰

Italy also failed to pass a law to protect LGBTQIA+ people from hate crimes. In October 2021, the Italian Senate decided not to hold a parliamentary session on a bill (already approved by the Chamber of Deputies in 2020) that introduces strict protections against hate crimes based on a person's gender, sexual orientation, and disability. The issue must now be debated in the current legislature at the end of 2023.

During the period under review, there was no progress in **Serbia with** regard to the draft law on same-sex partnerships previously initiated by the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights and Social Dialogue, nor with regard to the Ombudsman's recommendation to regularise legal gender recognition, as already planned in the previous anti-discrimination strategy. In June 2019, the country announced plans to amend the Civil Code to allow family partnerships between same-sex couples, ensuring some legal rights to marriage, including property rights and alimony. However, these amendments did not address the main issue - the rights to inherit, adopt, or access fertility treatment free of charge. In February 2021, the same-sex partnership bill was submitted for public consultation, but in May 2021, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic said he would impose it if it was approved by the National Assembly: "I don't know what the Assembly is planning when it comes to the law on same-sex unions. But as president of Serbia, I am obliged to protect the Constitution, and I cannot sign this law."¹¹¹

In June 2021, Russia, which back in 2013 adopted amendments to its Code of Administrative Offences banning homosexual propaganda among children, was joined by **Hungary**, which passed a similar law. The bill, sponsored by the ruling Fidesz party, has been framed as "a law allowing for stricter measures against pedophile criminals and the protection of children." It includes a ban on the promotion or portrayal of gender identity other than sex at birth, as well as the promotion of sex reassignment or homosexuality among those under 18.¹¹² The law has met fierce opposition from European leaders, including European Commission President

¹⁰⁹ Gender Recognition Reform Bill passed, 22 December 2022/Scottish Government. URL: <https://www.gov.scot/news/gender-recognition-reform-bill-passed/>

¹¹⁰ Crerar, P., & Brooks, L., 'Rishi Sunak blocks Scotland's gender recognition legislation'// *The Guardian*, 16 January 2023. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/16/rishi-sunak-blocks-scotlands-gender-recognition-legislation>

¹¹¹ Recognition of same-sex unions in Serbia/Wikipedia. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recognition_of_same-sex_unions_in_Serbia#Same-sex_marriage

¹¹² Hungary: Reject Bill Banning Discussion of LGBT Issues/Human Rights Watch, June 11, 2021. URL: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/11/hungary-reject-bill-banning-discussion-lgbt-issues>

Ursula von der Leyen and the European Commissioners for Justice and the Internal Market.¹¹³ Attitudes towards sexual minorities in Hungary were also in the spotlight in 2020, when parliament voted in favour of an omnibus bill that replaced the "sex" column with "sex at birth" in civil registration records, effectively barring transgender and intersex people from accessing legal gender recognition - a decision that was later overturned by the country's Constitutional Court.¹¹⁴

In **Russia** itself, during the period under review, the law on the prohibition of propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations was extended to cover not only children but also adults. On 5 December 2022, the law "On Amendments to the Federal Law 'On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection' and 'Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation'" came into force, prohibiting the dissemination in the territory of the Russian Federation of information promoting non-traditional sexual relations and (or) preferences, pedophilia, and sex change *without distinction of age*. The sanctions envisaged by the law are a fine from 50'000 to 400'000 rubles (4'000 EUR) for citizens, from 100'000 to 800'000 for officials, and from 800'000 to 5'000'000 or suspension of activities for up to 90 days for legal entities.¹¹⁵

CHAPTER 2. LAW ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES

2.1. Anti-Discrimination Law Enforcement Practices

The analysis of anti-discrimination law enforcement practices initiated by the government of the monitoring countries during the period under review can be roughly divided into several categories: support for minorities to ensure equality, diversity, and inclusion; assistance to refugees and migrants; and combating extremism and terrorism.

— Minority support

In December 2020, **Greece** adopted a National Action Plan against Racism and Intolerance (NAP). The aim of the NAP is to eradicate any kind of racism or discrimination on the grounds of "race," colour, religion, nationality or ethnic origin, disability, political opinion, chronic diseases,

¹¹³ ILGA Europe. 2021. Anti-LGBTI legislation in Hungary violates children's rights. Available at <https://www.ilga-europe.org/blog/how-new-anti-lgbti-legislation-hungary-violates-childrens-rights/> 3

¹¹⁴ ILGA Europe. 2020. Hungary Rolls back legal protections, puts trans and intersex people at risk. 19 May 2020. Available at <https://ilga-europe.org/press-release/hungary-rolls-back-legal-protections-puts-trans-intersex-people-at-risk/>

¹¹⁵ Федеральный закон от 05.12.2022 N 478-ФЗ "О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон "Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации" и отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации," 5 декабря 2022 года N 478-ФЗ//Консультант Плюс.
URL: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_433218/

sexual orientation, gender identity, or/and gender characteristics. The NAP is divided into four main areas, namely awareness-raising, education, social inclusion policies, and justice. It allows for prioritisation on an annual basis and will be subject to a mid-term evaluation. It also refers to the working definition of anti-Semitism adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). Particular reference is made to groups considered vulnerable to discrimination, such as migrants, asylum-seekers, Roma, and LGBTI persons. It is important to note that the Greek authorities adopted this plan after lengthy consultations with the country's non-governmental organisations.

A new national "Strategy and Action Plan for the Social Inclusion of Roma 2021-2030" in Greece was developed and made available for public consultation in 2021. The Strategy includes four main principles on which the follow-up work is intended to be based: i) preventing and combating poverty and social exclusion of Roma; ii) strengthening equal access of Roma to general social services; iii) preventing and combating discrimination and xenophobia against Roma; and iv) promoting participation in socially beneficial activities for Roma.

On 17 March 2021, a committee consisting of relevant legal experts and civil society representatives was established to develop a national LGBTI equality strategy for 2021-2025. The strategy was adopted after public consultation.¹¹⁶

In addition, in order to combat racial profiling in Greece, 151 police officers received in-service training on combating racist violence in 2021. On 21 February 2022, a wider training program was launched for 17,000 active police officers. It covers the topics of racist and domestic violence as well as the protection of LGBTI people and people with disabilities. Currently, 70 police units have police officers specialised in combating racist violence. Twenty-four specialised prosecutors had also been appointed to investigate racist crimes. According to Prosecutor's Circular No. 5/2018, all cases of hate speech and hate-motivated violence must be systematically dealt with. Prosecutors were instructed to focus on gathering evidence of bias motive. The initial education program for judges and prosecutors at the National School of Judges included courses on human rights issues, as well as specialised courses on racism and xenophobia and migration law.

On 16 December 2020, Sofia University in **Bulgaria** dismissed Professor Mikhail Mirchev after an ethics commission found that his lectures contained negative ethnic stereotypes. The dismissal came after the Jewish organisation «Shalom» and other non-governmental organisations protested that Mirchev's lectures contained racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic statements and rhetorical questions such as "Is it possible for Bulgaria to become a Jewish country if they, being

¹¹⁶ ECRI REPORT ON GREECE (sixth monitoring cycle)// Council of Europe, 28 June 2022. URL: <https://rm.coe.int/ecri-first-report-on-greece-adopted-on-28-june-2022-published-on-22-se/1680a818bf>

less than one per cent, own the state, the capital, the media, and the arts?" Mirchev claimed his words were taken out of context. In November, before Mirchev's dismissal, «Shalom»'s criticism sparked numerous anti-Semitic comments such as "Jews can only learn from a heavy hand and a bullet in the back of the head."¹¹⁷

Hungary has decided to adopt the experience, widespread in many EU countries, the USA, and Canada, of actively recruiting members of national minorities into the police force to combat racial profiling. Thus, for the academic year 2022/2023, the National Police Headquarters announced a competition to support young people of Roma origin who are full-time or part-time higher education students studying law, management, economics, technical sciences, information technology, or medicine. The aim of the competition is to encourage them to successfully complete their studies and consider a career in the police force.¹¹⁸ In addition to this affirmative action policy, the police have also taken measures to correct their reputation: among other things, the police chief of Pest County apologized to a Roma woman whom they stripped down to her underwear in 2019 in Vác during an inquest.¹¹⁹

It can be argued that there have been some improvements in the overall attitudes of Hungarian law enforcement officers towards minorities, but it is difficult to argue that these changes are fundamental.

Certain developments in anti-discrimination law enforcement are also taking place in **Italy**. Thus, on 15 March 2021, the Ministry of Equal Opportunities (*Ministero per le Pari Opportunità*) was established by decree of the President of the Council of Ministers.¹²⁰ The mandate of the Ministry includes the promotion of actions aimed at preventing and eliminating discrimination on grounds of sex, race, ethnic origin, religion, personal beliefs, age, gender, and sexual orientation, including the preparation of proposals to improve the legislative framework to combat discrimination, racism, and xenophobia in the legal system.¹²¹ In August 2021, the first National Strategy for Gender Equality (for the period 2021-2026) was presented to the Italian Government as an implementation of the "EU Gender Equality Strategy 2025."¹²²

¹¹⁷ 2020 International Religious Freedom Annual Report: Bulgaria, U.S. Department of State, 2021. URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/bulgaria/>

¹¹⁸ Roma Tender// Police. 2022. URL: <https://www.police.hu/hu/a-rendorsegrol/kepzes/roma-palyazatok>

¹¹⁹ The police apologise and pay damages to the woman stripped to her underwear/Helsinki Committee Hungary. 26.10.2021. URL: <https://helsinki.hu/a-rendorseg-bocsanatot-ker-es-serelemdijat-fizet-az-alsonemure-vetkoztetett-nonek/>

¹²⁰ DECRETO 29 aprile 2022. PRESIDENZA DEL CONSIGLIO DEI MINISTRI DIPARTIMENTO PER LE PARI OPPORTUNITA//Gazzetta Ufficiale. URL: <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2022/07/01/22A03808/sg>

¹²¹ LEGGE 16 giugno 2016, n. 115// Gazzetta Ufficiale. URL: <https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2016/06/28/16G00124/sg>

¹²² Gender equality strategy/European Commission. URL: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality-strategy_en

On 21 December 2020, the **Polish** Council of Ministers adopted the multi-annual Program for the Social and Civic Integration of Roma in Poland for 2021-2030.¹²³ The elaborated document is a description of the most important activities implemented in 2021. Its priority issue is education. Despite the activities carried out in previous editions of the program - remedial classes, measures to increase school attendance, purchase of school textbooks - the average score of Roma pupils has not increased and the percentage of pupils "dropping out" of the school system at the secondary level remains unchanged and covers almost the entire Roma population aged 15-18, as indicated in the Program. The document positively evaluated the experience of the so-called "Roma education assistants," who enjoy the trust of the local Roma communities - they provide comprehensive assistance to Roma pupils in their contacts with the school environment and create a positive image of the school and the benefits of education.

In 2022, the subject of more than a dozen appeals to the Polish Ombudsman was the issue of changing the funding (reduction of the educational subsidy) and organisation (reduction of the number of hours from 3 to 1 per week) of teaching German as a minority language. In general, the right to education in the mother tongue for national minorities is protected in Poland by the "Education System Act" of 7 September 1991.¹²⁴ According to the Educational Information System (SIE), as of 30 September 2021, a total of 83,285 pupils use the benefits from the study of a national or ethnic minority language and the Kashubian regional language.¹²⁵

On 1 March 2022, the Polish Ombudsman addressed the Prime Minister, stressing that the introduction of the contested amendments was discriminatory and, as such, contrary to constitutional norms and international law binding on the Republic of Poland. Furthermore, the amendments, which have the effect of significantly worsening the legal position of a certain group of Polish citizens solely on the basis of their German origin, go beyond the legislative authorisations contained respectively in Article 13(3) of the Act of 7 September 1991 on the education system and in Article 28(6) of the Act of 13 November 2003 on local government revenue.

Any failure to effectively enforce these rights, the Ombudsman pointed out, could indicate that Poland was in breach of its obligations under the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, adopted in Strasbourg on 5 November 1992. The Ombudsman, given the importance

¹²³ Uchwała nr 190/2020 Rady Ministrów z dnia 21 grudnia 2020 r. w sprawie ustanowienia programu wieloletniego "Programme integracji społecznej i obywatelskiej Romów w Polsce na lata 2021-2030" - <https://www.gov.pl/web/mniejszosci-narodowe-i-etniczne/program-integracji-spoecznej-i-obywatelskiej-romow-w-polsce-na-lata-2021-2030>

¹²⁴ Ustawa z dnia 7 września 1991 r. o systemie oświaty.

¹²⁵ IV raport dla Sekretarza generalnego Rady Europy z realizacji przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską postanowień Europejskiej karty języków regionalnych lub mniejszościowych. - Warszawa, 2022. S. 10.

of the issue at hand, asked the President of the Supreme Audit Office to include this topic in the audit activities of the Supreme Audit Office planned for 2023.

The administration of U.S. President Biden has made progress in promoting the rights of the Muslim community and providing opportunities for representation by appointing several Muslims to high government positions. It is believed that this administration's stance on issues important to many Muslims in the U.S., such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Chinese treatment of Uyghur Muslims, has contributed to a more favourable perception of the administration by the U.S. Islamic community.¹²⁶

In the US, the first ever National Strategy for Gender Equality was also adopted in 2021,¹²⁷ and the White House Council on Gender Policy was held in March 2021.

In September 2021, the Federal Court of **Canada** upheld two 2019 rulings by the Federal Human Rights Tribunal that awarded financial compensation to Indigenous children in the child welfare system - for the first time since 2006. The Tribunal found that the government discriminated against Indigenous children by deliberately underfunding child welfare services, resulting in their removal from families, and by refusing to provide services as a result of a jurisdictional dispute between the federal and provincial governments over which government should pay for care reserves.¹²⁸

— Assistance to migrants and refugees

Education programs for migrants and refugees have been actively implemented in **Greece**. One such initiative is the project entitled "Schools for All - Integration of Refugee Children in Greek Schools," which was implemented by the Ministry of Education through a joint statement of 19 non-governmental organisations that specialise in working with migrants.

Another initiative is the Accelerated Learning Program, presented by the Institute for Educational Policy together with academic partners and UNICEF, which provided teaching and learning materials to support students with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. Another project is called "Assessment of newly arrived migrants' knowledge in science and math using extended learning material - Extended Assessment." It will run for three years, starting on 1 November 2020, and will develop materials, practices and know-how to assess newcomers' existing knowledge in mathematics and science.

¹²⁶ Biden expresses 'solidarity' with China's Uighurs during Ramadan//AlJazeera, 23.03.2023. URL:

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/23/biden-expresses-solidarity-with-chinas-uighurs-during-ramadan>

¹²⁷ National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality//The White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/National-Strategy-on-Gender-Equity-and-Equality.pdf>

¹²⁸ 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Canada. URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/canada/>

These programs were the Government's response to a number of problems that had arisen with education for asylum-seeking children. In particular, in its Opinion of 26 January 2021, the European Committee of Social Rights found that there were numerous violations of the European Social Charter in Greece, including a violation of Article 17 §2 of the Charter in relation to the lack of access to education for accompanied and unaccompanied migrant children on several islands. For adult migrants, including those who have been granted asylum, free Greek language and Greek culture courses are currently provided by five Migrant Integration Centres.

In addition, there are so-called second chance schools, originally established for indigenous Greeks who had dropped out of school but later wanted to finish it. These schools are also open to all categories of migrant students and some of them have taken up the offer.

On 15 April 2020, **Russian** President Vladimir Putin issued a decree in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and border closures that allowed foreigners to retain legal status even if their legal terms of residence in the country and the documents granting this right had expired. Their registrations, patents, residence permits, and other documents were not cancelled, and they were not expelled or deported. This decision affected primarily migrants from Central Asian countries. The decree was extended three times: until 15 September, until 15 December, and until 15 June 2021. Employment conditions were also eased for citizens of certain countries.¹²⁹

On 8 June 2020, amendments were adopted to the law "On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation," which expanded the list of foreigners who can act as inviting parties when accepting migrants - previously it was qualified specialists, and now it is any person who owns residential premises and is ready to provide it to a migrant for housing, allowing registration and de-registration.¹³⁰

A separate topic related to refugees is assistance to **Ukrainian refugees** who fled Ukraine after the outbreak of hostilities there.

According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of 8 July 2023, 20,735,745 refugees left Ukraine and 14,427,070 refugees returned. As of 4 July 2023, there were 6,331,100 Ukrainian refugees worldwide. According to this data, the number of people who have entered Russia is 2,852,395 and 16,705 in Belarus. Accordingly, a total of 2,869,100 people have entered the Russian Federation and Belarus since the beginning of the conflict. The number of people who left in the opposite direction is not known. At the same time, 1,309,990

¹²⁹ За патент можно не платить, регистрацию не продлевать, работать без трудовых документов: Путин подписал Указ для мигрантов на период ограничений из-за коронавируса//Все о миграции. URL: <https://migranturus.com/za-patent-mozhno-ne-platit-registraciju-ne-prodlevat-rabotat-bez-trudovyh-dokumentov-putin-podpisal-ukaz-dlja-migrantov-na-period-ogranichenij-iz-za-koronavirusa/>

¹³⁰ Федеральный закон от 8 июня 2020 г. N 182-ФЗ "О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон "О миграционном учете иностранных граждан и лиц без гражданства в Российской Федерации"//RG RU, 11.06.2020. URL: <https://rg.ru/documents/2020/06/11/inostranzi-dok.html>

people were registered as refugees in the RF and RB, but only 68,190 people officially requested refugee status, temporary residence permits, or other forms of legal protection.¹³¹ The number of Ukrainian citizens who left the RF for the EU via Latvia and Estonia has not been established. At the same time, in February 2023, Russia officially reported 5.3 million refugees arriving from the territory of Ukraine, as well as from the territories of Donbas not controlled by Kyiv.¹³²

Regarding the number of refugees registered in EU countries, on 4 July 2023, UNHCR recorded that it was 5,967,100, with 2,799,810 officially applying for asylum or other status allowing them to remain in EU countries.¹³³ In August 2022 the number of registered Ukrainian refugees, according to the High Commissioner's office, was over 8 million.¹³⁴ Thus many refugees have returned or are migrating between Ukraine, the EU, the RF, and RB, as the legal framework in many countries of their temporary stay allows them to do so (see Chapter 1). This is also evidenced by the fact that in the summer of 2023 it was the influx of Ukrainian citizens at the land borders from the EU to the RF that caused a collapse at Russia's borders with Estonia and Latvia, which resulted in people waiting for days to pass through the Russian land border.

However, in any case, this number of refugees is huge for Europe. A few years ago, the migration crisis was triggered by just over 1 million people who travelled there from Asia and Africa. Now more than 20 million people have travelled across EU borders, with almost 6 million apparently having settled in EU countries. Most asylum seekers from Ukraine appear to have requested asylum status in Poland. The UNHCR gives a figure of 1,627,510 as of 4 July 2023, which in principle corresponds to Polish national data, which back in April 2022 recorded about 1.4 million Ukrainian war refugees.¹³⁵ This is followed by Germany with 1,076,680, the Czech

¹³¹ Ukraine Refugee Situation/Operational Data Portal. UNHCR, 08.07.2023. URL:

https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.258444429.668655194.1673470828-999211601.1673470828
Accessed 08.07.2023.

¹³² Более 5,3 млн беженцев с Украины и из Донбасса прибыли в Россию за год//Известия, 20 февраля 2023 г.
URL: <https://iz.ru/1472836/2023-02-20/bolee-53-mln-bezhentcev-s-ukrainy-i-iz-donbassa-pribyli-v-rossiiu-za-god>

¹³³ Ukraine Refugee Situation/Operational Data Portal. UNHCR, 08.07.2023. URL:

https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.258444429.668655194.1673470828-999211601.1673470828
Accessed 08.07.2023.

¹³⁴ Over 8.1 Million Ukrainian Refugees Have Fled to EU Countries Since War Started/SchengenVisaInfo.com, August 19, 2022. URL: <https://www.schengenvisa.info/news/over-8-1-million-ukrainian-refugees-have-fled-to-eu-countries-since-war-started/>

¹³⁵ Szefernaker: tylko współpracując, byliśmy w stanie pomóc tylu uchodźcom z Ukrainy. - URL:

<https://samorzad.pap.pl/kategoria/aktualnosci/szefernaker-tylko-wspolpracujac-bylysmy-w-stanie-pomoc-tylu-uchodzcom-z>

Republic with 533,490, Spain with 183,980, and Bulgaria with 162,935.¹³⁶ As of February 2023, 271,000 refugees were accepted by the USA,¹³⁷ and 164,626 by Canada as of 24 June 2023.¹³⁸

Nevertheless, despite these numbers of people arriving almost simultaneously, we have observed a much more loyal attitude of both the authorities and society towards Ukrainian refugees than towards refugees from third world countries in 2015. It is not only about unprecedented legislative decisions (see Chapter 1), but also about prompt managerial steps that avoided the disaster of accommodation, employment, and social support for so many refugees.

For example, **Bulgaria** provided access to health care, social services, and education to 150,000 people who had registered for temporary protection.¹³⁹ The government has provided them with long-term accommodation, as called for by the UNHCR.

As already mentioned, **Poland received** 1.6 million refugees according to UNHCR data. Polish local authorities received additional funds (more than 2 billion PLN) intended primarily for educational tasks related to the education, upbringing, and care of children and students from Ukraine in 2023. Companies and organisations assisting Ukraine were granted tax exemptions for a year. Additional funding was also allocated to the Polish Red Cross in connection with the armed conflict in Ukraine.

More than 1 million Ukrainian refugees have been accepted by **Germany**. It should be noted that not all of those who received the status of temporary protection (refugee) remained in the country. Some Ukrainians have returned or moved to other countries without having deregistered in Germany. According to experts, the implementation of EU directives, as well as national legislative regulations regarding Ukrainian refugees in this country, can be considered successful, especially if it is commensurate with the circumstances, timing, and number of people who arrived.

Immediately after arriving in Germany, Ukrainian refugees were registered and granted a two-year residence permit in accordance with the aforementioned §24 of the Residence Act for Foreigners. This type of residence permit can be extended unless circumstances in the country of origin change for the better and the threat to the health and life of the foreign national disappears.

¹³⁶ Ukraine Refugee Situation/Operational Data Portal. UNHCR, 08.07.2023. URL: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.258444429.668655194.1673470828-999211601.1673470828 Accessed 08.07.2023.

¹³⁷ Julia Ansley, U.S. has admitted 271,000 Ukrainian refugees since Russian invasion, far above Biden's goal of 100,000/NBC News, Feb. 24, 2023. URL: <https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/us-admits-271000-ukrainian-refugees-russia-invasion-biden-rcna72177>

¹³⁸ Canada-Ukraine authorisation for emergency travel: Key figures/Government of Canada. URL: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/immigrate-canada/ukraine-measures/key-figures.html>

¹³⁹ Bulgaria 2022// Amnesty International Report Bulgaria, 2022. URL: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/bulgaria/report-bulgaria/>

Asylum seekers from Ukraine were immediately integrated into the social system of the Federal Republic of Germany, provided with benefits, free medical insurance, housing, and heating costs, as well as additional allowances, e.g. for the purchase of furniture, clothing, and household appliances. They were provided with free German language courses and a work permit. School-age children were integrated into the secondary education system of the FRG (in Germany, attendance at secondary school is compulsory). Ukrainian schoolchildren with insufficient knowledge of German attend so-called "welcome classes,"¹⁴⁰ formed in a number of educational institutions in the country. Since 1.06.2022, Ukrainian refugees have been entitled to unemployment benefit ALG 2 (since 01.01.2023 renamed Bürgergeld)¹⁴¹ and thus have been fully equalised in social security matters with German citizens and foreign nationals permanently residing in Germany. The German railways and regional transport companies have for a long time provided Ukrainian refugees with free travel. A Ukrainian passport was sufficient for travelling on public transport and regional trains throughout Germany.

Virtually every EU country that has received refugees has endeavoured to grant them, by virtue of their economic capacity, serious privileges that have actually helped them to settle in their new place.

In March 2022, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced a Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program for Ukrainians in the United States that allowed them to apply for protection from deportation and obtain work authorisation.¹⁴² The 18-month TPS program is intended for nationals of countries affected by war, natural disasters and emergencies. It is supposed to be temporary and does not allow its recipients to obtain permanent residency in the United States.

It should be noted that in June 2022, **Russia** also provided special conditions for refugees from the territory of Ukraine. The procedure for granting asylum was officially simplified - instead of the generally accepted 3 months, it is granted to them in 3 days. Ukrainian citizens can receive temporary asylum for 1 year until they receive refugee status or Russian citizenship. They were provided with certain material assistance, pensions, and unemployment benefits as for Russian citizens. All IDP minors were granted access to education in pre-school, secondary, and higher

¹⁴⁰ "Welcome" (in some Federal Länder "transition") classes are designed to teach German and explain the German education system to migrant pupils who have recently arrived in Germany. These classes also teach the subjects of the school program, but in an extremely lightened version - *author's note*.

¹⁴¹ Lisa Kaspari, Harz IV für Ukrainer. 449 Euro und viele Fragen// Die Zeit, 01.06.2022, URL: https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2022-05/harz-iv-gefluechtete-grundsicherung-ukraine?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F

¹⁴² Designation of Ukraine for Temporary Protected Status: Impact and Other Considerations/Congressional Research Service, April 2022. URL: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11889>

education institutions on an equal footing with Russian children, as well as the right to free medical care.¹⁴³ All refugees were offered a simplified regime for obtaining Russian citizenship.

The UNHCR Office in Russia, the Russian Red Cross, and a number of Russian non-governmental organisations are actively involved in the issues of refugees from Ukraine in the Russian Federation.¹⁴⁴

In addition, according to the UN, as of 24 May 2023, 5 million 88 thousand people were internally displaced within **Ukraine**. Most of the internally displaced persons are from the eastern regions of the country, where the most active hostilities are taking place - about 1.9 million people.¹⁴⁵

— Combating extremism and terrorism

Monitoring countries generally act to counter extremism and terrorism in accordance with their national plans, as detailed in our previous Report "Xenophobia, Radicalism, and Hate Crime in the OSCE Area, 2018-2020."¹⁴⁶ The **UK**'s CONTEST program is considered the gold standard of counter-terrorism strategies, which is broadly in the spirit of the "European" counter-extremism model outlined above and allows for a multi-sectoral response not only to the risks of violent extremism, but also to the risks of radicalisation of populations, guided by four principles: "prevent, pursue, protect and be prepared [to deal with the consequences]."¹⁴⁷ In particular, the British strategic plan includes several parts, including the use of effective procedures for identifying individuals on the path to radicalisation (the Channel process).

Participation in the Channel process is voluntary and individuals are often paired with a mentor, as well as mental health, employment, and housing experts, to find a comprehensive solution to extremism. This is not just about addressing the ideological basis of their extremist activity, but also addressing a range of social, economic, and psychological issues that may

¹⁴³ Что положено беженцам из Украины в Россию в 2022 году? Какие выплаты можно получить//Сайт «Уполномоченный по правам человека в Российской Федерации», 28 июня 2022 г. URL: https://ombudsmanrf.org/napravleniya_deyatelnosti/pravovoe_prosveshhenie/nec/2f54e4cb-072e-4ec7-9acf-bdbd60eacde1

¹⁴⁴ Refugees from Ukraine to the Russian Federation//UNHCR. The UN Refugee Agency. URL: <https://help.unhcr.org/russia/ukrrefugeesinru/>

¹⁴⁵ Total Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) by Oblast//UN Operational Data Portal. Refugee Situation, 24 May, 2023. URL: https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/ukr/751?secret=unhcrrestricted#_ga=2.22009275.129020978.1678786402-1154705740.1678786402

¹⁴⁶ Xenophobia, Radicalism and Hate Crime in the OSCE Area, 2018-2020, Report 2021, pp. 44-47. URL: https://civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/Report_radicalism_2018_2020.pdf

¹⁴⁷ Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST)//GOV.UK. Policy Paper. URL: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest>

influence their choice to follow a particular radical path.¹⁴⁸ On top of this, there are non-governmental deradicalisation programs (such as EXIT UK), largely run by former extremists, which provide training, education, and mentoring services for people who want to break away from extremist organisations.¹⁴⁹

EU countries are also developing strategic plans in a similar vein. For example, in November 2020, the **German** federal government published a new plan to combat right-wing extremism and racism. More than one billion euros have been allocated for the period 2021-2024 to combat these manifestations. The corresponding budget line for 2021 was supplemented by a separate sum of 150 million euros. According to the plan, four main areas of work have been recognised as appropriate:

1. Raising awareness of the population, strengthening interaction between government agencies and NGOs.
2. Preventive measures.
3. Expanding victim assistance.
4. Recognising and promoting the successes of members of society with a migration background, demonstrating positive examples.¹⁵⁰

The Plan consists of 89 different activities, both aimed at combating specific manifestations, e.g. anti-Gypsy sentiments, racism, anti-Semitism, and others, and in the form of specific programs (educational, aimed at integrating and increasing the representation in public service of people with a migration background, youth, increasing media competence, etc.). The Plan defines the ministries and agencies responsible for the implementation of individual activities.¹⁵¹ In May 2021, a resolution of the Government Commission on Combating Right-Wing Extremism and Racism was promulgated, which contains a higher degree of specificity in the individual measures.¹⁵² At an early stage, civil society organisations were given the opportunity to submit their recommendations and expert assessments to the commission. In August 2020, for

¹⁴⁸ The Channel programme//GOV.UK. Case Study. URL: <https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/the-channel-programme>

¹⁴⁹ See: EXIT UK website. URL: <https://exithate.org/index.html>

¹⁵⁰ Bundesregierung. Kabinettausschuss, Klares Signal gegen Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus, 25.11.2020, URL: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/kabinett-rechtsextremismus-1819828>

¹⁵¹ Maßnahmenkatalog der Bundesregierung zur Bekämpfung von Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus, vom 25.11.2020. URL: <https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/997532/1819984/4f1f9683cf3faddf90e27f09c692abed/2020-11-25-massnahmen-rechtsextremi-data.pdf?download=1>

¹⁵² Abschlussbericht des Kabinettausschusses zur Bekämpfung von Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus, vom 12.05.2021, URL: <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/themen/sicherheit/abschlussbericht-kabinettausschuss-rechtsextremismus.html>

example, this was utilised by the Anti-Discrimination Union (ADVD), an umbrella association of a number of NPOs across the country.¹⁵³

In general, German state institutions focus on four types of support and preventive efforts: (a) educational work at all levels; (b) support for grass-roots social organisations, including migrant associations that have direct contact with the target groups; (c) prohibition measures against radical and extremist organisations of various ideological orientations as well as individuals; and (d) judicial decisions.

Federal target programs are a traditional tool for preventive work of German state institutions. Funds from the state budget are allocated to a certain ministry or agency, which holds a competition among NGOs for project implementation. The main principles are to work at the "lowest" level, to be as close to the target groups as possible, and to work both with those who have already come under the influence of extremist groups and with those who may be susceptible to radical ideologies. Examples of such a program include "Participate in Democracy" (Ministry of Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, over 600 projects nationwide),¹⁵⁴ "Unity through Participation" (Ministry of the Interior, 53 projects in the period 2020-2024),¹⁵⁵ "Uniting for Democracy and Tolerance, Against Extremism and Violence" (Federal Agency for Political Education)¹⁵⁶ and others. As a rule, the projects welcome a comprehensive approach: they not only combat radicalism and extremism in a preventive manner, but also demonstrate the benefits of democracy, peaceful resolution of conflict situations, and show the possibility for everyone to participate in peacebuilding processes.

Germany's National Preventive Program against Islamist Extremism operated under the auspices of the Foreign Ministry between 2016 and 2021. The website of the German Ministry of the Interior summarised its six main working areas as follows:

1. Work at the municipal level, including the smallest settlements.
2. Work with families and social environment, including NGOs and self-help associations for migrants.
3. Work in mosques, houses of worship and religious communities.

¹⁵³ ADVD-Empfehlungen an den Kabinettsausschuss gegen Rechtsextremismus und Rassismus, ADVD, 05.08.2020, URL: <https://www.antidiskriminierung.org/neuigkeiten-1/2020/8/5/advd-empfehlungen-an-den-kabinettsausschuss-gegen-rassismus-und-rechtsextremismus?rq=kabinett>

¹⁵⁴ Programme Demokratie Leben. Extremismusprävention, URL: <https://www.demokratie-leben.de/magazin/magazin-details/extremismuspraevention-64>

¹⁵⁵ Programmem Zusammenhalt durch Teilhabe, URL: <https://www.zusammenhalt-durch-teilhabe.de/>

¹⁵⁶ Bisherige BfDT-Formate Aktiv-Wettbewerb, Jugendkongress und Festakt zur Auszeichnung der "Botschafterinnen für Demokratie und Toleranz" werden in die Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung/bpb überführt, BFD, 22.12.2022, URL: <https://www.buendnis-toleranz.de/service/177321/bisherige-bfdt-formate-aktiv-wettbewerb-jugendkongress-und-auszeichnung-der-botschafterinnen-fuer-demokratie-und-toleranz-werden-in-die-bundeszentrale-fuer-politische-bildung-bpb-ueberfuehrt>

4. Working in the education sector, including schools.
5. Work on the Internet, including social networks.
5. Risk Assessment.
6. Co-operation within and outside the European Union.¹⁵⁷

In parallel, the state authorities publish brochures explaining what Islamism is, its methods, the difference between the world religion Islam and extremism, and "political Islamism."¹⁵⁸ Separate information is intended for Muslim youth in order to prevent them from being drawn into Islamist structures, such as Salafists, who are often the target group of extremists.

One of the preventive tools used in Germany to combat Islamist terrorism is the forcible deportation of persons identified as potentially dangerous, against whom there is strong evidence or strong, substantiated *suspicion of* links to terrorist organisations. In 2020, The European Court of Justice upheld Germany's right to preventively imprison suspects if their actions pose a tangible threat to the national security of the state, although the judges noted the need to keep them separate from other prisoners.¹⁵⁹

A new Counter Extremism Strategy (until 2025) was adopted in May 2020 in **Russia**. The Strategy introduced the concept of "ideology of violence," defined as "a set of views and ideas that justify the use of violence to achieve political, ideological, religious, and other goals."¹⁶⁰

In line with the "Shanghai" model of countering extremism and recent changes in legislation (see Chapter 1), the definition of "manifestations of extremism" has been extended to include acts that threaten the constitutional order and violate the territorial integrity of Russia. The definition of "countering extremism" also includes activities to minimise and eliminate the consequences of extremism.

The new version of the Strategy provides an updated description of external and internal extremist threats.¹⁶¹ According to the new document, external threats now include "support and

¹⁵⁷ Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat, Nationales Präventionsprogramm gegen islamistischen Extremismus, URL: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/themen/sicherheit/praeventionsprogramm-islamismus.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 ; <https://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/radikalisierungspraevention/271943/nationales-praeventionsprogramm-gegen-islamistischen-extremismus-npp>

¹⁵⁸ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Islamistische Aktivitäten erkennen, URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz-mv.de/static/VERF/Dateien/Broschueren/Broschre_Islamistische_Aktivitten_erkennen.pdf

¹⁵⁹ Marcel Leubecher, Deutschland darf Islamisten vor Abschiebung im Gefängnis festhalten, Die Welt, 02.07.2020- URL: <https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article210877511/EuGH-Urteil-Deutschland-darf-Islamisten-vor-Abschiebung-im-Gefaengnis-festhalten.html>

¹⁶⁰ Указ Президента РФ от 29 мая 2020 г. № 344 "Об утверждении Стратегии противодействия экстремизму в Российской Федерации до 2025 года"/Гарант РУ. Информационно-правовой портал, 1 июня 2020. URL: <https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/doc/74094369/>

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

encouragement by a number of states of destructive activities carried out by foreign or international non-governmental organisations aimed at destabilising the socio-political and socio-economic situation in the Russian Federation, violating the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, including the instigation of 'colour revolutions', destroying traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, as well as contributing to the destruction of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values."

The Strategy defines internal threats as attempts to carry out extremist activities by "nationalist, radical public, religious, ethnic, and other organisations and individuals, spreading violent ideology, inducing, recruiting or otherwise involving Russian citizens and foreigners in the country in extremist communities and other illegal activities, as well as the formation of closed ethnic and religious enclaves, and also due to historical and socio-economic factors."¹⁶²

As a potential source of threats, the new Strategy mentions hotbeds of terrorism in the Middle East, the creation of clandestine cells of extremist and terrorist organisations (including through remote recruitment), the danger of radicalisation of migrant workers, and the "information and psychological influence" of foreign intelligence services to "erode traditional Russian spiritual and moral values and destabilise the domestic political and social situation in the country" through "destructive activities" of NGOs "under the guise of humanitarian aid.

The directions of State policy on countering extremism include "improving mechanisms for countering the destructive activities of foreign or international non-governmental organisations," combating the "instigation of colour revolutions," preventing any form of discrimination, and creating an atmosphere of intolerance towards xenophobia in society.

In the area of migration policy, it is proposed to develop adaptation programs for migrants; to counteract the emergence of spatial segregation, the formation of ethnic enclaves, and the social exclusion of certain groups of citizens; to involve civil society institutions and fully inform society about migration processes, and to counteract false information that causes hatred and hostility.

According to the new version of the Strategy, the educational process should form in children "an all-Russian civic identity, patriotism, civic responsibility, a sense of pride in the history of Russia," as well as foster a culture of inter-ethnic and inter-religious communication.

The Strategy also included a list of areas of anti-extremism policy related to civil society: state support for civil society institutions fighting extremism, including veteran and youth organisations, work with socially oriented NGOs, participation of public councils in activities to harmonize inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, and assistance to the media "in broad and objective coverage" of the activities of counter-extremism actors.

¹⁶² Ibid.

On 3 March 2021, at an enlarged meeting of the board of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Russian President V. Putin called on law enforcement officers to suppress propaganda of nationalism, xenophobia, religious hatred, and violence. "The most serious attention should be paid to the fight against extremism. I ask you to strictly suppress propaganda of nationalism, xenophobia, religious hatred and violence, to bring to justice provocateurs who run away, hide, and if they are caught by the hand - repent, and people are pushed on the path of offences," the Russian leader said.¹⁶³

The period under review saw significant changes in law enforcement practices to prevent violent extremism, counter-terrorism, and hate crimes in the **United States**. The main reason was the events of 6 January 2021, when crowds of right-wing D. Trump supporters stormed the Capitol. FBI Director Christopher A. Wray testified at a Senate hearing at the time about violent extremism that almost led to an insurrection.¹⁶⁴ The extremists' actions were too serious to fall under the hate crime label and were labelled domestic terrorism (DT).

This is why, early in his presidency, Joe Biden initiated a 100-day comprehensive review of the U.S. government's efforts to combat domestic terrorism (DT). An unclassified summary of that assessment was released in March 2021. A second FBI assessment of the DT situation was released in October 2022.¹⁶⁵ According to this assessment, the two most lethal elements of today's domestic terrorism threat in the U.S. are: a) racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists advocating white supremacy; and b) violent extremists opposed to the government or authorities, such as militia violent extremists.

The review resulted in the groundbreaking National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which was released by the Biden administration in 2021.¹⁶⁶ This document officially recognises for the first time that it is right-wing, racially motivated anti-government violence that poses a greater threat than so-called Islamist violent extremism and terrorism.¹⁶⁷¹⁶⁸

¹⁶³ Расширенное заседание коллегии МВД России//Президент России, 3 марта 2021 г. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65090>

¹⁶⁴ Our President Wants Us Here: The Mob That Stormed the Capital// New York Times, 2021/01/09. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-rioters.html> .

¹⁶⁵ Appendix C, "Wide-Ranging Domestic Violent Extremist Threat to Persist," https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/2022_10_FBI-DHS_Strategic_Intelligence_Assessment_and_Data_on_Domestic_Terrorism.pdf .

¹⁶⁶ FACT SHEET: National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism//White House, June 15, 2021. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/15/fact-sheet-national-strategy-for-countering-domestic-terrorism/>

¹⁶⁷ National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism//National Security Council, June, 2021. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National-Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf>

¹⁶⁸ 18 U.S. CODE § 2331(5) - DOMESTIC TERRORISM//EG. URL: <HTTPS://WWW.THEFEDERALCRIMINALATTORNEYS.COM/DOMESTIC-TERRORISM>

Under U.S. federal law (18 U.S. Code § 2331(5)), domestic terrorism is defined as "activity involving acts dangerous to human life that are in violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state; where it appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence government policy through intimidation or coercion, or to influence government conduct through mass destruction, murder, or kidnapping."

It is important to note that despite this federal definition, *there is no federal criminal statute* that explicitly defines domestic terrorism as a criminal offence, as this is contrary to the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment to the US Constitution, which protects, among other things, freedom of speech, press, and assembly.¹⁶⁹ Whereas international terrorism is codified by US law as a separate offence with all its implications, domestic terrorism, although mentioned in the US Code of Laws, is not codified as a separate offence with its own special characteristics. Therefore, a "domestic" terrorist can be convicted in the U.S. for any violent crime or weapons possession, but not for terrorism.

Under the new National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security use the term "domestic violent extremism" (DVE) in accordance with the American concept of extremism (see above) to refer to individuals who pose a domestic terrorist threat, which is currently considered the "most urgent terrorist threat" in the United States.¹⁷⁰ A person suspected of DVE is defined as "an individual based and operating primarily in the United States or its territories *without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power* who seeks to achieve political or social objectives, in whole or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence dangerous to human life."¹⁷¹ The word "violent" is important because the mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or general philosophical acceptance of violent tactics does not constitute violent extremism and is protected, as already indicated, by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Threat Assessment (2021), DVE posed an elevated threat in 2021.¹⁷² Among DVEs promoting various ideologies,

¹⁶⁹ Constitution. The Bill Of Rights//The White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/our-government/the-constitution/#:~:text=The%20First%20Amendment%20provides%20that,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances.>

¹⁷⁰ FACT SHEET: National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism//White House, June 15, 2021. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/15/fact-sheet-national-strategy-for-countering-domestic-terrorism/>

¹⁷¹ Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on Domestic Terrorism// Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Homeland Security, October 2022. URL: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-10/22_1025_strategic-intelligence-assessment-data-domestic-terrorism.pdf

¹⁷² (U) Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021/Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 01 March 2021. URL: <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment-17MAR21.pdf>

racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) and militias of violent extremists (MVEs) were identified for the first time as the most dangerous threats, noting that racially and ethnically motivated extremists are capable of conducting mass casualty attacks against civilians, while militia members typically target law enforcement and government personnel as well as government facilities.¹⁷³ Meanwhile, the text of the National Strategy asserts that RMVEs are "convinced of white supremacy, which calls for violence in support of perverse and repugnant notions of racial 'purity' or 'cleansing'."¹⁷⁴ All of this is a significant departure from the United States' earlier 2018 National Counterterrorism Strategy, which stated that "radical Islamist terrorists remain a serious transnational terrorist threat to the United States and its vital national interests."¹⁷⁵

Finally, radical leftist, anarchist militant extremists (AVEs) have also been categorised as domestic terrorism. After being ignored as a relatively lesser threat (in terms of lethality), it was identified as an emerging heightened threat to democracy and society in 2021.¹⁷⁶

Some changes have also occurred with regard to Islamist violent extremism. After a series of mistakes and harm to civilians in US counterterrorism operations against ISIL abroad, when it became known that more than 1,300 civilians had been killed there since 2014,¹⁷⁷ in October 2022 the US imposed restrictions on counterterrorism drone strikes in war zones.¹⁷⁸ Also in October 2022, the Biden administration released, according to US media reports, a new secret policy memorandum (PPM),¹⁷⁹ outlining the conduct of counter-terrorism drone strikes outside conventional combat zones. These strikes are now limited to known terrorists who are "almost certainly" beyond civilians.

The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2020-2021 and the subsequent assassination of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in July 2022, and even earlier, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in December 2021, marked the end of the war on Islamist

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ FACT SHEET: National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism//White House, June 15, 2021. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/15/fact-sheet-national-strategy-for-countering-domestic-terrorism/>

¹⁷⁵ National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America//President of the United States of America, October 2018. URL: https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/NSCT.pdf

¹⁷⁶ (U) Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021/Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 01 March 2021. URL:

<https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment-17MAR21.pdf>

¹⁷⁷ Rowan Philp, How the NYT's Pulitzer-Winning Series Exposed Civilian Deaths in the Air War on ISIS//Global Investigative Journalism Network, May 30, 2022. URL: <https://gijn.org/2022/05/30/nyt-pulitzer-prize-investigation-exposed-civilian-death-toll-isis-air-war/>

¹⁷⁸ Luke Hartig, The Biden Drone Playbook: The Elusive Promise of Restrained Counterterrorism//Just Security, October 17, 2022. URL: <https://www.justsecurity.org/83586/assessing-bidens-counterterrorism-rules/>

¹⁷⁹ Oona A. Hathaway, Biden's New Counterterrorism Policy Guidance Further Entrenches the Forever War// Just Security, October 11, 2022. URL: <https://www.justsecurity.org/83487/bidens-new-counterterrorism-policy-guidance-further-entrenches-forever-war/>

terrorism and the end of prioritising the fight against it over other security threats. The former has been replaced by domestic terrorism, the war in Ukraine, and competition with China, which are now of primary concern to the Biden administration.¹⁸⁰ Aside from the small training contingents remaining in Iraq and Syria and other efforts, the only place where there is a significant U.S. troop presence is Somalia, where the fight against al-Shabaab continues. Unlike his predecessors, Biden has not made a major speech on international terrorism, nor is there a new publicly available national strategy for international counterterrorism (the latest is dated October 2018).¹⁸¹

However, to fully end the war on Islamist terrorism, the U.S. will need a complete legislative reform that repeals the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF; 2001)¹⁸² and the War Powers Resolution (1973.)¹⁸³ Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to conduct airstrikes in the Middle East and keeps open Guantanamo Bay prison, where as of March 2023 there are still 31 prisoners, all of whom are foreign Muslims (most of whom have been there for over twenty years) without charge.¹⁸⁴ In addition, from the perspective of U.S. experts, the current administration is not fully transparent in its counterterrorism operations, and in the absence of new legislation, this could lead the next president, especially if it turns out to be a Republican, to change course again.¹⁸⁵

In any case, the current American administration is keen to do away with the theme of Islamic terrorism and change the perception of America as a country where Muslims are associated with terror. While his predecessor in the White House infamously proclaimed: "Islam hates us," Biden organised a White House celebration of the Muslim holiday of Uraza Bayram (Eid al-Fitr) during which he declared that "Muslims are making our nation stronger every day."¹⁸⁶ U.S. Muslims, however, report an increase in hate crimes (see below).

In 2022, the **Bulgarian** government began developing an action plan to combat anti-Semitism. The development of the action plan is preceded by the first ever special public opinion

¹⁸⁰ Biden's National Security Strategy Focuses on China, Russia and Democracy at Home//New York Times, October 12, 2022. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/12/us/politics/biden-china-russia-national-security.html>

¹⁸¹ National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America//President of the United States of America, October 2018. URL: https://www.dni.gov/files/NCTC/documents/news_documents/NSCT.pdf

¹⁸² PUBLIC LAW 107-40-SEPT. 18, 2001//U.S. Congress. URL: <https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf>

¹⁸³ CHAPTER 33-WAR POWERS RESOLUTION//U.S.Code House. GOV. URL: <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title50/chapter33&edition=prelim>

¹⁸⁴ Now is the Time to Finally Close Guantanamo/Amnesty International. URL: <https://www.amnestyusa.org/2022-the-year-to-finally-close-guantanamo/>

¹⁸⁵ See: Brian Finucane and Luke Hartig, Permanently Winding Down the War on Terror Requires Greater Transparency//Just Security, January 30, 2023. URL: <https://www.justsecurity.org/84939/permanently-winding-down-the-war-on-terror-requires-greater-transparency/>

¹⁸⁶ Remarks by President Biden at a Reception to Celebrate Eid al-Fitr, May 02, 2022//The White House. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/05/02/remarks-by-president-biden-at-a-reception-to-celebrate-eid-al-fitr/>

poll and survey on attitudes towards Jews in Bulgaria, which aims to provide policymakers with reliable and valid data to develop a course of action and to introduce the practice of regular surveys on attitudes towards Jews.¹⁸⁷

It should also be noted the intolerant reaction of both the Bulgarian government and other public services to manifestations of anti-Semitism in the academic environment. For example, on 17 January 2020, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences organised a roundtable together with the Ministry of Defense to present a report entitled "*Labour conscription of Jews during World War II: a rescue plan or a repressive measure?*," which denied that the authorities forced the male Jewish population to be sent to labour camps in the early 1940s, and argued that instead the army labour corps conscripted Jews as part of a government plan "to save them from the Nazis." The Ministry of Education and Culture, the VMRO, and several non-governmental organisations such as the Bulgarian-Jewish Research Institute and the Independent Historical Society supported the roundtable. The «Shalom» Society, for its part, criticised the event as a "disturbing revisionist attempt to distort the history of the Holocaust" at all institutional levels. It was supported by the country's Foreign Ministry. In a January 30 speech, Foreign Minister Ekaterina Zakharijeva said that sending Jews to labour camps during World War II was part of an "anti-Semitic repressive machine" created through anti-Semitic legislation.¹⁸⁸

In 2020, **France's** Central Office for Combating Crimes against Humanity and Hate Crimes (OCCLCH), which seeks out and prosecutes war criminals and their accomplices who have sought refuge in the country (many of whom are accused of involvement in the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda), created a separate unit responsible for combating hate speech. France follows the so-called "European" model of combating extremism (see above), i.e. it has criminalised the spread of hatred. The unit employs about 10 people and is responsible for prosecuting racist, anti-Semitic, anti-religious, and anti-LGBTQI+ propaganda, especially on the Internet. The new unit is obliged to respond not only to requests and instructions from the prosecutor's office, but also to citizens' complaints filed through the PHAROS system for reporting illegal activities on the Internet.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ The sociological survey on "Public Attitudes towards Anti-Semitism and Hate Speech in Bulgaria" was conducted by the Sociological and Marketing Research Agency Alpha Research and presented on 5 April 2022. The full text of the survey (in Bulgarian) is available at: <https://alpharesearch.bg/post/996-obshtestveni-naglasii-kum-antisemitizma-i-ezika-na-omrazata-mnenieto-nashirokata-obshtestvenost-i-na-evreiskata-obshtnost.html?lang=bg> - *author's note*.

¹⁸⁸ 2020 International Religious Freedom Annual Report: Bulgaria, U.S. Department of State, 2021. URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-report-on-international-religious-freedom/bulgaria/>

¹⁸⁹ Signaler un contenu suspect ou illicite avec PHAROS//Ministere de l'Interieur et des Outre-Mer. URL: <https://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-de-la-rubrique-Ma-securite/Signaler-un-contenu-suspect-ou-illicite-avec-PHAROS>

The scope of the new unit was expanded by decree of 21 December 2021.¹⁹⁰ Its activities have already yielded results. In particular, following an investigation, Holocaust denier Vincent Renoir, who had fled France to avoid imprisonment, was found in Scotland and is now in prison awaiting trial for his extradition.¹⁹¹ According to General Jean-Philippe Reyland, head of the OCCLCH, 80 per cent of the unit's cases involve the internet and social media.¹⁹²

2.2 Court Judgements, Sentences and Indictments

In general, the number of charges and convictions increased during the monitoring period, primarily due to increased prosecutions for spreading hatred online. This was especially true during the pandemic, when people were forced to stay at home and spend time online. At the same time, this process was not the same and unambiguous everywhere.

In the **UK**, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) reported in a data summary that the conviction rate for hate crime increased to 81% in the fourth quarter of 2021/22, up from 79% in 2020/21 and 77% in the 2019/20 season.¹⁹³ This was the result, amongst other things, of continued efforts to meet the 55% conviction rate target that was set by the Crown Prosecution Service back in 2016 as part of its strategic plan to tackle hate crime in 2017-20.¹⁹⁴

However, when analysing the data for the current reporting period in more depth, a mixed picture emerges. The number of annual prosecutions has been falling from 2016/17 to 2020/21, with 2019/20 representing the largest percentage decrease over this period.¹⁹⁵ The CPS also reported that in the fourth quarter of 2021/22, the number of cases received by the police decreased by 10 per cent compared to the previous year.¹⁹⁶ It fell from 10,969 in 2020/21 to 9,836 in 2021/22. Finally, the overall percentage of convictions compared to non-convictions increased slightly

¹⁹⁰ Décret n° 2021-1738 du 21 décembre 2021 portant modification du décret n° 2013-987 du 5 novembre 2013 portant création d'un office central de lutte contre les crimes contre l'humanité, les génocides et les crimes de guerre/Legifrance. URL: <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000044546424>

¹⁹¹ Paul Conge, Le négationniste Vincent Reynouard arrêté en Écosse après deux ans de cavale/Marianne, 13/11/22. URL: <https://www.marianne.net/societe/police-et-justice/le-negationniste-vincent-reynouard-arrete-en-ecosse-apres-deux-ans-de-cavale>

¹⁹² La haine en ligne, cheval de bataille de l'OCLCH// Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Outre-Mer, 01/09/22. URL: <https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/gendinfo/paroles-de-gendarmes/la-haine-en-ligne-cheval-de-bataille-de-l-oclch>

¹⁹³ CPS data summary Quarter 4 2021-2022//CPS. URL: <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/cps-data-summary-quarter-4-2021-2022#:~:text=Overall%2C%20the%20volume%20of%20police,to%208805%20in%202021%2D2022>

¹⁹⁴ UK Crown Prosecution Service, 'Hate Crime Strategy, 2017-2020'. URL: <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/CPS-Hate-Crime-Strategy-2020-Feb-2018.pdf>, p. 3.

¹⁹⁵ CPS data summary Quarter 4 2021-2022//CPS, 20.07.2021. URL: <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/cps-data-summary-quarter-4-2020-2021>

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

(from 81.9% to 83.3% quarter-on-quarter at the end of 2022), while there was also a slight increase in executed convictions (up 4.1% on the previous quarter).¹⁹⁷

According to the data of the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the **Russian Federation**, we can talk about an increase in the number of those convicted under the "anti-extremist" articles of the Criminal Code (Art. 282, 280, 280.1, 205.2, 354.1, Parts 1 and 2 148, 282.1, 282.2, 205.4, 205.5). After a temporary decline in 2019 caused by the decriminalisation of Art. 282 - 602 persons in 2020, 1,102 in 2021, and with 571 persons convicted in January-June 2022, a figure of at least 1,100 persons in 2022 is clearly expected. In addition, under Articles 20.3 and 20.31 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO) ("Demonstration of Nazi symbols and symbols of banned organisations" and "Incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as humiliation of human dignity"), 2,936 people were convicted in 2020, 4,110 in 2021, and 2,690 in January-June 2022. Under article 20.29 of the Code of Administrative Offences "Dissemination of extremist materials," 1,825, 1,319, and 507 persons were convicted respectively.¹⁹⁸

On 9 February 2021, the chairman of the Russian Supreme Court, Vyacheslav Lebedev, told an all-Russian seminar-conference of judges of courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts that according to his data, 575 people were convicted on "terrorist" articles in 2020, and 325 for extremist crimes.

According to the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, 217 persons were punished under Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences (violation of legislation on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and religious associations) in 2020, 201 in 2021, and 105 in January-June 2022.¹⁹⁹ Most were punished for issuing or distributing literature within the framework of missionary activities without indicating their official full name, or for not having a permit to conduct missionary activities.

We should note the high proportion of sentences involving actual deprivation of liberty - 60 in 2020, 130 in 2021, and 114 in 2022.

Notable cases include the following: On 23 December 2020, the Presnensky District Court of Moscow passed a verdict in the case of anti-Semitic writers Oleg Platonov (the largest publisher

¹⁹⁷UK Crown Prosecution Service, "CPS Data Summary Q4 2021-2022," URL: <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/cps-data-summary-quarter-4-2021-2022#:~:text=All%2C%20%20%20volume%20%20%20of%20police,to%208805%20in%20202021%2D2022>.

¹⁹⁸ Сводные статистические сведения о деятельности федеральных судов общей юрисдикции и мировых судей за 2020 год // Судебный департамент при Верховном Суде Российской Федерации. URL: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=5671>; Сводные статистические сведения о деятельности федеральных судов общей юрисдикции и мировых судей за 2020 год // Судебный департамент при Верховном Суде Российской Федерации. URL: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=6120>; Сводные статистические сведения о состоянии судимости в России за 1 полугодие 2022 года // Судебный департамент при Верховном Суде Российской Федерации. URL: <http://www.cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=7069>

¹⁹⁹ Судебный департамент ВС РФ. URL: <http://cdep.ru/index.php?id=79&item=6120>

of anti-Semitic literature in Russia) and Valery Yerchak, sentencing them to suspended terms of imprisonment.²⁰⁰

On 9 June 2021, the Basmanny District Court of Moscow sentenced A. Bereznyy for the murder of a gay man to 9 years in a strict regime colony. In November 2021, the Moscow City Court commuted the sentence to 8 years and 9 months' imprisonment.²⁰¹

On 16 December 2021, the magistrate court of the Leninsky district of Yaroslavl fined Andrei Palachev, chairman of the board of the military-patriotic club "Desantnik," five thousand rubles, whose wards, during the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the club, took a gas-silicate block with the inscription "Death to pi...m" (homosexuals) to the stage and smashed it with a sledgehammer.²⁰²

On 25 December 2021, Krasnodar's Pervomaysky District Court sentenced Zoya Malova, a 70-year-old supporter of the Citizens of the USSR, to six years in prison in the case of the attempted assassination of a rabbi.²⁰³

In July 2022, the Mytishchi City Court of the Moscow region handed down sentences in connection with the notorious neo-Nazi murder of two people that took place in 2007, when the video "Execution of a Tajik and a Dag" appeared on the Internet, sentencing S. Marshakov to 17 years of strict regime and M. Aristarkhov to 16 years of strict regime. In December 2020, six more people suspected of complicity in this murder and a number of other neo-Nazi crimes of the early 2000s were arrested as part of the investigation into this case.²⁰⁴

On 28 October 2022, the 1st Eastern District Military Court passed a verdict in the case of a Vladivostok resident who was preparing to blow up a mosque. The court recognised the sentence of 16 years' imprisonment with the first 5 years to be served in prison and the rest of the sentence to be served in a strict regime penal colony.

In December 2022, a court in Belgorod sentenced three of the eight members of the White City 31 gang, including its leader, David Tronenko. The court sentenced David Tronenko to 12 years in prison, his brother Andrei to 3, and Poderyagin to 4. It is important to emphasise that the

²⁰⁰ Суд в Москве приговорил писателей Платонова и Ерчака к условным срокам за возбуждение ненависти//Агентство городских новостей. Москва, 23.12.2020/ URL:

<https://www.mskagency.ru/materials/3073347>

²⁰¹ Мосгорсуд снизил срок осужденному за убийство гомосексуала на Курском вокзале до 8 лет и 9 месяцев//Такие дела, 3 ноября 2021. URL: <https://takiedela.ru/news/2021/11/03/mosgorsud-snizil-srok/>

²⁰² В Ярославле гомофобный скандал с юными десантниками завершился штрафом//YARNEWS. Ярославский информационный портал, 16.12.2021. URL:

https://www.yarnews.net/news/show/accidents/60541/v_yaroslavle_gomofobnyj_skandal_s_yunymi_desantnika_mi_zavershilsya_shtrafom_.htm

²⁰³ Кубанский суд приговорил к 6 годам колонии 70-летнюю сторонницу «Граждан СССР» по делу о покушении на раввина//Медиазона, 25 декабря 2021 г. URL: <https://zona.media/news/2021/12/25/ussr>

²⁰⁴ В деле Тесака наступил особый порядок// Коммерсантъ, 27.07.2022. URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5481761>

TASS news agency published his origin as "native of Ukraine,"²⁰⁵ which, like the mentioning of ethnicity in criminal reports, can contribute to incitement of hatred on ethnic grounds.

In **Hungary**, in general, it can be argued that the number of registered hate crimes is gradually decreasing, while the number of court decisions/sentences is on the contrary increasing. This can be considered a positive result, but legal statistics do not always correspond to the reality determined by the dominance of right-wing and far-right political forces in the country.

Another issue relates to the enforcement of judgements. According to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, detailed statistics on the number of cases in which court judgements are not enforced, including those in which the non-enforcement is due to the fault of state authorities, are not publicly available. The enforcement process is hampered by practical shortcomings that need to be addressed, and the existing system of sanctions and jurisprudence does not effectively deter non-enforcement. State authorities also have the possibility to circumvent ordinary court judgements by appealing to the Constitutional Court. This is made possible by a new form of constitutional complaint introduced in 2019, which allows public bodies to challenge final court judgements by claiming that their rights have been violated. As a result, constitutional complaints not only protect the rights of individuals against public authorities, but also provide constitutional protection for public authorities in their suits against individuals.²⁰⁶

During the period under review, there were also several lawsuits related to the segregation of Roma, as illustrated by the case of the Hungarian school in Gyöngyöspát. The school illegally segregated Roma minority students for many years, and the country's Supreme Court (Kuria) awarded the children's families 100 million HUF (\$310,000) in compensation in May 2020.²⁰⁷

In November 2020, the verdict of the Constitutional Court of the **Federal Republic of Germany** received a great deal of media attention. An employee of a private company was dismissed for making racist remarks about his black colleague. The dismissed employee lost his lawsuits in various courts in Cologne and in the High Labour Court. The Constitutional Court upheld the validity of the dismissal, stating that the invocation of the constitutional right to freedom

²⁰⁵ В Белгородской области судят группу экстремистов, которую возглавлял уроженец Украины//ТАСС, 26 ноября 2022 г. URL:

https://tass.ru/proisshestiya/16433715?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fzen.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D

²⁰⁶ Non-execution of domestic and international court judgments in Hungary Research report summary December 2021. URL: https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/01/HHC_Non-Execution_of_Court_Judgments_2021_summary.pdf

²⁰⁷ Reuters. (2020). Hungarian top court confirms Roma unlawfully segregated, awards damages. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/hungary-roma-segregation-ruling-idUKL8N2CU61V>

of opinion in this case was groundless: the plaintiff had violated fundamental individual rights (AZ 1 BvR 2727/19B).²⁰⁸

In October 2022, the German Constitutional Court found that the rule in force since 2019, according to which asylum seekers living in hostels receive 10 per cent less benefits than those with the same status outside the hostels, contradicts the tenets of equal rights and equal provision of all persons with minimum means consistent with human dignity. The rule should be repealed (Az. 1 BvL 3/21).²⁰⁹

This period also saw the injunctions of several German right-wing extremist organisations. Here is a list of them. In 2020: "Combat 18" (the German branch of a neo-Nazi network based in the UK), "Association of German Peoples," "Northern Eagle," "Assault Group 44;" and in 2021: "National Socialists of Rostock and Baltic Corps."²¹⁰ Analysing the activities of these groups allows us to note three unifying factors. Firstly, they are small groups of several dozen people, formally registered as NPOs. Secondly, virtually all right-wing radical groups were either connected with criminals or are themselves engaged in criminally punishable activities. Thirdly, the process of finally banning a group takes a considerable period of time, not least because of its NPO status.

The decision of the Berlin court authorising the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to call the "Identity Movement" right-wing extremist is significant. The "Movement" positions itself as a "legitimate defender of the ethnic majority" in European states on the basis of the theory of "Identitarianism," against the "threat" posed by Islam. In June 2020, despite the allegedly non-violent forms of protest practised by this movement, the court recognised it as right-wing extremist. The main reasoning is that not only is the ideology of the Identitarians racist, but their calls for "purity of race" and the recognition of certain ethnic groups as "second-class citizens" may well motivate the movement's supporters to violence (AZ 1 L 188/20).²¹¹

Also in the past period, higher courts have upheld a number of sentences handed down by primary courts. For example, in May 2021, the Higher Court of Justice confirmed the validity of

²⁰⁸ "Menschenverachtende Diskriminierung": Verfassungsgericht bestätigt Kündigung wegen rassistischer Affenlaute// Tagesspiegel, 24.11.2020. URL: <https://m.tagesspiegel.de/politik/menschenverachtende-diskriminierung-verfassungsgericht-bestaetigt-kuendigung-wegen-rassistischer-affenlaute/26653848.html>

²⁰⁹ Tanja Podolski, Alleinstehenden Asylbewerber steht mehr Geld zu// Legal Tribune Online, 24.11.2022. URL: <https://www.lto.de/recht/nachrichten/n/bverfg-1-bvl-3-21-berechnung-leistungen-asylbewerber-existenzminimum-verstoss-menschenwuerde/>

²¹⁰ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Rechtsextremismus: Symbole, Zeichen und verbotene Organisationen, vom September 2022. URL: <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/rechtsextremismus/2022-02-rechtsextremismus-symbole-zeichen-ofranizationen.html>

²¹¹ Verfassungsschutz darf "Identitäre Bewegung" als "gesichert rechtsextremistisch" bezeichnen, Beschluss vom 19.06.2020 // Kostenlose-Urteile. URL: https://www.kostenlose-urteile.de/VG-Berlin_1-L-18820_Verfassungsschutz-darf-Identitaere-Bewegung-als-gesichert-rechtsextremistisch-bezeichnen.news28905.htm

the conviction of eight far-right members of the terrorist group Chemnitz Revolution, who had set up a neo-Nazi network and discussed plans to organise riots and violence on the Internet.²¹²

In addition to radical right-wing symbols and organisations, Islamist associations and symbols are also banned. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz, BfV) informs about this on its website. Thus, in 2020, a ban on Hizbollah was issued.²¹³ In 2021, several pseudo-social organisations with quite peaceful names were banned: "Give Peace," "People for People," and "German-Lebanese Family." In the same year, the German branch of Ansaar, a large network declaring aid to the needy in Syria, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Somalia, was liquidated, along with 10 subsidiary organisations in Germany. In practice, following surveillance, German security services concluded that the organisation was involved in financing Hamas and Middle Eastern terrorist groups.²¹⁴

In December 2020, the High Court in Belgrade, **Serbia**, issued a final judgement against the police, finding that the ill-treatment of the Romani couple was ethnically motivated. However, it should be noted that the guilt of individual law enforcement officers was never established, as the prosecution authorities and internal police services failed to conduct a proper investigation but managed to charge the victims with "knowingly false denunciation," a baseless charge that was later dropped. The couple complained of ill-treatment by Belgrade police after reporting that their car had been stolen. They were held in custody for 13 hours, threatened with imprisonment, and suffered from the removal of their children. Officers pointed a gun at the man and put a bag over his head, prevented the couple from calling their lawyer, and forced them to sign documents they had not read and could not carry with them.

There is a case of the General Prosecutor's Office and a court decision in Subotica in December 2021 in a hate crime case, when a citizen of Croatian nationality was attacked. The perpetrator was convicted. The only proceedings conducted so far against foreign fighters from Serbia defined as terrorist activities concern seven Serbian citizens of the Muslim faith. They were charged with terrorist association under Article 393a of the Serbian Criminal Code, financing of terrorism under Article 393 of the Criminal Code, recruitment and training for terrorist acts under

²¹² BGH bestätigt Urteil gegen Mitglieder der rechtsextremistischen terroristischen Vereinigung "Revolution Chemnitz," Beschluss vom 20.05.2021 // Kostenlose-Urteile. URL: https://www.kostenlose-urteile.de/BGH_3-StR-41820_BGH-bestaetigt-Urteil-gegen-Mitglieder-der-rechtsextremistischen-terroristischen-Vereinigung-Revolution-Chemnitz.news30368.htm

²¹³ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Islamismus und islamischer Terrorismus. URL: <https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/arbeitsfelder/af-islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/verbotene-ofranizationen-islamismus>

²¹⁴ Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat, Bundesinnenminister verbietet islamistisches Netzwerk Ansaar International e.V.// Pressemitteilung vom 05.05.2021. URL: <https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/pressemitteilungen/DE/2021/05/verbotsverfahren-ansaar.html>

Article 393b, and public incitement to commit terrorist acts under Article 391a of the Criminal Code.

In 2020, for the first time, a ban on the "Lukov March," an ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi youth torchlight procession celebrating the legacy of a **Bulgarian** pro-Nazi politician, in the Bulgarian capital Sofia, was upheld by Bulgaria's Supreme Administrative Court and the procession was subsequently cancelled. The Court's decision was preceded by a decision by the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office to apply to the Court to cancel the registration under the Non-Governmental Organisations Act of the Bulgarian National Union (BNS) Edelweiss, the organiser of the "Lukov March." During the investigation, the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office identified numerous public statements by members of the leadership and activists of the BNU "Edelweiss," and statements and opinions of the organisation containing incitement to violence and incitement to hatred on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds. In June 2022, a court in Sofia ordered Boyan Rassate, a candidate of the Bulgarian National Union party for the 2021 presidential election, to pay a fine of BGN 3,000 (EUR 1,500) for breaking into the Rainbow Hub LGBTI community centre in 2021, during which the facility was vandalised.

In the **U.S.**, the number of FBI domestic terrorism investigations has more than doubled since 2020, and the number of open FBI investigations in particular has more than quadrupled from 1,981 in 2013 to 9,049 in 2021.²¹⁵ The annual number of prosecutions and indictments in federal district courts increased from 175 in 2020 to 449 in 2021. In total, from October 2010 to July 2021, 1,584 defendants in 1,255 cases were charged in federal district court with domestic terrorism.²¹⁶

In 2020, there were 7,759 cases of racist offences involving 6,740 people in the judicial system of the **French Republic**, 5% more than in 2019. After prosecution, only 2,858 of them were brought to trial (45%). The reason why only this number of suspects were prosecuted is either because the offence was not sufficiently documented and was therefore dropped, or that the prosecutor's office preferred alternative measures. In any case, only 955 racist offenders received a criminal sanction in 2020, and although this is +10% compared to 2019, it is still too low compared to the number of offences committed. The reason given by the judiciary is that in many cases it is difficult to prove a racist motive in committing an offence.²¹⁷

²¹⁵ The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. and Federal Efforts to Combat It//U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 02, 2023. URL: <https://www.gao.gov/blog/rising-threat-domestic-terrorism-u.s.-and-federal-efforts-combat-it#:~:text=The%20number%20of%20FBI%20domestic,to%209%2C049%20in%20FY%202021>

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ ECRI Report on Bulgaria. Adopted on 28 June 2022. URL: <https://rm.coe.int/ecri-sixth-report-on-bulgaria/1680a83581>

In 2021, a major racial profiling case illustrating discriminatory police practices against black and Indigenous Canadians began trial in **Canada**. The case challenges the right of police to arbitrarily stop and detain drivers without suspicion and outside of a sobriety checkpoint. The lawsuit argues that this arbitrary power of arrest allows for racial profiling and is a manifestation of an unnecessary and unconstitutional law enforcement function.²¹⁸

According to the State Judicial Administration²¹⁹ of **Ukraine**, in 2022, 28 cases were pending in court against 29 persons under article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine "Violation of equal rights of citizens on the basis of their race, nationality, or attitude to religion." Nineteen of these cases were filed during the year. The court considered 16 proceedings, 11 of which resulted in a judgement against 12 people. A guilty verdict was passed in 7 proceedings; 1 was returned to the prosecutor in respect of one person; 3 cases were closed in respect of 3 persons. A total of 12 persons were convicted. It is noted that no punishment was imposed on 9 persons, but a probationary period was imposed. At the end of the reporting period, 12 proceedings against 12 persons remained pending in court.

The Greek authorities informed of seven court judgements in 2022 in which defendants were convicted of offences with a racist or homophobic motivation recognised by the court, including racist murder.²²⁰

2.3 Discriminatory Practices

In 2022, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the case of **Paketova and Others v Bulgaria**,²²¹ concerning the forced eviction of an entire neighborhood in 2019. The practice and legislation supporting this is still ongoing and there is largely no change.

In October 2022, the ECHR ruled that the authorities had violated the right to private and family life of Roma living in Voyevodinovo, Bulgaria, who were evicted from their homes during violent anti-Roma protests in 2019, and ordered the authorities to pay compensation. In August 2022, the national Commission for Protection against Discrimination stated that the eviction of Roma from Voyvodinovo was an act of discrimination. In this regard, the European Commission

²¹⁸ Trial Begins in Major Constitutional Challenge Targeting Racial Profiling//Canadian Civil Liberties Association, May 30, 2022. URL: <https://ccla.org/press-release/trial-begins-in-major-constitutional-challenge-targeting-racial-profiling/>

²¹⁹ Response of the State Judicial Administration 8.03.2023 No. inf. /B 294-23- 305/23.

²²⁰ ECRI REPORT ON GREECE (sixth monitoring cycle)// Council of Europe, 28 June 2022, p.16. URL:

<https://rm.coe.int/ecri-first-report-on-greece-adopted-on-28-june-2022-published-on-22-se/1680a818bf>

²²¹ CASE OF PAKETOVA AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA (*Applications nos. 17808/19 and 36972/19*)//European Court of Human Rights. URL:

<https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#%22tabview%22:%22document%22,%22itemid%22:%22001-219776%22>]

against Racism and Intolerance called on the authorities to do more to combat hate speech and prejudice against Roma.²²²

According to the Standing Romani Conference, local authorities disproportionately target illegal Romani dwellings for demolition and evict Romani families without providing adequate alternative housing.²²³ NPOs alleged that local authorities and politicians "penalise" Romani communities for political gain. For example, in May, local activists from Democratic Bulgaria (a political alliance) initiated a check on the address registration of residents in the Roma neighborhood in Razlog and asked the regional building authority to demolish houses in the area after a group of Roma attacked and beat a 25-year-old man in a restaurant. In July, the mayor of Gurkovo cut off the water supply to a local Romani neighborhood after residents became more insistent that he fulfil campaign promises made during the 2019 local elections.

According to the umbrella coalition of NGOs Standing Roma Conference, national census staff in September refused to register residents of the neighborhood of Nadezhda in Silven who wished to identify their ethnicity as "Roma." Similarly, United Macedonian Organisation-Ilinden cited cases in Blagoevgrad where national census staff told people they visited that "Macedonian" was not an available ethnic identification option.

Romani NGOs stated that municipalities impose discriminatory requirements that limit Romani women's access to reproductive health services. For example, assisted reproduction programs in Veliko Tarnovo, Vratsa, and Kyustendil require the mother to have completed high school. According to BHC and Médecins Sans Frontières, Romani women are regularly segregated in hospital maternity wards. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has expressed concern about "the persistence of child and/or forced marriages, in particular among Romani girls." NGOs criticised the authorities for treating early marriage as an ethnic Romani rather than a gender issue but acknowledged that child marriage is widespread in Romani communities.

In general, it should be noted that members of the Roma community have been particularly hard hit by the authorities' response to the pandemic, especially as many of them have precarious employment in the informal economy.²²⁴

As the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) notes in its 2020 report, some government measures taken in response to the COVID-19 crisis, not only in Bulgaria but also in a number of other countries, have targeted groups such as

²²² 2021 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Bulgaria//ecoi.net. URL: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2071249.html>

²²³ 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Bulgaria. URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bulgaria/>,2022

²²⁴ Ibid.

Roma, refugees, and asylum seekers without evidence of any public health risks posed by these groups, leading to further discrimination against them.²²⁵

Forced evictions of Roma in **Greece** are also one of the main problems faced by Roma in the country. Landlords are reportedly reluctant to rent to Roma and because of the negative attitudes towards them prevalent in large parts of the country, local authorities allegedly favour evictions. Reasonable efforts to promote Roma rights have been made at the national level, but not at the local level.

According to ECRI and non-governmental organisations, refugees, asylum seekers, and other migrants, as well as Roma and members of LGBTI communities, remain victims of frequent hate speech in Greece, sometimes involving politicians and even government officials. Despite the commendable work of many human rights NGOs, their capacity to support migrants has been jeopardised by a 2020 ministerial decision introducing stricter registration and activity rules for NGOs working in the sectors of international protection, migration, resettlement, or social integration of migrants. A number of international organisations have expressed concerns about the way in which registration was conducted in practice, which allegedly led to the delisting of some NGOs supporting migrants.

The Association of the Roma People in **Poland** draws attention to the practice of some media outlets to indicate the nationality of perpetrators or suspects in cases where they are of Roma origin. Providing such information in descriptions of incidents, the circumstances of which are not related to the nationality of the persons involved, only contributes to the stigmatisation of members of minority communities. Such actions perpetuate unfavourable images of minorities, which very often underpin xenophobic attitudes and can lead to manifestations of intolerance and, in extreme cases, acts of physical aggression motivated by hatred. On 20 November 2020, the Media Ethics Council explicitly stated in a public statement that journalists should not indicate the national or ethnic origin of perpetrators of offences in order to not to reproduce negative stereotypes reinforcing the erroneous and harmful perception that Polish citizens of other ethnic origin or foreigners living in Poland are collective bearers of negative characteristics.

Disturbing developments are taking place with regard to the foster care system in **Hungary**. In December 2021, the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of Human Resources. The basis for the lawsuit was that children from Romani families are more likely to end up in foster care than children from other ethnic groups. According to ERRC research, although Roma make up less than 20 per cent of the population of Nograd district, more than 80 per cent of the children placed in state care are from Roma families. Although Hungarian law

²²⁵ Annual Report on ECRI Activities, covering the Period from 1 January to 31 December 2020. Strassburg, March 2021. URL: <https://rm.coe.int/annual-report-on-ecri-s-activities-for-2020/1680a1cd59>

prohibits the removal of children from families solely for material reasons, poverty was a significant factor in the majority of removals. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has repeatedly called on Hungary, most recently in February 2020, to fully implement the ban on separating children from their families and placing them in alternative care institutions based on the economic situation of their families.^{226 227}

The Hungarian health care system also reflects significant problems related to societal and systemic attitudes towards minorities and foreigners. Inadequate maternity wards and frequent reports of gynecological violence persist. The rate of stillbirths among Roma was higher than among the rest of the population, which continued to coincide with previous data showing that life expectancy among Roma was ten years shorter than the national average.²²⁸ The same happened during the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused more deaths among the Roma population compared to the rest of the population, due to pre-existing diseases.²²⁹

Indigenous children in **Canada** (7 per cent of all children in the country) make up 52 per cent of all foster children in the child welfare system,²³⁰ and in other areas, such as unemployment and poverty, they perform better than the rest of Canadians.

In **Russia**, a man with an interest in Scottish history was detained by National Guardia officers in St. Petersburg at the end of August 2022 for wearing a kilt. They were about to draw up a report on him on charges of LGBT propaganda. After a short lecture on Scottish history of the 13th-14th centuries, he was released.²³¹

On 25 October 2021, it became known that prisoners of Correctional Colony No. 2 in Kurgan region of the Russian Federation complained about the staff of the colony. According to the inmates, in August, the colony staff seized religious paraphernalia from them and, in particular, threw the Koran on the floor and trampled on it.²³²

In November 2021, the administration of Syzran filed a lawsuit with the court to demolish the mosque "Faizullah," as it considered the mosque an unauthorised construction. On 7 February

²²⁶ Discriminatory Practices against minorities//Civic-nation, 2022. URL: https://civic-nation.org/hungary/government/law_enforcement_practices/discriminatory_practices_against_minorities/

²²⁷ Forray, R. K., Cigány egészség, cigány betegség, 2013. URL: www.hier.iif.hu/hu/letoltes.php?fid=tartalomsor/2244

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Koller, I. Z., Health Disparities and Ethnic Classification in Hungary. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 21(1), 2022, pp. 23-43.

²³⁰ First National Child and Family Services// Government of Canada. URL: <https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1100100035204/1533307858805>

²³¹ В Петербурге мужчину в килте попытались задержать по статье о «гей-пропаганде»//The Insider, 31.08.2022. URL: <https://theins.ru/news/254593>

²³² Татьяна Андреева, В курганской колонии мусульмане жалуются на тюремщиков. «Топтались по Корану»//URA.RU, 25 октября 2021. URL: <https://ura.news/news/1052512996>

2022, it became known that the Arbitration Court of the Samara region rejected the claim of the administration.²³³

In 2020, a case was recorded in Essentuki when women were not allowed into the swimming pool because of the Muslim closed swimming costume - burkini. A number of conflicts can be noted in 2022 due to visits to schools or universities by Muslim women wearing headscarves. These conflicts were reported at School No. 88 in Tyumen (September 2022),²³⁴ Moscow School No. 2025 (September 2022),²³⁵ Chelyabinsk Secondary School No. 71,²³⁶ at School No. 8 in Balashikha near Moscow (September-October 2022),²³⁷ and Astrakhan State Medical University (September 2022).²³⁸

In the **United States**, human rights activists have drawn attention to the fact that some law enforcement officers share the views of white supremacy advocates.²³⁹ An example is the case of the Atlanta spa shooting in March 2021, which killed eight people, six of whom were Asian, and the link to right-wing extremism was not properly investigated. The sheriff working on the case explained that the alleged perpetrator was simply having a "bad day" and was charged with murder rather than a hate crime.²⁴⁰ This and other similar cases demonstrate that when extremist and terrorist acts are committed by white people, they are not always judged in the same way as acts committed by people of colour and religious minorities such as Muslims.

Since November 2022, escalation around the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (former Church of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church - UOC) in **Ukraine** has started to grow. For example, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) conducted searches in Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and in a number of churches and monasteries of the UOC in Rivne, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi regions, and Transcarpathia.

²³³ Катерина Маяковская, В Самаре суд отказал в удовлетворении иска о сносе сызранской мечети "Файзулла"//Idel. Реалии, 07.02.2022. URL: <https://www.idelreal.org/a/31691209.html>

²³⁴ Тюменскую школьницу в хиджабе отказались выпускать на уроки. Конфликт с директором попал на видео//72.RU, 02.09.2022. URL: <https://72.ru/text/gorod/2022/09/02/71623211/>

²³⁵ Очередной случай запрета посещения школы в платке//НАЮР, 22.09.2022. URL: <https://t.me/nayurru/110>

²³⁶ В Челябинске директор школы два месяца борется с десятиклассницей Викой из-за платка//ИА IslamNews, 20 октября 2022 г. URL: <https://islamnews.ru/news-v-chelyabinske-direktor-shkoly-dva-mesyatsa-boretsya-s-desyatiklassnitsey-vikoy-iz-za-platka>

²³⁷ В Балашихе девочке запретили посещать школу в платке//ИА IslamNews, 19 сентября 2022. URL: <https://islamnews.ru/news-v-balashikhe-devochke-zapretili-poseshchat-shkolu-v-platke>

²³⁸ Астраханский медицинский университет запретил студенткам носить хиджаб//Грозный Информ, 05.09.2023. URL: <https://www.grozny-inform.ru/news/society/143197/>

²³⁹ Michael German, Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism, White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in Law Enforcement//Brennan Centre for Justice, August 27, 2020. URL: <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law>

²⁴⁰ Jeanine Santucci, A hate crime? Georgia attacks that killed mostly Asian women raise questions of bias, motive//USA Today, March 18, 2021. URL: <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/03/18/hate-crime-attacks-georgia-raise-motive-bias-questions/4739328001/>

In essence, the UOC was declared by the Ukrainian authorities to be part of the "fifth column," allegedly for its activities contributing to the preservation of Russian influence in Ukraine. In spite of the fact that from the first days of the Russian invasion, the Church took a position to condemn Russia and support the government and the Ukrainian army in the war. Despite this, the Verkhovna Rada Committee for Humanitarian and Information Policy supported three draft laws concerning the activities of the UOC, which essentially ban its activities. In particular, the committee supported parliament's appeal to the government regarding the transfer of the complexes of buildings of Pochaev Dormition Lavra and Kyiv Pechersk Lavra to the alternative Orthodox Church of Ukraine of the Patriarchate of Constantinople - the PCU - for free use (N8012).²⁴¹ In addition, they supported the draft law N8262, which simplifies the transition of congregations from the UOC to the pro-government PCU.²⁴²

— Racial and religious profiling

Institutional discrimination on racial and ethnic grounds during and after the coronavirus pandemic remained a serious problem for many monitoring countries during the period under review. In **Greece**, for example, such cases of harassment and even violence were uncovered in the context of police checks of movement restriction measures. According to victims' testimonies, in some cases police officers, during the checks of movement restrictions during the quarantine period, located the victims and checked specifically members of these minorities, despite the fact that they were in the midst of large numbers of people (e.g. in queues in supermarkets, on the streets, etc.). Victims believe that they were not selected at random, but on the basis of their characteristics, such as ethnic origin or skin colour (profiling).

In **Bulgaria** in 2022, a report by the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee on differences in minority behaviour in the context of criminal procedure investigations was published. A survey of 1,000 prisoners showed that members of the Roma minority were more likely to complain of ill-treatment during detention and inside the police station.

The problem of racial profiling remains acute in **Hungary** as well. In fact, as experts recognise, it is due to a lack of political will, which is reflected in the fact that the Hungarian authorities are also rather lenient in cases of police brutality against ethnic minorities. This was

²⁴¹ На рассмотрение ВРУ подан законопроект о передаче ПЦУ Киево-Печерской и Почаевской лавры//Религиозно-информационная служба Украины, 10.09.2022. URL: https://risu.ua/ru/na-rassmotrenie-vru-podan-zakonoproekt-o-peredache-pcu-Kyivo-pecherskoj-i-pochaevskoj-lavr_n132164

²⁴² Про прийняття за основу проекту Закону України про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України щодо удосконалення правового регулювання діяльності релігійних організацій//Liga 360. URL: <https://ips.ligazakon.net/document/DI08539A>

also the conclusion reached by the deputies of the Committee of Ministers in December 2021. The Committee found particularly problematic the lack of a "visible strategy" in the systematic handling of cases of ill-treatment of ethnic minorities by law enforcement officers. This is also evident in the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) against Hungary from 2020-23: in another case of police ill-treatment of Roma (Mata v Hungary, 7 July 2022), the ECHR awarded the applicant €19,500 following an incident in 2014 when the applicant was assaulted by Hungarian police officers. Reports that local police were fining Roma for minor offences as a means of maintaining "public order" and an undeclared policy of racial harassment have long been a problem for Hungarian society.²⁴³

In **Canada**, compared to other racialised communities, Black people are significantly more vulnerable to arbitrary police use of coercive measures such as arrests, detentions, and the use of weapons. So-called "carding practices" by police, where they stop people without any evidence that the person was involved in an offence, replicate the differential treatment of young people in race communities and reduce their chances of a fair and just hearing.²⁴⁴

Although suspicion-less traffic stops have historically been referred to as "random stops" or "random routine checks," it is now accurately established that these interceptions are not in fact randomly conducted. Rather, the practice of impartial traffic stops has served as a pretext for profiling and discrimination that disproportionately affects racialised and marginalised individuals. The risk that any expansion of these powers will lead to further discriminatory outcomes and abuse in Canada is very high.

In Khabarovsk, **Russia**, on 26 December 2022, uniformed and masked police officers broke into the dining room of a mosque where imams and worshippers were staying. The worshippers and the imam were thrown to the floor and beaten, after which they broke down the door to the prayer room and scattered books, including the Koran, and religious items. The law enforcers themselves later stated that they were conducting a document check.²⁴⁵

²⁴³ European Roma Rights Centre. 2022. European Court Awards Romani Applicant 19,500 EUR in police brutality case. 19 July 2022. URL:// <http://www.errc.org/news/hungary-european-court-awards-romani-applicant-19500-EUR-in-police-brutality-case>

²⁴⁴ Carding and anti-Black racism in Canada/Amnesty International. URL: https://movies-media.com/US/2124294406?trackid=603455958&T1=b75a9ea9e05eb27b0000018940988452d&subid=42926&sii=4833&sik=us-u62j&soi=7027&kv_variation=A&t3=|

²⁴⁵ Мусульмане Хабаровска пожаловались на погром и избиение "людьми в масках" (ВИДЕО)// ИА IslamNews, 28.12.2022. URL: <https://islamnews.ru/news-musulmane-khabarovska-pozhalovalis-na-pogrom-i-izbienie-lyudmi-v-maskakh>

On 18 February 2020, it became known that Cossack patrols "check for coronavirus" the newcomers from Asian countries at Ekaterinburg's largest market "Tagansky Ryad" in the "7 Keys" micro district, where many natives of China live.²⁴⁶

On 26 June 2022, it became known that in Yekaterinburg, two Tuva (Far East Region of Russia) residents were prevented from entering the club "Air" by a security guard who claimed, "that it was a matter of their appearance and ethnicity." The girls showed him their Russian passports, but he continued to insist that he "could not let them in 'on the grounds of racism.'" Later, African Americans were prevented from entering the bar for the same reason. After the scandal, the club manager apologised and promised that the guard would be fired.²⁴⁷

In the **United States**, the problem of racial profiling also persists.²⁴⁸ There are also controversial cases. On 7 January 2023, a 29-year-old black man, Tyre Nichols, was beaten in Memphis, Tennessee, by police officers when he was pulled over for what police initially called reckless driving. The stop turned into a violent confrontation. Nichols passed away three days later at a hospital. Although at first glance the incident cannot be classified as racial profiling because all five officers involved were also black, it was nevertheless determined that the incident was a case of racial injustice in policing.²⁴⁹ All of these law enforcement officers were fired and charged with various criminal offences, including second-degree murder (punishable by up to 60 years in prison and a fine of up to \$50,000; they pleaded not guilty in February 2023) and stripped of their police certification.²⁵⁰ Nichols' death has sparked renewed calls for police reform, as well as for additional investment in housing, just as it has for substance abuse and mental health treatment in communities of colour. As with the NO BAN Act, both the 2020 and 2021 versions of criminal justice reform, the George Floyd Justice and Police Act, were "buried" in the Senate by the Republican majority.²⁵¹ The bill addresses police use of excessive force as well as other misconduct, most notably racial profiling. The US prison population remains at nearly 2 million (the largest prison population in the world) and most of them are people of colour.²⁵² Nearly another one million are on parole and over 3 million are on probation. During the COVID-19

²⁴⁶ В Екатеринбурге казаки проверяют на коронавирус работников рынка//РИА НОВОСТИ, 18.02.2020. URL: <https://ria.ru/20200218/1564920345.html>

²⁴⁷ В Екатеринбурге двух жительниц Тувы не пустили в клуб из-за «расизма»//Подъем, 26.06.2022. URL: <https://pdmnews.ru/27145/>

²⁴⁸ U.S. Data on Police Shootings and Violence// University of Illinois Chicago. URL: <https://policepi.uic.edu/u-s-data-on-police-shootings-and-violence/>

²⁴⁹ Jelany Cobb, The Killing of Tyre Nichols and the Issue of Race//The New Yorker, January 31, 2023. URL: <https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-killing-of-tyre-nichols-and-the-issue-of-race>

²⁵⁰ Adrian Florido, All 5 ex-Memphis officers plead not guilty in the beating death of Tyre Nichols//NPR, February 17, 2023. URL: <https://www.npr.org/2023/02/17/1157756023/memphis-tyre-nichols-police-officers-court-charges>

²⁵¹ H.R.7120 - George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020//Congress.Gov. URL: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/7120>

²⁵² Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2023//Prison Policy Initiative, March 14, 2023. URL: <https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2023.html>

pandemic, prisons were provided with no protection, including vaccines, against the outbreak. As of April 2023, more than 600,000 inmates have contracted COVID and 2,932 inmates have died.²⁵³

One of the main concerns when it comes to racial justice in the United States relates to immigration practices, primarily the aforementioned ICE 287(g) immigration enforcement program. Racial profiling by law enforcement officers involved in this program continues. It affects undocumented migrants, citizens and residents alike, as well as Latinos and other people of colour (African Americans, Native Americans, Pacific Islanders, and people of different races), as well as Muslims and people of Arab and South Asian descent.

Debate continues on the topic of violence by law enforcement officials in **France**. The case of violence in November 2020 against a music producer of colour who was beaten and insulted for no reason has sparked a heated debate on how to deal with minority groups. It was known, however, that French police officers received training on racism and anti-Semitism. There are few reliable statistics on the subject, but the internal unit in charge of police disciplinary investigations, the IGPN (Inspectorate General of the National Police), admits that the police have checked the documents of about 80 per cent of Arab and black youths in five years, which compares to 16 per cent of the general population.²⁵⁴

— Migrants and refugees

As a result of the hostilities on the territory of Ukraine, more than 2 million refugees had ended up in **Russia** by the autumn of 2022. In March 2022, Western countries accused Russia of allegedly forcibly removing Ukrainian citizens from the territory of Ukraine.²⁵⁵ The Russian Ministry of Defense denied this report, saying that there was a voluntary evacuation of Ukrainian residents, primarily from Mariupol, where active hostilities were taking place at the time. The Russian Embassy in the United States called the US State Department's accusations of setting up filtration camps a fabrication,²⁵⁶ while Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya said it was impossible to bring and detain 2.5 million refugees and that all refugees from

²⁵³ The COVID Prison Project tracks data and policy across the country to monitor COVID-19 in prisons//The COVID Prison Project, July 3, 2023. URL: <https://covidprisonproject.com/>

²⁵⁴ Ce que disent les études parues en France sur les contrôles au faciès et les "violences policières"//RadioFrance,10/06/2020. URL: <https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceinter/ce-que-disent-les-etudes-parues-en-france-sur-les-contrôles-au-faciès-et-les-violences-policieres-1185508>

²⁵⁵ U.S. accuses Russia of war crimes by forcibly deporting Ukrainians/Reuters, September 8, 2022. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/un-says-it-needs-access-ukrainian-detainees-held-by-russia-2022-09-07/>

²⁵⁶ Посольство России ответило на материал Госдепа про "фильтрационные лагеря"//РИА Новости, 26 августа 2022 г. URL: <https://ria.ru/20220826/ukraina-1812213102.html>

Ukraine had the ability to move in and out of the country.²⁵⁷ "Do you seriously think that such a number of people can be brought in by force and silenced?" he asked rhetorically in an interview with Russia's TASS news agency.²⁵⁸ Nebenzya added that "naturally, temporary migrants are registered at the border with Russia, after which those in need are helped to get to stationary temporary accommodation centres."

Official representatives of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), to which the Border Guard Service belongs, also reported that their officers check Ukrainian citizens who enter the territory of the Russian Federation to determine whether they belong to intelligence and sabotage groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Thus, on 24 June 2022, FSB spokesman Mikhail Sheludyaev, in response to appeals from Russian human rights activists, said that law enforcement officers "work with Ukrainian citizens crossing the border for as long as necessary." "If they work with a person for 20 minutes or maybe three hours, it means it is necessary. So, it is done in order not to transfer these horrors that are happening there, here, to Russia. This is all justified. Here we must literally understand that we have a difficult history and that we are working in the interests of the security of the state," he said.²⁵⁹ Sheludyaev added that Ukrainians who cross the Russian border illegally are also trying to "cover themselves with refugee status." "There are fugitives from justice, they have nothing to do with refugees, but they are all actively trying to cover themselves with this status," he emphasised.

Earlier, Army General Vladimir Kulishov, head of the Border Service of the Russian Federal Security Service, also noted that his agency regularly identifies saboteurs and supporters of Ukrainian right-wing radical nationalists, "including those involved in hostilities, who are trying to enter Russia under the guise of refugees." He said that as of the end of May 2022, "Russian border guards together with employees of territorial security agencies and Rosgvardiya units "identified about 250 persons of this category in the flow of refugees."²⁶⁰

The Russian human rights ombudsman, Tatyana Moskalkova, has said that there are no filtration *camps in the country*, but there are filtration *points* where Ukrainian refugees who seek refuge from the war on Russian territory are checked. These people should be checked to see if they belong to subversive groups. At the same time, she expressed concern about the conditions of detention there. "We have no doubt that the goals are justified ... But the conditions of detention there must be decent. I receive numerous letters that people's documents

²⁵⁷ Nebenzya прокомментировал обвинения США в адрес РФ в создании "фильтрационных лагерей">//ТАСС, 8 сентября 2022 г. URL: <https://tass.ru/politika/15688923>

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ ФСБ ответила на жалобы беженцев с Украины на фильтрационные пункты//РБК, 24 июня 2022 г. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/06/2022/62b5a4ed9a79479a7db11145>

²⁶⁰ Погранслужба ФСБ выявила 250 националистов среди беженцев с Украины//ТАСС, 27 мая 2022 г. URL: <https://tass-ru.turbopages.org/tass.ru/s/obschestvo/14744577>

are confiscated, not everyone is provided with a sleeping place, medical care, and this, of course, is wrong," she said. Moskalkova added that she had sent a letter to Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin with a request to authorise the Ministry of Emergency Situations to provide such centres with everything they need.²⁶¹

As noted above, a significant proportion of refugees who crossed into Russian territory then travelled to countries in the EU via the border with Latvia and Estonia. This is evidenced by the sharp decline in the capacity of land border control points at these borders, which began to be observed as early as April 2022. The large number of Ukrainian nationals travelling through Russia to the EU is also evidenced by the reverse border crossing crisis that erupted a year later, at the end of May 2023, when thousands of Ukrainian refugees headed back to Russia from Latvia and Estonia.²⁶² Most of them were returning to their permanent place of residence, on holiday, with the aim of visiting their homes, "sorting out their documents," visiting their relatives back home, etc.²⁶³

They could not do so across the Polish-Ukrainian border for a number of reasons, primarily because they could not cross the front line. In addition, Russia started to pay monetary compensation for loss or damage to housing due to combat operations. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnulin announced in August 2022 that compensation for Mariupol residents who lost their housing during the hostilities would be 36,000 rubles per square metre,²⁶⁴ which at the time was approximately 590 euros. As of mid-January 2023, about 1 billion rubles had already been allocated for this purpose,²⁶⁵ which could also be the reason for the mass movement of Ukrainian refugees back in the summer of 2023. It should also be noted that the Russian border services on the country's western borders separately check all newly arriving Ukrainian citizens.

On 22 March 2022, the US Embassy in Kyiv accused Russia of "abducting 2,389 Ukrainian children from Donetsk and Luhansk."²⁶⁶ In April 2022, Ukraine, represented by the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights Lyudmyla Denisova, accused Russia of "abducting

²⁶¹ ФСБ ответила на жалобы беженцев с Украины на фильтрационные пункты//РБК, 24 июня 2022 г. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/24/06/2022/62b5a4ed9a79479a7db11145>

²⁶² Long lines in Russia's direction at 'Vientuli' border point//Eng. LSM.LV, June 13, 2023. URL: <https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/13.06.2023-long-lines-in-russias-direction-at-vientuli-border-point.a512538/>

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Лишившиеся жилья в Мариуполе смогут получить компенсацию в 36 000 руб. за метр – Хуснуллин//Милосердие. RU, 05.08.2022. URL: <https://www.miloserdie.ru/news/lishivshiesya-zhilya-v-mariupole-smogut-poluchit-kompensacziyu-v-36-tys-rub-za-metr-husnullin/>

²⁶⁵ Более 1 млрд рублей компенсаций выплачено жителям Мариуполя на жилье//РИА НОВОСТИ-Недвижимость, 16.01.2023. URL: <https://realty.ria.ru/20230116/mariupol-1845176421.html>

²⁶⁶ Russian forces 'kidnapped' 2,389 children from Donetsk and Luhansk, US embassy says//The Guardian, 22.03.2022. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/mar/22/russia-ukraine-war-zelenskiy-urges-talks-with-putin-biden-flags-clear-sign-russia-considering-chemical-weapons-live?page=with:block-6239bd368f08118734a6ff86#block-6239bd368f08118734a6ff86>

more than 121,000 Ukrainian children" who are being evacuated as orphans. In June 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that 200,000 Ukrainian children were allegedly forcibly taken to Russia.²⁶⁷

Russia rejected these accusations as well. The Russian embassy in the United States officially said that it had "accepted children forced to flee with their relatives from the shelling and atrocities of the Ukrainian armed forces. We are doing everything possible to keep minor citizens in families, and in cases of absence or death of parents and relatives - to transfer orphans under guardianship," the statement said.²⁶⁸

Despite the unprecedented and generally successful process of accepting refugees from Ukraine in the **EU, USA, and Canada**, it is necessary to note a number of difficulties and shortcomings that characterised many of them (according to the refugees themselves):

1. bureaucratic obstacles in the process of registration and issuance of residence permit, long waiting time for the date of interview, unclear distribution of powers between different agencies.

2. Lack of affordable housing, especially in large cities, which has forced refugees to live for long periods of time in hostels or reception centres, or to move to smaller settlements with poorer infrastructure and low chances of employment.

3. Difficulties in the field of school education. Ukrainian students and their parents complained about the "too simple" program in the "welcome classes," low intensity of learning the state language of the host country, inconsistency of full-time education with the ongoing distance learning in the Ukrainian program.

4. Long waiting times for language courses, which makes even the initial integration of newcomers difficult.

5. Difficulties with the recognition of certificates and diplomas of all levels and with starting a business.

To one degree or another, this applied to all EU countries.

In 2021, the UNHCR also reported an increase in cases of violence, robberies, and humiliating acts against migrants and asylum-seekers at **Bulgaria's** border with Turkey. As of 5 December, the Ministry of Interior reported 50,779 attempts to enter the country illegally across the border, during which border guards detained 2,349 people. On 2 September 2021, the interim Minister of Interior told a hearing in the National Assembly that "about 200 migrants were pushed

²⁶⁷ Зеленский заявил, что 200 тысяч детей были насильственно вывезены в Россию//Голос Америки, 02.06.2022. URL: <https://www.golosameriki.com/a/ukraine-zelensky-children/6599974.html>

²⁶⁸ Комментарий Посольства Российской Федерации в США//Telegram, 15.02.2023. URL: <https://t.me/EmbUSA/2269>

back last night at the border and 10-15 were detained." The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee claims that the government detained migrants and asylum seekers only when their detention could not be avoided, such as in NGO-controlled areas and on trains, and otherwise pushed everyone else across the border.²⁶⁹ Banks refused to open accounts for refugees, hampering their ability to obtain legal employment and benefits. In 2022, the number of refugees and migrants arriving at the border with Turkey increased dramatically. Authorities registered more than 85,000 arrivals, more than double the 2021 figure. Mass returns of refugees back to Turkey, sometimes accompanied by violence, remained widespread.

As of 12 December, the Ministry of Interior reported 162,340 attempts to enter the country illegally across the border, during which border authorities detained 4,585 people. In May, Human Rights Watch accused Bulgarian authorities of "beating, robbing, stripping, and using police dogs to attack Afghan and other asylum seekers and migrants, and then pushing them back into Turkey without any formal interview or asylum procedure."

Bulgarian human rights organisations have reported continuing discriminatory practices in the asylum system, whereby applications from nationals of certain countries, including Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Morocco, and Tunisia, are automatically rejected.²⁷⁰

The trend towards a more restrictive refugee policy already started soon after the conservative New Democracy (ND) party came to power in **Greece** in July 2019, choosing a tougher line on immigration and asylum policy. The emergence of a new coronavirus and the Evros crisis earlier in the year provided the government with the opportunity to promote a change of course with the restraint of EU authorities and only rarely under its critical gaze. The consequences of the containment policy have been particularly damaging for refugees and migrants stranded at the border - often living in inhumane conditions - especially those waiting for their asylum application to be processed and those who have already been granted the right to stay and are trying to get back on their feet in Greece. In its election program, ND presented a series of proposals on migration that included, among other things, closed reception centres and speeding up the asylum process. ND favoured stricter border controls and stricter control of legal documents of migrants and refugees, promised transparency in the management of refugee-related financial resources, and insisted on European resources to implement its policies.

The ND's first move after coming to power was to close the Ministry of Migration Policy and transfer responsibility to the Ministry of Civil Defence, sending a clear signal that immigration

²⁶⁹ 2022 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Bulgaria. URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/bulgaria/2022>

²⁷⁰ Bulgaria Report/Amnesty International, 2022, URL: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/bulgaria/report-bulgaria/>.

is mainly a security issue. NGOs were criticised for their role in mismanaging the refugee crisis.²⁷¹ The government immediately tried to change the agenda by emphasising that Greece was not facing a refugee crisis but a migration crisis, as most of the people arriving in Greece and the EU were economic migrants.

The aim was to make it easier for the government to take a tougher stance, as public opinion did not consider economic migrants as a risk group. Soon, however, it became clear that many of the statements could not be realised and the government had to revise its original plan. Six months later, the government re-created the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, which took over the responsibility of the Ministry of Civil Defense and started the ND program from scratch. The new ministry's plan included border protection, closed controlled camps, and accelerated asylum and return procedures. Social integration as a goal of migration policy was still absent.

There is also growing concern in Greece over the recent withdrawal of housing support for recognised refugees as well as those whose asylum applications have been rejected. The first phase of the plan, which was postponed from April to May 2020 due to Covid-19 restrictions, affected more than 11,000 people who had to leave their housing by 1 June 2020, following a change in Greek law that came into effect on 11 March 2020. Under the new requirements, once recognised, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection must leave their accommodation within 30 days instead of six months. However, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection often stay longer in reception centres, where they continue to receive livelihoods and other services in practice.

The **Hungarian** police maintain a detailed overview of illegal immigration incidents, which is provided on a weekly basis.²⁷² The state usually provides a detailed report on immigration-related incidents, supporting the public discourse of securitisation throughout. Some examples are particularly revealing, including statements by the Secretary of State of the Ministry of the Interior, for example, that "Hungary's southern border is under siege" or that "illegal migrants are becoming more and more aggressive and there are increasingly disturbing phenomena on the Hungarian border."²⁷³ According to official statements, illegal immigration is on the rise,

²⁷¹ Dimitris Gatsios: 'K. Mitsotakis: The five pillars proposed by the ND', capital.gr, 16/11/2017. URL: <https://www.capital.gr/politiki/3254769/k-mitsotakis-oi-pente-pulones-pou-proteinei-i-nd>

²⁷² 2023. Information on illegal migration/Hungarian Police. URL: https://www.police.hu/hu/hirek-es-informaciok/hatarinfo/illegalis-migracio-alakulasa?weekly_migration_created%5Bmin%5D=2022-01-01+00%3A00%3A00&weekly_migration_created%5Bmax%5D=2023-01-01+00%3A00%3A00

²⁷³ Oriasi kozbiztonsagi kockazatot jelent a tomeges es illegalis migracio Europaban [Mass and illegal migration in Europe poses a major public safety risk] // BEOL. 2023. URL: <https://www.beol.hu/orszag-vilag/2023/01/oriasi-kozbiztonsagi-kockazatot-jelent-a-tomeges-es-illegalis-migracio-europaban>

with more than 269,254 people apprehended in 2022 compared to 122,239 in 2021.²⁷⁴ It remains unclear whether the abuse by law enforcement officials has changed over time.

Serbia's Interior Ministry has released a video of heavily armed police apparently raiding an improvised migrant camp in a forest near the Hungarian border, confiscating phones, money, and leading the migrants out of the camp - most of them with their hands behind their heads.

The video shows Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin joining the operation, which was carried out in the early morning hours of 5 October 2021 by a task force and members of the Serbian gendarmerie.

A statement by the Ministry of the Interior, also published on YouTube, said that police actions were aimed at preventing the smuggling of illegal migrants, weapons and drugs into Hungary, as well as preventing violent crime on their part. According to the report, raids against illegal migrants in the northern city of Subotica, were carried out throughout March and into April 2022, sometimes on a daily basis. In some cases, police were seen kicking people to force them into police vans, and some migrants suffered injuries such as broken arms and bruised eyes, which they said were the result of police violence during these evictions.²⁷⁵

Immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in the **US** also face discrimination by law enforcement officials. As of the end of March 2023, the fate of more than 78,000 Afghans who cooperated with US troops in Afghanistan before the Taliban took power²⁷⁶ and who have been resettled in the US is stalled in Congress. Meanwhile, many Afghans fear deportation despite the risk of prosecution for co-operating with a pro-American regime. The actual number of Afghans with this status may be as high as 200,000 to 300,000.²⁷⁷ According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), half of these cases will eventually qualify for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV), which grants permanent resident status. However, by some estimates, there are more than seven times as many applications now as in the summer of 2021.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁴ 2022. Hungarian Police to continue to protect borders and prevent illegal entries in 2022// Schengenvisainfo. URL: <https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/hungarian-police-to-continue-to-protect-borders-prevent-illegal-entries-in-2022/>

²⁷⁵ Serbia: Minister condemns migrants following police raid//InfoMigrants, 10.06.2022. URL: <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/43814/serbia-minister-condemns-migrants-following-police-raid>

²⁷⁶ A Year Later, Afghan Refugees Remain in Legal Limbo as Vets Continue Evacuating Allies Left Behind/Military.Com, August 9, 2022. URL: <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/08/09/year-later-afghan-refugees-remain-legal-limbo-vets-continue-evacuating-allies-left-behind.html>

²⁷⁷ Robbie Gramer, Mary Yang and Kelly Kimball, Afghans Promised a Way Out Are Still Trapped by Red Tape//FP, August 9, 2022. URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/09/afghanistan-evacuation-siv-visa-taliban-troops-immigration/>

²⁷⁸ Muzaffar Chishti and Julia Gelatt, Mounting Backlogs Undermine U.S. Immigration System and Impede Biden Policy Changes/Migration Policy Institute, February 23, 2022. URL: <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/us-immigration-backlogs-mounting-undermine-biden>

According to a DHS fact sheet, in 2022, a total of 66 individuals whose names are on the terrorist watch list were stopped at the U.S.-Mexico border.²⁷⁹ In July of that year, there were 199,976 encounters at the U.S.-Mexico border between the U.S. Border Patrol and non-U.S. citizens attempting to cross the border illegally (compared to 40,929 in July 2020). According to the data, July 2022 was the 17th consecutive month in which more than 150,000 such encounters were recorded at the border - a never-before-recorded trend. As of July 2022, there have been 900,000 border violations since Biden became president.

As in most other monitoring countries, during the coronavirus pandemic, mayoralities of cities and towns hosting large refugee communities in **Italy** suspended all projects that involved the reception of migrants. In addition, the Council of Ministers agreed to the postponement of the issuance of visas and introduced strict vetting of all foreigners and migrants. At the same time, between 1 June and 15 August 2020, more than 200,000 applications were submitted for regularisation of irregular migrants living and working in the country mainly as agricultural workers or domestic care workers.²⁸⁰ By Order of 26 March 2020, the Italian Minister of the Interior decided to carry out a strict control of all migrants in immigration centres, with a mandatory medical visit on arrival and a mandatory 14-day quarantine.²⁸¹

As can be seen, enforcement was largely routine during the pandemic (especially in the first period of 2020-2021) and affected the general population with restrictive measures, but especially minorities such as migrants and foreigners, regardless of whether they were living in the country legally or illegally. This was especially true for newcomers detained at migrant concentration points, which far-right nationalists often saw as sources of contamination.

A decree by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministries of Health, Security, and Defense of 17 April 2020, established that Italian ports would no longer be considered safe areas for migrants arriving on Italian shores, as established by the Hamburg Agreement.²⁸² This decision meant the creation of several problems, especially for NGO boats, which at that time were rescuing in the Mediterranean Sea people at risk of drowning due to the wrecking of their boats. Another aspect that could be considered discriminatory for migrant residents was the difference in treatment when applying the anti-covid protocols in practice. The obligation of confinement for more than 14 days and the mandatory regularisation or immediate expulsion of foreign workers, although justified as

²⁷⁹ Ranking Member John Katko, Border Crisis Startling Stats, August 4, 2022. URL: <https://homeland.house.gov/media/2022/08/FINAL-JULY-SS-2022-1.pdf>

²⁸⁰ Misura sull'emergenza coronavirus (COVID-19) - Quadro generale//Parlamento Italiano, 12.07.2022. URL: <https://temi.camera.it/leg19/temi/iniziative-per-prevenire-e-contrastare-la-diffusione-del-nuovo-coronavirus.html>

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

preventive measures to protect the indigenous population from the spread of the virus, in fact further penalised migrants arriving or already residing in the country.

CHAPTER 3. XENOPHOBIA

This chapter is devoted to analysing xenophobic attitudes in the monitoring countries towards different social groups. Given that traditional international surveys (e.g. Pew Research Center survey) were virtually non-existent during the COVID-19 pandemic, in this report we use mainly data from national surveys, the comparative analysis of which allows us to analyse general trends.

Britain is one of those countries that in recent years have shown a change in the negative public trend, at least in relation to migrants. Data published by the World Values Survey shows that negative perceptions of immigration and its importance as a problem have actually decreased since Britain left the EU. While in 2009, 65 per cent of Britons believed that when jobs are scarce, employers should prioritise home-country residents over immigrants, this figure has more than halved since then, to 29 per cent in 2022.²⁸³

Only 21 per cent of the country's population think immigration increases unemployment, significantly less than in countries such as Germany (36 per cent), Australia (36 per cent), and the US (33 per cent).²⁸⁴ Interestingly, attitudes towards the EU itself in Britain have also begun to diverge in recent years from recent voting patterns, with a majority (57 per cent) wanting to rejoin the EU and 43 per cent of respondents wanting to remain outside the EU.²⁸⁵ The explanation lies in the views of young people who, by age, did not vote in the 2016 referendum (i.e. the younger cohorts of voting age). They were more than twice as likely to say they would support 'remain' than 'leave'.²⁸⁶

Several opinion polls conducted during the period under review fleshed out trends in prejudice towards other social groups. In January 2022, a representative survey of over 1,667 people conducted by the University of Birmingham showed that 25.9 per cent of Britons had a negative attitude towards Muslims, 8.5 per cent towards Jews, 6.4 per cent towards black people,

²⁸³ Kings College Policy Institute, 'UK attitudes to immigration: how the public became more positive', February 2023, DOI: 10.18742/pub01-115.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ What UK Thinks EU, 'Post-Brexit Poll of Polls'// National Centre for Social Research. URL: <https://whatukthinks.org/eu/opinion-polls/poll-of-polls-uk-eu/>

²⁸⁶ Curtice, J., 'Public Attitudes on Brexit: Past, Present and Future'// UK in a Changing Europe, 21 June 2021. URL: <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/public-attitudes-brexit/>

and 8.4 per cent towards white people.²⁸⁷ With a certain tolerance we can conclude that we are dealing here with a small but negative trend. It should also be noted that support for a ban on immigration into the country for all Muslims is 4-6 per cent higher than for other ethnic and religious groups (supported by just 18.1 per cent of respondents), and Britons are almost three times more likely to hold prejudiced views about Islam than about other religions. For example, 21.1 per cent of Britons wrongly believe that Islam teaches its followers that the Koran should be read "completely and literally."²⁸⁸ Moreover, in a separate survey conducted by Hope Not Hate, a British anti-fascist NGO, 30 per cent of the 20,000 respondents thought it was probably or definitely true that "parts of many European cities have become no-go zones for non-Muslims."²⁸⁹ On top of this, anti-Muslim sentiment within the UK Conservative Party was investigated in 2022 when a Conservative councillor tweeted, "It looks like an invasion when we end up having complete no-go zones in all major cities where there are large numbers of Islamic immigrants/communities."²⁹⁰

Finally, surveys on attitudes towards sexual minorities were also conducted during the reporting period. The Ipsos Mori survey found that a majority of Britons (60 per cent) believe that people from LGBTQ+ communities face at least a fair degree of discrimination, while 16 per cent say they themselves face serious discrimination.²⁹¹ A new xenophobic threat came to Britain's attention during the period under review. Official statistics showed a significant increase in the number of young men referred to the government's Prevent program (see above) because of incel ideology discriminating against women. A senior counter-terrorism officer described incel as an 'emerging risk', accounting for 1 per cent of all referrals to Britain's anti-extremist system in the year to March 2022 - 77 cases.

Counter-terrorism officials believe the rise in reported cases is linked to the spread of this particular ideology in the UK - mainly via the internet - and because of a growing awareness of its potential danger among teachers and others. There is emerging evidence that incel co-exists with other extremist violent ideologies in the UK.²⁹²

²⁸⁷ Stephen H. Jones and Amy Unsworth, 'The Dinner Table Prejudice Islamophobia in Contemporary Britain'//University of Birmingham, January 2022. URL: <https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/documents/college-artslaw/ptr/90172-univ73-islamophobia-in-the-uk-report-final.pdf>

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Hope Not Hate, 'State of Hate 2023: Rhetoric, Race and Resentment', February 2023, p. 13. URL: <https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/state-of-hate-2023-v7-1.pdf>

²⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 28.

²⁹¹ Shrimpton, H., 'Sexual orientation and attitudes to LGBTQ+ in Britain'//Ipsos Mori, 26 June 2020. URL: <http://ipsos.com/en-uk/sexual-orientation-and-attitudes-lgbtq-britain>

²⁹² Large rise in men referred to Prevent over women-hating incel ideology//The Guardian, 26 Jan. 2023. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2023/jan/26/large-rise-in-men-referred-to-prevent-over-women-hating-incel-ideology>

The long-standing policies of the **Hungarian** government do not indicate much potential for positive public attitudes towards immigrants and foreigners. Years of intense propaganda and narratives used against them, such as "hordes" "invasion of the Ottomans,"²⁹³ have influenced the way these groups have been perceived in Hungarian society in the last couple of decades. If we add to this the long-standing rejection of multiculturalism by Hungarian high-ranking officials,²⁹⁴ we see that Hungarian society initially had a rather low bar for developing positive attitudes towards this social group.

Thus, 57 per cent of Hungarians do not want immigrants in their country, compared to 3 per cent in Sweden and 2 per cent in Norway, according to the biennial European Social Survey (ESS) commissioned by the European Union.²⁹⁵ 23 per cent of Hungarians believe that Western societies and their way of life threaten their identity and values. Approximately 20 per cent feel the same about not only the European Union but also the United States of America.²⁹⁶ A comparative analysis of racist attitudes in the V4 region showed that Hungary (together with the Czech Republic) is the "regional champion of racism," with older people having more racist attitudes.²⁹⁷

In **Germany**, a large-scale study by the University of Leipzig on a wide range of radical and extremist attitudes in society was released in 2022. The study draws parallels with a similar study from 2020. The authors of the study conclude that, firstly, the number of individuals with deep, holistic right-wing views is slightly decreasing, but that extremist circles have effectively "canned." Secondly, the level of intolerance towards foreigners is not increasing, but remains at a high level. Thirdly, the same individuals possess a whole set of discriminatory perceptions, for example, professing racism, homophobia, and sexism.²⁹⁸

At the same time, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation published an equally extensive study on right-wing extremist and anti-democratic trends in Germany in the period 2020-2021. Here is the data concerning the issues outlined in this report: 70.3 per cent of respondents considered right-

²⁹³ Hungary's Orban invokes Ottoman invasion to justify keeping refugees out // Washington Post, 4 September 2015. URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/04/hungarys-orban-invokes-ottoman-invasion-to-justify-keeping-refugees-out/>

²⁹⁴ Hungarian FM: Multicultural Societies Not Necessarily Better Than Homogeneous Ones// Voice of America, 4 April 2018. URL: <https://www.voanews.com/a/hungarian-foreign-minister-multicultural-society/4333350.html>

²⁹⁵ Hungarians Have Most Negative Attitude Towards Migration in Europe// Hungary Today. 2022. URL: <https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarians-negative-attitude-towards-migration-europe/>

²⁹⁶ Hungary: Perceived threats from other countries or groups// Statista. 2020. URL: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1128082/hungary-perceived-threats-from-other-countries-or-groups/>

²⁹⁷ Bell, D. A., Strabac, Z., & Valenta, M. (2022). The Importance of Skin Colour in Central Eastern Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Racist Attitudes in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. *Central and Eastern European Migration Review*, 11(1), 5-22.

²⁹⁸ Oliver Deckel u.a., Autoritäre Dynamiken in unsicheren Zeiten. Neue Herausforderungen - alte Reaktionen? Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studie 2022. URL: https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/2022-11/decker-kiess-heller-braehler-2022-leipziger-autoritarismus-studie-autoritaere-dynamiken-in-unsicheren-zeiten_0.pdf

wing extremism a threat to the country (1st place in the list of threats), 35.3 per cent named Islamism (6th place), and 34.8 per cent left-wing extremism (7th place). The potential for right-wing populism decreased from 38.2% of respondents in 2018-2019 to 28.2% in 2020-2021. At the same time, the study shows such tendencies not only among supporters of extreme right-wing parties, but also among voters of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and the Left.

Such theses as "it is in the national interest to establish a dictatorship" and "we need a leader who will rule Germany with a strong hand" were condemned by the overwhelming number of respondents (respectively, summing up the answers "completely disagree" and "mostly disagree," 85.1% and 84.4%). Also, the absolute majority did NOT support the statements "foreigners come to Germany to take advantage of its social system" (against 57.3%), "if there is a shortage of jobs, foreigners should be deported to their home countries" (80.4%) and "there are already so many foreigners in the country that it already constitutes a danger for us" (67.4%), although these results already show a slightly different trend than the condemnation of the dictatorship.

Verbal "disapproval" of foreigners, stereotypes unrelated to the potential use of violence, is much more widespread than other forms of xenophobia. The negative attitude to anti-Semitic clichés is quite unambiguous. 80.7 per cent disagreed with the statement "even today the influence of Jews is too great." 86,2% with the statement "Jews more often than representatives of other nationalities use cunning methods to achieve their goals," 84,9% with the statement "Jews have special characteristics and properties, they are not suitable for our society." In general, only 4.5 per cent of respondents expressed unequivocal support for hatred of foreigners, 1.7 per cent for anti-Semitism, 1.7 per cent for right-wing extremism, and 2.2 per cent for a dictatorial form of government. All of these manifestations are more widespread in East Germany than in West Germany. The authors summarise: only a small part of the population has unambiguously right-wing extremist views. But the percentage of such in the latent plane is higher, because a larger proportion of respondents are susceptible to right-wing populist propaganda, which may lead to the formation of right-wing radical views in the future.²⁹⁹

At the same time, data from the National Monitoring on Discrimination and Racism was published in 2022. 22 per cent of all German residents and 58 per cent of those who might be discriminated against on the basis of "external characteristics" have experienced racism. 45 per cent of those surveyed had observed a racist manifestation at least once. 90% recognised the existence of racism in Germany, of which 61% agreed that it is quite widespread, and 70%

²⁹⁹ Andreas Zick, Beate Küppler, Die geforderte Mitte. Rechtsextreme und demokratiegefährdende Einstellungen in Deutschland 2020/21// FES. URL: <https://www.fes.de/index.php?elD=dumpFile&t=f&f=78925&token=eb588a6bb6d9b528b8f13b53c5f3642cf896db55>

expressed a personal willingness to oppose racism to the best of their ability. More than 83 per cent agreed that racism still manifests itself today against blacks and Jews.³⁰⁰

Although **Italy** has become an increasingly multicultural and multi-ethnic country over the last thirty years and the gradual secularisation of Italian society has improved the acceptance of LGBCT+ people, episodes of discrimination, xenophobia, and intolerance towards those perceived as different are still widespread. The Italian National Office against Racial Discrimination collected 287 reports of discrimination on the grounds of religion or personal belief, of which 177 concerned episodes of anti-Semitism and 46 of Islamophobia.³⁰¹

According to an October 2020 poll on Italians' attitudes toward Jews, the number of those who deny the Holocaust has increased in 15 years from 2.7% to 15.6%, the most disastrous trend in Europe. 23.9% of Italians believe that Jews control economic and financial power in the country, 26.4% believe that Jews determine America's political choices, and 22.2% believe that Jews control the media.³⁰² Characteristically, 60.6 per cent of Italians believe that these incidents of anti-Semitism are the result of a fairly widespread hate speech based on racism; 47.5 per cent believe that these incidents are a warning sign of worsening racism in the country, and only 37.2 per cent believe that they are simply pranks and "teasing" with no intention to offend and no racist overtones.³⁰³

The NGO Observatory of Antisemitism of the Foundation of the Jewish Centre for Contemporary Documentation (CDEC) has recorded 164 incidents of hate speech on social media or online in Italy in 2022, compared to 117 incidents in 2021. The press reported examples of anti-Semitic graffiti and posters, including images of swastikas on walls, anti-Semitic stereotypes and praise of neo-Nazi groups in cities such as Rome, Milan, and Busto Arsizio. Experts who monitor anti-Semitism said they believe the number of anti-Semitic incidents recorded is significantly underreported.³⁰⁴

Vox Diritti, an independent non-governmental organisation, reported that in a monitoring of social media between January and October, 854 tweets mentioning Islam contained negative messages against Muslims.³⁰⁵

³⁰⁰ Rassismusmonitor. Studie rassistische Realitäten. URL: https://www.rassismusmonitor.de/fileadmin/user_upload/NaDiRa/CATI_Studie_Rassistische_Realit%C3%A4ten/DeZIM-Rassismusmonitor-Studie_Rassistische-Realit%C3%A4ten_Wie-setzt-sich-Deutschland-mit-Rassismus-auseinander.pdf

³⁰¹ 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Italy//U.S. Department of State. URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/italy/>

³⁰² Eurispes, l'antisemitismo non è stato ancora superato/Eurispes, 15.10.2020. URL: <https://eurispes.eu/news/eurispes-lantisemitismo-non-e-stato-ancora-superato/>

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Italy//U.S. Department of State. URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/italy/>

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

In 2021, a series of comprehensive studies were conducted by the non-profit Angus Reid Institute in partnership with the University of British Columbia on the attitudes of **Canadians** towards diversity and racism.³⁰⁶ According to this report, 85 per cent of the country's population believes that Canada is home to people of different races and ethnicities and that this makes for a better nation. People from all regions of the country, age groups, and ethnicities agree.

At the same time, one in three (34 per cent) say that "Canada is a racist country." Among those who believe this most strongly: visible minorities (42%) and women, especially those under 35, who are much more likely than men to hold this view (54%). On the other hand, fewer than one in eight (12 per cent) believe that some races are superior to others. In addition, 41 per cent of Canadians say that people who see discrimination where it doesn't exist are a bigger problem for the country than people who don't see where it does exist. Additional findings from the Angus Reid Institute's 2021 report show that:

- Three-quarters of Canadians over 55 disagree that Canada is a racist country, but 54 per cent of women aged 18 to 34 say it is.
- One in five Canadians (21 per cent) say they feel they are treated as an outsider in Canada. This proportion is 17 per cent among Caucasians, 30 per cent among Indigenous respondents, and 29 per cent among visible minorities.
- 25 per cent of Canadians, are very concerned about the presence of racial profiling in the police force.
- 25 per cent believe that immigration levels are too high and that racism is not a problem in Canada.
- 25 per cent of Canadians have "cool feelings" towards Muslims. This is most often said by men over 55 (42 per cent) and Quebecers (37 per cent).
- Majorities of Alberta residents (54 per cent) and Saskatchewan residents (57 per cent) believe that the exaggeration of racism is a bigger problem in Canada than the absence of racism where it exists.
- However, Saskatchewan residents (44%) were the most likely to agree that Canada is a racist country. Quebecers (24 per cent) were least likely to agree.

The survey also found that young Asian Canadians are "most affected by racism." Key findings on attitudes toward the Asian community in Canada show that 79 per cent of non-Asian

³⁰⁶ Diversity and Racism in Canada: Competing views deeply divide country along gender, generational lines/Angus Reid Institute, June 21, 2021. URL: <https://angusreid.org/diversity-racism-canada/>

Canadians find Asian Canadians warm and friendly, while half (50 per cent) say they think this group is often mistreated in Canada.

Meanwhile, one in five non-Asian Canadians said they believe that most or all Asian Canadians do not contribute to the broader community. More than 25 per cent of respondents said that many or most Asian Canadians do not make an effort to fit into the broader Canadian society. One in three non-Asian respondents believe that Chinese Canadians are more loyal to China than to Canada when it comes to bilateral conflict between the two countries. That said, only seven per cent of Chinese Canadians say this is actually the case. Nearly equal numbers of Asian (20 per cent) and non-Asian Canadians (17 per cent) say they would prefer the community in which they live to be people of their own race or ethnicity. Asian and non-Asian Canadians tend to agree that it will take another generation to solve this problem. However, 26 per cent of Asian Canadians do not think Canada will ever overcome some of its discriminatory practices and prejudices - 10 percentage points higher than non-Asian Canadians (16 per cent).

During the period under review, **Russia** still recorded a fairly high level of migrantophobia. According to a survey conducted in December 2021 by the Levada Centre (listed as a "foreign agent" in the Russian Federation), there was a slight decrease in the share of those who believe that the government should limit the inflow of labour migrants: 68% of respondents thought so (73% in August 2020). Only 11% believed that the authorities should facilitate the inflow of labour migrants. At the same time, 50% of respondents believed that the work of migrants is useful for the country and society, while 45% held the opposite view. 57% of respondents believed that the presence of migrants in their city or region is excessive (63% in 2019). 59% thought that their relatives and acquaintances would be willing to do the work that migrants do now (64% thought so in 2019). 41% of respondents thought that most migrants live better and richer lives than they and their families (44% in 2019).³⁰⁷

According to a poll conducted by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM) on 18 November 2021, 54% of Russians supported the idea of refusing to use migrant labour in construction. Only 28% had a positive attitude to the influx of foreigners in various sectors of the economy, while 41% of citizens held the opposite point of view. 56% of respondents agreed that foreign labour migrants fill the shortage of workers in low-skilled and low-paid jobs, 24% disagreed, and 17% partly agreed and partly disagreed. The opinion that immigrants create competition on the labour market and "take away" jobs from locals is shared by 44% of Russians,

³⁰⁷ Ксенофобия и мигранты//Левада – Центр, 24.01.2022. URL: <https://www.levada.ru/2022/01/24/ksenofobiya-i-migranty/>

while 37% disagree. At the same time, 57% see a connection between the growth of crime and the number of migrants from other countries, 20% do not see such a connection.³⁰⁸

At the same time, despite all the migrantophobia, Russians generally do not consider the problem of migrants to be of paramount importance. In August 2020, when asked in a Levada-Centre poll about their most worrying social problems, only 16% named "the influx of newcomers, migrants," which ranked 12th on the list.

As for interethnic relations, in general they remained at the same level, with a positive trend. Thus, 11 per cent of Russians feel irritation or dislike towards representatives of any nationality. During the period of observation - since 2002 - the share of such answers has decreased threefold. 87 per cent of Russians do not feel any such dislike - 22 percentage points more than in 2002.³⁰⁹ At the same time, 52 per cent of respondents believed that multinationality is a good thing for the country, 22 per cent had the opposite point of view and 26 per cent found it difficult to answer.

At the same time, a Levada Centre poll conducted in December 2021 provides data on the so-called "unloved" peoples. According to it, the most disliked people were Roma. Only 3% of respondents were ready to see them among their family members (in 2020 this figure was 2%), 3% - among close friends (in 2020 - 2%), 6% - among neighbours (in 2020 - 4%), 3% - among work colleagues (1% in 2020). 29% were willing to see them among residents of Russia (23%). At the same time, 14% said they would let them into Russia only temporarily (22% in 2020), and 37% said they would not let them into Russia at all (44% in 2020).³¹⁰

Africans are next. Only 4% of respondents were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was 3%), 6% - among close friends (in 2020 - 4%), 7% - among neighbours (in 2020 - 6%), 5% - among work colleagues (4%). 20% were ready to see them among residents of Russia (17%). 25% said they would let them into Russia only temporarily (31%), and 27% said they would not let them into Russia at all (28%).³¹¹

Africans were followed by Central Asians (Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks). Only 4% of respondents were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was also 4%), 6% - among close friends (in 2020 - 4%), 7% - among neighbours (in 2020 - 7%), 6% - among work colleagues (5%). 22% were ready to see them among residents of Russia (20%). 25% said they

³⁰⁸ Трудовые иммигранты в России: вклад, положение, отношение//ВЦИОМ, 18 ноября 2021 г. URL: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/trudovye-immigranty-v-rossii-vklad-polozhenie-otnoshenie>

³⁰⁹ Межнациональные отношения//ФОМ, 16 августа 2021 г. URL: <https://fom.ru/Nastroeniya/14616>

³¹⁰ Ксенофобия и мигранты//Левада – Центр, 24.01.2022. URL: <https://www.levada.ru/2022/01/24/ksenofobiya-i-migranty/>

³¹¹ Ibid.

would let them into Russia only temporarily (33%), and 26% said they would not let them into Russia (26%).³¹²

Chechens ranked fourth. 4% of respondents were ready to see them among family members (unchanged from 2020), 6% among close friends (5% in 2020), 8% among neighbours (the same 8% in 2020), and 4% among work colleagues (3%). 32% were willing to see among Russian residents (31%). 15% said they would let them into Russia only temporarily (18%), and 26% said they would not let them into the country at all (26%), ignoring the fact that Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation.

Regarding the Chinese: 5% were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was the same 5%), 8% - among close friends (in 2020 - 5%), 8% - among neighbours (9%), 7% - among work colleagues (7%). 21% were willing to see among residents of Russia (16%). At the same time, 23% said they would let them into Russia only temporarily (30%), and 22% would close them off from entering the country altogether (22%).³¹³

Regarding Ukrainians: 13% were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was 11%), 9% - among close friends (in 2020 - 7%), 10% - among neighbours (11%), 4% - among work colleagues (5%). 26% were willing to see among Russian residents (23%). At the same time, 15% said they would let them into Russia only temporarily (22%), and 17% would close their entry to Russia altogether (19%).³¹⁴

Russians were least xenophobic towards Jews. 13% were ready to see them among family members (in 2020 this figure was the same 13%), 11% - among close friends (in 2020 - 10%), 14% - among neighbours (13%), 7% - among work colleagues (7%). 27% were ready to see them among residents of Russia (25%). 9% said they would let Jews into Russia only temporarily (14%), and 13% would not let them in at all (13%).³¹⁵

According to a Levada Centre poll published in February 2022, 27% of respondents agree that "a non-Russian person cannot be a true patriot of Russia," 38% of respondents agree with the statement that ethnic "Russians in Russia should have certain advantages over everyone else," 36% of respondents believe Russians in Russia should have advantages when holding government positions. 42 per cent of respondents believe that a person's ethnicity should be taken into account when being appointed to public positions in the Russian government.³¹⁶

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Ксенофобия и национализм в государственной власти//Левада – Центр, 11.03.2022. URL: <https://www.levada.ru/2022/03/11/ksenofobiya-i-natsionalizm-v-gosudarstvennoj-vlasti/>

In a November 2021 poll by the aforementioned Levada Centre, the number of Russians who believe that gays and lesbians should have the same rights as other Russian citizens fell to 33% from 47% in a similar 2019 survey. A quarter of Russians (25%) believe in one way or another that consenting adults have the right to enter into relationships with people of the same sex. Over the past few years, the share of people who hold this opinion has slightly increased: in 2015, there were only 19%. At the same time, 87% of respondents said that there were no members of sexual minorities in their social circle.³¹⁷

In **Serbia**, the latest opinion polls conducted by the sociological agency BCSP have shown that citizens consider the migrant problem to be the most serious external threat to the country's national security. At the same time, it is among the top three internal security threats. Also, about 75 per cent of respondents are concerned about the "free movement of migrants in urban and rural areas."³¹⁸ Other studies show that Serbian citizens have many negative attitudes towards migrants, fraught with fear of them.³¹⁹ This trend has developed under the strong influence of extreme right-wing parties and organisations. Every fourth Serbian citizen supports the activities of extreme right-wing groups such as "1389" and "Nashi," "Leviathan" and "People's Patrol," or the banned "National Unity" and "Honor."

This does not mean that all those who support the work of these organisations will be involved in their activities or vote for them in elections if they have to stand for office, but it does indicate that a significant number of citizens support the values inherent in the far right. The BCSP poll also showed that almost a quarter of those surveyed believe that democracy is desirable but that a "firm hand" is needed in the current circumstances, while a fifth believe that all regimes are the same. Among those who believe that all regimes are the same are the youngest people, residents of Central and Western Serbia, and citizens with incomplete primary education.

The high level of xenophobia in Serbia also persists with regard to the Roma minority. In total, according to the Hungarian-registered NGO Minority Rights Group Europe (MRGE), in 2021, 12.7 per cent of the total number of discrimination complaints were based on the nationality and ethnicity of the complainants, with the majority (77.1 per cent) of such cases being reported by Roma. Negative attitudes and prejudices against Roma are often repeated, manifesting

³¹⁷ Отношение россиян к ЛГБТ людям//Левада-Центр, 15.10.2021. URL: <https://www.levada.ru/2021/10/15/otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-lgbt-lyudyam/>

³¹⁸ Marija Ignjatijević, Bojan Elek, and Marija Pavlović, Boosting Armament to Fight Demographic Decline, Crime and Corruption//Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2020, pp. 4-5. URL: <https://bezbed-nost.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/naoruzanje-eng.pdf>

³¹⁹ Jovana Bjekić, Marko Živanović, and Maša Vukčević Marković, Attitudes Towards Migrants and Refugees in Serbia/Belgrade: Psychosocial Innovation Network, 2020. URL: https://psychosocial-innovation.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Stavovi-prema-izbeglicama-i-migrantima_ENGL.pdf

themselves in different local environments, for example through graffiti on walls and on social media.³²⁰

At the same time, a Public Opinion Poll conducted by Civil Rights Defenders in 2020 showed that 73% of Serbs support the right of same-sex couples to visit their partners in hospitals, 60% support health insurance for same-sex partners, 59% support allowing same-sex partners to inherit each other's property after death, and 59% were in favour of equal division of property. A total of 80 per cent of Serbs supported granting same-sex couples some legal rights, and 26 per cent of respondents supported same-sex marriage, up from 11 per cent in 2015.³²¹

The situation in the **United States** is not simple. The American public continues to believe that their society is racist: 80% of Americans, according to the Pew Research Center, said in 2021 that there is a great deal or some discrimination against blacks; 76% believe there is discrimination against Hispanics; 70% believe there is discrimination against Asians.³²² In a 2022 Pew Research Center Public Opinion Poll, 78% of Americans surveyed believe Muslims face discrimination in their country; 68% believe Jews face discrimination; and 44% believe evangelical Christians are victims of discrimination.

According to the Edelman Trust Special Report: Business and Racial Justice in America, in May 2022, 67% of Americans were concerned about systemic racism and racial injustice in their country; 73% of Americans believed that racial injustice and racism exist.³²³

According to the 2021 survey, more black adults than other adults believe structural or legislative racism is a serious problem in the U.S. (compared to individual forms of racism). Two-thirds (65%) of Americans believe that individual racism by individuals against blacks is a more serious problem than racism in legislation. Among them, majorities of white (70%), Asian (65%), and Hispanic (63%) Americans believe that individual racism is more significant than institutional racism. 11% of African Americans, 12% of Asians, and 12% of Hispanics believe there is no discrimination against blacks. On the other hand, 52% of black Americans believe that legislative

³²⁰ Marijana Luković, Erika Muhi and Andrea Spitalšzky, Building trust in equality: Enhancing access to justice for Roma in Hungary and Serbia. Report//MRGE, Sept, 2022. URL: https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/MRG_Rep_REILA_EN_Sept22.pdf

³²¹ Attitudes towards LGBT+ rights and issues in Serbia 2015 vs 2020/Civil Rights Defenders. URL: <https://crd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/ENGLESKA-VERZIJA-1.pdf>

³²² Andrew Daniller, Majorities of Americans see at least some discrimination against Black, Hispanic and Asian people in the U.S.//Pew Research Center, March 18, 2021. URL: <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/03/18/majorities-of-americans-see-at-least-some-discrimination-against-black-hispanic-and-asian-people-in-the-u-s/>

³²³ Edelman Trust Special Report: Business and Racial Justice in America (2022), p. 4. URL: <https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2022-06/2022%20Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%20Special%20Report%20Business%20and%20Racial%20Justice.pdf>

racism is a bigger problem for blacks than racism by individuals. Only 3% of blacks believe there is no discrimination against them.³²⁴

It is clear that the US population is being polarised along political lines, and this polarisation is accompanied by an increasingly clear division along racial lines. Thus, according to a Morning Consult poll published in March 2021, 49% of Americans disapprove of Biden's immigration policy - 70% of Democrats and only 11% of Republicans were in favour of it.³²⁵ In addition, 74% of African Americans, 50% of Hispanics, and 34% of white Americans approved of the policy.³²⁶ While 64% of Democrats see increased diversity in the U.S. as a positive thing, 25% of Republicans say the demographic changes are a threat to whites, and 35% believe liberals are behind the changes.³²⁷

Despite the spike in anti-Semitic incidents, according to the 2022 poll, Americans were least opposed to Jewish presidential candidates: only 7% of Americans would oppose such a candidate. Interestingly, the gap between Democrats and Republicans in this case is the narrowest (a difference of only 2%). This low opposition to a Jewish candidate persists among Catholics (7%), Protestants, and evangelical Christians (6%); and is equally true for whites and non-whites (7% for each). Catholic and traditional Protestant candidates were the next preferred choice, with only 9% and 10% identified as opposing such a potential candidate, respectively. Meanwhile, 26% of Americans would oppose a Muslim presidential candidate and 34% would oppose an atheist candidate.³²⁸

Meanwhile, according to a representative poll of 1,500 people conducted by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) in April 2022, 70% of Republicans share beliefs and narratives that Democrats consider extremist, including the "white replacement" theory and the suspicion that Democrats are trying to change demographics in order to outnumber white conservative voters and thus secure an electoral advantage.³²⁹ The same poll showed that 44% of Americans believe their

³²⁴ Black Americans Have a Clear Vision for Reducing Racism but Little Hope It Will Happen//Pew Research Center, August 30, 2022. URL: <https://www.pewresearch.org/race-ethnicity/2022/08/30/black-americans-have-a-clear-vision-for-reducing-racism-but-little-hope-it-will-happen/>

³²⁵ Eli Yokley, Voter Sentiment About Biden's Immigration Handling Drops Underwater//Morning Consult, March 31, 2021. URL: <https://pro.morningconsult.com/articles/immigration-biden-approval-rating-polling>

³²⁶ AP-NORC poll: Border woes dent Biden approval on immigration//AP, April 5, 2021. URL: <https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-mexico-health-immigration-immigration-policy-1fb007e86452849d8e373908a3d81e94>

³²⁷ Cassie Miller, SPLC POLL FINDS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FOR 'GREAT REPLACEMENT' THEORY AND OTHER HARD-RIGHT IDEAS//SPLC, JUNE 01, 2022. URL: <HTTPS://WWW.SPLCENTER.ORG/NEWS/2022/06/01/POLL-FINDS-SUPPORT-GREAT-REPLACEMENT-HARD-RIGHT-IDEAS>

³²⁸ Shibley Telhami, Stella M. Rouse, The antisemitic and Islamophobic fringe is alarmingly emboldened - but it's shrinking//Brookings, December 22, 2022. URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-antisemitic-and-islamophobic-fringe-is-alarmingly-emboldened-but-its-shrinking/>

³²⁹ Cassie Miller, SPLC POLL FINDS SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT FOR 'GREAT REPLACEMENT' THEORY AND OTHER HARD-RIGHT IDEAS//SPLC, JUNE 01, 2022. URL: <HTTPS://WWW.SPLCENTER.ORG/NEWS/2022/06/01/POLL-FINDS-SUPPORT-GREAT-REPLACEMENT-HARD-RIGHT-IDEAS>

country is headed toward civil war (among them 53% of Republicans and 39% of Democrats).³³⁰ These figures show that American society has become polarised and radicalised.

In 2022, a poll conducted in **Greece** revealed the following picture: 60.3 per cent of people had a negative attitude towards Turks, 47.9 per cent towards Muslims, 48.4 per cent towards Germans, and 42.8 per cent towards migrants. At the same time, 49.3 per cent of Greeks had a positive attitude towards Americans, 46.3 per cent towards Jews, 55.4 per cent towards refugees, and 48.7 per cent towards Russians.³³¹

In 2022, a majority of Greeks continued to believe that children born in Greece to legal immigrant parents should be granted Greek citizenship (59.1 per cent), although this figure is significantly lower than in 2015 (75.2 per cent).

In 2020, Colour Youth, an Athens-based youth organisation, conducted a study on attitudes towards LGBTI pupils and students in schools, which found that the situation of LGBTI children in Greek schools "remains deplorable."³³² They experience stigmatisation, institutional and verbal discrimination, harassment, lack of medical care, and lack of legal recognition.

As for **Poland**, according to the 2020 poll, Poles had the worst attitude towards Arabs (65 per cent), Roma (57 per cent), Russians (43 per cent), Ukrainians (41 per cent), Romanians (40 per cent), and Jews (33 per cent).³³³ The situation has changed slightly since 2021. At that time, Poles had the least sympathy for Arabs (46%), Roma (42%), Russians (35%), Romanians (31%), Jews (29%), and Germans (27%).³³⁴ In 2022, Arabs (46 per cent), Russians (38 per cent) Roma (37 per cent), Belarusians (29 per cent), and Jews (27 per cent) remained the leaders of the anti-Polish sympathy rating.³³⁵

Obviously, the main factors influencing the dynamics of hateful attitudes during the period under review were the **COVID-19 pandemic** and the **Ukrainian migration crisis**.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ What Greeks believe, 2022. URL:<https://www.dianeosis.org/en/2022/09/what-greeks-believe-in-2022-part-a/>

³³² GALE, the Global Alliance for LGBT Education (2020, March 15), In Greece, even teachers make homophobic remarks about LGBT students, referring to ILGA// Rainbow Digest March 2020, Colour Youth, 2020, First Greek National School Climate Survey. URL: https://www.gale.info/en/news/local_news/200315-in-greece-even-teachers-make-homophobic-remarks-about-lgbt-students

³³³ Omuła-Rudzka M. Raport z badań CBOS. Postawy wobec innych narodów. Warszawa: Fundacja Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2020.

Melnychenko N. Raport: Przystępstwa z nienawiści w Polsce w 2020 roku. - URL: <https://odfoundation.eu/a/81457,raport-przestepstwa-z-nienawisci-w-polsce-w-2020-roku/> - https://odfoundation.eu/content/uploads/2021/08/hate-crimes-2021-by-rtf_update_pl_3.pdf

³³⁴ Komunikat z badań CBOS. Stosunek do innych narodów. 2021. № 30. - URL: https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2021/K_030_21.PDF

³³⁵ Komunikat z badań CBOS. Stosunek do innych narodów. 2022. № 21. - URL: https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K_021_22.PDF

— The COVID-19 Pandemic as a Factor in Xenophobic Sentiments

During the pandemic, criminological theories that certain social groups were breeding grounds for the disease and even spreading the infection on purpose were spread with varying degrees of intensity in almost all monitoring countries. In some communities, these rumors significantly influenced attitudes towards migrants, people of Asian origin, Jews, Muslims, etc.

As in other Western countries, Covid-19 and its spread in the **UK** has been largely associated with the rise of Sinophobia and anti-East Asian sentiment. In the United Kingdom, the most widely publicised case is that of Jonathan Mok, a student from Singapore who was attacked at the height of the Sinophobic fervor on Oxford Street in London on 24 February 2020; his attackers shouted at him, "I don't want your coronavirus in my country."³³⁶

In terms of official data and research conducted on hate crime and victimisation, since the first known case of COVID-19 in the United Kingdom, individuals from China/East Asia have become more likely targets for hate crime than members of any other ethnic minority groups.³³⁷ In particular, victimisation reported by Chinese/East Asian interviewees reached its highest level in March 2020 (before isolation); it then declined significantly after the initial relaxation of restrictions in May 2020. Examining more locally the concentration of Chinese and East Asian populations in London, another study based on Metropolitan Police crime data also found that hate crimes against Chinese people increased between January and March 2020 (i.e. after the first appearance of Covid-19 and before the introduction of national isolation in the UK).³³⁸ By examining recent months, during and after the first quarantine in the UK, the findings also showed that the pandemic had a sustained impact on hate crimes against the Chinese.

At the same time, far-right social media users took advantage of the pandemic to spread Islamophobic conspiracy theories and fake videos showing Muslims neglecting social distancing measures and allegedly prone to spreading the virus.³³⁹ This propensity for victimisation has been further confirmed by public health statistics: public health England (2020) found that ethnic minority groups are more than four times more likely to die from Covid-19 than white people.³⁴⁰

³³⁶ See Chiu A. (2020, March 20). 'Trump has no qualms about calling the coronavirus the 'Chinese Virus.' That's a dangerous attitude, experts say.'//*The Washington Post*. URL:

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/20/coronavirus-trump-chinese-virus/> and the Asian Pacific Policy and Planning Council. URL: : <http://www.asianpacificpolicyandplanningcouncil.org/stop-aapi-hate/>

³³⁷ Sandy Schumann, Ysanne Moore, 'The COVID-19 outbreak as a trigger event for sinophobic hate crimes in the United Kingdom' //*The British Journal of Criminology*, 2022. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1093/bjc/azac015>

³³⁸ Gray, C., & Hansen, K. (2021). Did Covid-19 Lead to an Increase in Hate Crimes Toward Chinese People in London? *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 37(4), 569-588. <https://doi.org/10.1177/10439862211027994>

³³⁹ Awan, Imran "Coronavirus: conspiracy theories and fake videos fuel rise in Islamophobia." *The Conversation*, 24 April 2020. URL: <https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-conspiracy-theories-and-fake-videos-fuel-rise-in-islamophobia-137107>

³⁴⁰ Public Health England, 'Disparities in the risks and outcomes of COVID-19', London: Department of Health, August 2020. URL:

Moreover, in addition to being more likely to die, ethnic minority groups were also 54% more likely to be fined for isolation offences than whites.³⁴¹ Thus, there is growing evidence that Covid-19 and racism are inextricably linked.

In **Hungary**, the early stages of the pandemic were marked by a series of incidents involving Iranian students who were targeted by radicals who accused them of "bringing the virus into the country" and some were even expelled from universities, officially for "violating quarantine rules."³⁴² In the early stages of the pandemic, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was accused of using the pandemic to suspend asylum rights in Hungary.³⁴³ In early March 2020, Hungary also announced that admissions to two transit zones on the border with Serbia would be halted indefinitely, stating that asylum seekers on the Serbian side of the border waiting to be admitted to these zones were coming from high-risk countries such as Iran, despite the fact that most of these people had been on the Serbian side for an average of about 18 months, hence away from areas considered high-risk.³⁴⁴ Various support programs related to integration (such as those provided by the European Social Fund or the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund, suspended already in 2018), access to the labour market, health care, etc., which were significantly hampered during the pandemic, were significantly hindered or closed. It is true that there were some positive examples, including attempts to formulate a toolkit to support minorities in the workplace during this period.³⁴⁵ However, negative attitudes towards minorities only increased.

Despite the fact that the **German** Federal Government and the heads of the Länder pursued, in comparison with a number of other states, a relatively mild strategy of sanitary and epidemiological restrictions in the fight against the spread of COVID-19 and abandoned a number of measures used in the EU, Russia, and Asia (no electronic control of citizens' movement, virtually no restrictions on movement per se, masks in open spaces were mandatory only for a short period of time and on a small number of streets within major cities), it quickly gained a

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/908434/Disparities_in_the_risk_and_outcomes_of_COVID_August_2020_update.pdf

³⁴¹ Busby M., Gidda M., 'BAME people fined more than white population under coronavirus laws', *The Guardian*, 26 May 2020. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/26/bame-people-fined-more-than-white-population-under-coronavirus-laws> & Rawlinson K., Quinn B., 'Police investigate alleged coronavirus-linked attack on London student', *The Guardian*, 3 March 2020. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/03/police-investigate-alleged-coronavirus-linked-attack-on-london-student-jonathan-mok>

³⁴² Hungary Today. 2020. Coronavirus: Another 13 Iranian Students Expelled for Violating Quarantine Rules. 16 March 2020. URL: <https://hungarytoday.hu/coronavirus-iranian-students-hungary-expelled/>

³⁴³ Euronews. 2020. Orban uses Coronavirus as excuse to suspend asylum rights in Hungary. 03 March 2020. URL: <https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/03/orban-uses-coronavirus-as-excuse-to-suspend-asylum-rights-in-hungary>

³⁴⁴ Human Rights Watch. 2020. Hungary weaponises coronavirus to stoke xenophobia. 19 March 2020. Available at <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/hungary-weaponizes-coronavirus-stoke-xenophobia>

³⁴⁵ WeAreOpen. 2021. "What can employers do? COVID-19 Impact Report on Women, LGBTQ+, Roma & Disabled People." Available at <https://nyitottakvagyunk.hu/en/2020/06/09/covid-impact-report-2020/>

relative mass appeal and also quickly entered the political scene. It quickly gained relative mass popularity and just as quickly withdrew from the political scene. In Germany, systemic opponents of government restrictive measures to combat the spread of COVID-19 are commonly referred to as Querdenker ("those who think differently").

Some Coronasceptics resorted to violence. Two cases were the most high-profile. In September 2021, an employee of a petrol station in Idar-Oberstein in south-west Germany was killed. A visitor, in response to the clerk's request to wear a legally mandated medical mask, fired a fatal shot into the victim's head.³⁴⁶ In December 2021, a Coronasceptic activist killed his wife and three children at his home in Königs-Wusterhausen near Berlin before committing suicide.³⁴⁷ The "cause" of the tragedy was the exposure of forged vaccination certificates in the family's possession. The killer was found to have believed in conspiracy theories, particularly a "worldwide Jewish conspiracy" and vaccination as "a step towards establishing Jewish domination." Verbal and physical violence was inflicted on doctors and nurses, employees of vaccination centres, and municipal politicians who supported the vaccination campaign and restrictive measures.³⁴⁸ There have also been arson attacks on vaccination centres, for example in September 2021 in Saxony.³⁴⁹ In April 2021, representatives of Reporters Without Borders stated that the majority of all attacks on journalists at that time occurred at Coronasceptic demonstrations.³⁵⁰

Coronasceptics did not have a single ideological platform, so it would be wrong to classify them all as supporters of a particular ideology. Nevertheless, right-wing extremists and populists became not only regular participants in their actions (with the connivance of the organisers), displaying right-wing radical symbols such as the "Imperial Flag," but also allies of seemingly "moderate" Coronasceptics in their struggle against the state and society, most of which did not share their postulates. The most striking example was the breaking of the police cordon and the symbolic "occupation" of the steps of the Reichstag building during a coronasceptic demonstration in August 2020.³⁵¹ Right-wing extremists from the "Citizens of the Reich" grouping under the

³⁴⁶ Christian Gehrke. Tankwart erschossen: Täter fühlt sich "stark belastet" von Corona-Situation, Berliner Zeitung, 20.09.2021. URL: <https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/staatsanwalt-tankstellen-kassierer-wegen-corona-maske-erschossen-li.184058>

³⁴⁷ Mord in Königs Wusterhausen. Familienvater war in "Querdenker"-Kreisen unterwegs, N-TV, 08.12.2021. URL: <https://www.n-tv.de/panorama/Familienvater-war-in-Querdenker-Kreisen-unterwegs-article22986752.html>

³⁴⁸ Ärztekammer beklagt "neue Qualität von Hass" wegen Coronaimpfungen, Ärzteblatt, 22.10.2021. URL: <https://www.aerzteblatt.de/nachrichten/128390/Aerztekammer-beklagt-neue-Qualitaet-von-Hass-wegen-Coronaimpfungen>

³⁴⁹ Tobias Utz, Brandanschlag auf Corona-Impfzentrum - Flucht in roter Limousine, Merkur, 15.09.2021. URL: <https://www.merkur.de/welt/sachsen-brandanschlag-corona-impfzentrum-treuen-polizei-einsatz-zr-90981951.html>

³⁵⁰ "Reporter ohne Grenzen"-Liste. Pressefreiheit nur noch "zufriedenstellend" , Tagesschau, 20.04.2021. URL: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/rog-pressefreiheit-deutschland-corona-101.html>

³⁵¹ Proteste in Berlin Fast 40,000 Menschen bei Corona-Demos - Sperren am Reichstag durchbrochen, RBB, 20.08.2020. URL:

"Imperial Flag" took an active part. Politicians from the AfG, the Third Way, the Right, the NPDG, and activists from anti-migrant right-wing extremist movements such as PEGIDA took part in other actions. In particular, PEGIDA founder Lutz Bachmann was particularly active at the rallies.³⁵²

The slogan put forward by one representative of the Third Way, "The system is more dangerous than a coronavirus," has become popular in coronasceptic circles. The media reported on the close ties of important figures in this movement, such as the founder of Querdenker 711, entrepreneur Michael Ballweg, to the AfG, the far-right group Resistance 2020 and PEGIDA.³⁵³ Ballweg, as well as the other leader of "to Querdenker," the doctor and blogger Udo Schiffmann, repeatedly repeated the theses of the extreme right: everything is the fault of the "system" which must be abolished, i.e. democracy replaced by authoritarianism, the media "manipulated" and "silenced," the "inability" of the democrats to carry out public administration in Germany, anti-Semitic statements about a "world conspiracy," etc. Ballweg met with representatives of the "Reichsbürger" in order to coordinate common actions.³⁵⁴

Unlike in Germany, the coronasceptic movement in **Russia** has not developed seriously and has had little impact on people's xenophobic attitudes. In 2020, after the introduction of the self-isolation regime, Russian far-right Internet resources (as during the 2008 crisis) began to publish "scare stories" about gangs of "hungry gastarbeiters" who were out of work and who would now allegedly start terrorizing the inhabitants of Russia. There were also demands for mass deportations of migrants. We can also note the accusations against Protestants community in 2020 that their parishioner from the Bryansk region had become "patient zero" there with the coronavirus.³⁵⁵

However, this has not led to the emergence of any powerful movement or public actions, largely due to the lack of a base in the form of capable organisations. Everything was limited to a small burst of Internet activity. Interestingly, this topic was hardly mentioned in the description of criminal cases related to hate crimes and extremism in 2020-2022 - only isolated episodes were noted.

https://www.rbb24.de/politik/thema/2020/coronavirus/beitraege_neu/2020/08/demonstrationen-samstag-corona-querdenken-gegendemos.html

³⁵² Main Baumgärtner u.a., Wut und Wahnsinn, Spiegel, Heft 20, 09.05.2020. URL:

https://medienblog.hypothesen.org/files/2020/05/Wut-und-Wahnsinn_SPIEGEL-20.pdf

³⁵³ Tilman Steffen, Corona-Proteste: Sie wollen sich anstecken dürfen, DIE ZEIT, 09.05.2020. URL:

<https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2020-05/coronavirus-proteste-demonstrationen-infektionsschutz-einschraenkungen/komplettansicht>

³⁵⁴ Stefan Tomik, Rüdiger Soldt, Querdenker und Reichsbürger, Audienz bei König Peter I., FAZ, 26.11.2020. URL:

<https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/querdenker-um-michael-ballweg-treffen-reichsbuerger-peter-fitze-17070780.html>

³⁵⁵ В Брянске сообщили об антироссийской агитации в церкви пятидесятников//Новости Брянска, 17.03.2022. URL: https://newsbryansk.ru/fn_891340.html

In **Italy**, the pandemic was perceived in a xenophobic manner from the outset. As a virus first registered in China, its spread in Italy triggered numerous episodes of racism against the Chinese community. According to the non-governmental organisation "Cronache di Ordinario" Razzismo, 61 cases of racism against people of Chinese origin with verbal insults, acts of discrimination, arson, and acts of violence were recorded between 20 January and 8 March 2020.³⁵⁶ Initially, the Chinese community was to pay the price for the spread of the pandemic, but later prejudice and racism spread to all foreigners and migrants present in the territory. This phenomenon was somehow redefined when the pandemic became global and when even Italians abroad (especially in other European countries) became targets of xenophobic accusations of spreading the virus.

U.S. President Trump's inflammatory remarks, including referring to COVID-19 as a "Chinese virus," have contributed to an increase in xenophobia against Asians. At the end of July 2020, there were over 2,000 hate incidents against Asians.³⁵⁷ Hate crimes against them have increased by 73% in 2020.³⁵⁸ According to Stop Asian Hate, there were nearly 11,000 such attacks between March 2020 and December 2021.³⁵⁹ They ranged from microaggressions to physical attacks. Since the start of the pandemic, anti-Chinese propaganda has been spread in right-wing media and public discourse (and not just on far-right websites), including accusations that the "uncivilised" Chinese tradition of using wild animals for food. The renewed hatred of the Chinese is a legacy of an entrenched historical tradition of Americans' racist perception of the Chinese as a "yellow peril."

Other minorities were also affected during the pandemic. There was an increase in attacks on immigrants from Latin America, as well as on immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in general, who were blamed for the increase in coronavirus infection rates. When the U.S. was hit by the pandemic, the Trump administration used public health authorities to achieve its goal of closing the border to migrants and asylum seekers. The public health emergency allowed the White House to circumvent international law protecting refugees and asylum seekers, specifically the

³⁵⁶ I tassi di affezione da Covid-19 tra le nazionalità straniere in Italia//ISMU. URL: <https://www.ismu.org/i-tassi-di-affezione-da-covid-19-tra-le-nazionalita-straniere-in-italia/>

³⁵⁷ Erin Donaghue, 2,120 hate incidents against Asian Americans reported during coronavirus pandemic//CBS News, July 02, 2020. URL: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/anti-asian-american-hate-incidents-up-racism/>

³⁵⁸ Anti-Asian hate crimes rose 73% last year, updated FBI data says//NBC News, Oct. 25, 2021. URL: <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/anti-asian-hate-crimes-rose-73-last-year-updated-fbi-data-says-rcna3741>

³⁵⁹ Stop AAPI Hate National Report. URL: <https://stopaapihate.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/22-SAH-NationalReport-3.1.22-v9.pdf>

1951 UN Refugee Convention.³⁶⁰ The authorities were given the green light to deport asylum seekers without giving them the opportunity to appeal to a court in the United States.³⁶¹

Following the outbreak of the pandemic in February 2020, several extreme right-wing figures in **France** pointed to the possible responsibility of the Chinese government for the late and inappropriate response to the pandemic, as well as the idea that the virus had accidentally emerged from the Wuhan virology laboratory. This theory was circulated in mid-April 2020 in France by Professor Luc Montagnier, winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in Medicine, and was commented on profusely by elected representatives of the Rassemblement Nationale, such as Julien Odoul and MP Gilbert Collard, as well as former MEP Jean-Yves Le Galloux. They supported Montagnier's assertion as a credible alternative to the "official truth" stated by WHO and European governments. The Rassemblement Nationale did not officially follow in Montagnier's footsteps, and there is no doubt that Marine Le Pen was very careful not to damage her "normalisation" by calling this theory conspirativist. Despite this rather moderate attitude of the LE, anti-Chinese racism quickly went viral on social media, leading to a judicial enquiry in November 2020,³⁶² as well as a growing awareness of racism among the Chinese community in France and the emergence of counternarratives - protest demonstrations and social media activism by French citizens of Chinese descent.

However, the Chinese community was not the only one blamed for the spread of the virus in France: Jews were also attacked. It so happened that the then Minister of Health, Agnès Bouzin, her husband, Professor Yves Levy, and the government coordinator of the COVID task force, Professor Jérôme Salomon, are Jews and widely respected doctors. Conspiracy theorists accused them of sabotaging alternative COVID-19 treatments, particularly chloroquine treatment.³⁶³ The theory of a "Jewish conspiracy" to spread the virus or cover up the truth about it immediately arose and spread. It was actively promoted by the Civitas movement of Catholic fundamentalists. On 7 August 2021, in Metz, during a demonstration against pandemic restrictions, a former member of the Rassemblement Nationale named Cassandra Fristo, a teacher, held an anti-Semitic placard

³⁶⁰ The 1951 Refugee Convention// UNHCR. URL: <https://www.unhcr.org/us/about-unhcr/who-we-are/1951-refugee-convention>

³⁶¹ In March 2020, an order³⁶¹ from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was issued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 265, 268 and 42 C.F.R. § 71.40 ("Title 42") of U.S. Law.

³⁶² Enquête ouverte pour des appels à la violence contre les Asiatiques//Le Monde, 01.11.2020. URL: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2020/11/01/enquete-ouverte-pour-des-appels-a-la-violence-contre-les-asiatiques_6058104_3224.html

³⁶³ Caricatures, complot, liste de noms : le coronavirus engendre des attaques antisémites sur le web/Radiofrance, 30.03.2020. URL: <https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceinter/caricatures-complot-liste-de-noms-le-coronavirus-engendre-des-attaques-antisemites-sur-le-web-4672165>

clearly targeting Jewish politicians, businessmen, and philanthropists as participants in this conspiracy.³⁶⁴

Fristo walked alongside local Civitas activists and later became a member of that party with leadership responsibilities. Civitas used the pandemic to spread the idea that the virus was part of a worldwide conspiracy by globalised elites known as "The Great Reset."³⁶⁵ "The Great Reset" is the title of a 2020 book by Klaus Schwab, founder of the World Economic Forum in Davos, and his "number two" - Thierry Mallere. In it, they call on world leaders to take advantage of the pandemic to adopt a new code of behaviour to create a more inclusive, eco-friendly, and innovative world, based on the idea that the big changes in human history have always come at times of profound global challenges that disrupt the world order. Conspirators read the book from the opposite perspective and claimed it was a plan to enslave citizens through vaccination and other new technologies, with Civitas claiming it would bring totalitarianism to the world.

Clearly, the quarantine restrictions have increased the tendency of many people to believe in fanciful conspiracy theories because they believe in their gut feelings rather than scientifically proven truths. By spending more time online and on social media than usual due to restrictions, these people have been exposed to a lot of fake news, misinformation, and conspiracy theories. Several people who were active on social media before and during the pandemic are known to have been convicted of planning terrorist attacks during this period. Official sources claim that 21 far-right militants have been arrested for preparing terrorist attacks in 2021, and the Home Office confirms that the far-right is a growing threat, although it is unclear whether this surge is a result of isolation during COVID restrictions.³⁶⁶

In February 2020, Blagovest Asenov, leader of **Bulgaria's** informal ultra-nationalist organisation National Resistance, accused Jews and Jewish non-governmental organisations via social media of "anti-Bulgarian sentiments" and of causing the "refugee crisis in Europe" and imposing the COVID-19 pandemic on the authorities. Police issued a warning to Asenov, but the prosecutor closed the case, citing a lack of evidence of a criminal offence.

The Bulgarian Jewish non-governmental organisation «Shalom» reported death threats, increased incidents of anti-Semitic hate speech in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, and recurrent vandalism of Jewish cemeteries and monuments.

³⁶⁴ Pancarte antisémite. Cassandre Fristot condamnée à 6 mois de prison avec sursis//Licra, 20.10.2021. URL: <https://www.licra.org/pancarte-antisemite-cassandre-fristot-condamnee-a-6-mois-de-prison-avec-sursis>

³⁶⁵ Civitas, de l'intégrisme chrétien à l'opposition au passe sanitaire//Le Monde, 18.08.2021. URL: https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2021/08/18/civitas-de-l-integrisme-chretien-a-l-opposition-au-passe-sanitaire_6091720_3224.html

³⁶⁶ En France, une menace terroriste d'extrême droite en nette progression//France 24, 05.04.2023. URL: <https://www.france24.com/fr/france/20230405-en-france-une-menace-terroriste-d-extr%C3%Aame-droite-en-nette-progression>

In November 2020, «Shalom» notified the Sofia Municipality of anti-Semitic and racist posters put up throughout Sofia by activists of the nationalist social club 131. In June, «Shalom» claimed that organisations such as Revived Bulgaria - Bulgarian National Unity and Military Union - and Bulgarian National Movement Shipka were spreading propaganda on the Internet that Jews were involved in the COVID-19 pandemic in order to then provide a "deadly pseudo-antidote" aimed at "mass extermination of people." After the authorities issued a summons to the prosecutor's office to the leader of Revived Bulgaria - Bulgarian National Unity, Lyudmila Kostadinova, informing her that she would be criminally prosecuted if she continued her activities, the mailings stopped.³⁶⁷

According to a survey conducted by Alpha research in January 2021, mistrust towards Muslims in Bulgaria was 26 per cent, towards Jews and Protestants 10 per cent, and towards Catholics 8 per cent.³⁶⁸

Roma have also been the object of hatred in the context of the pandemic. Politicians and some media labelled Roma as a threat to public health and demanded special measures against them on this basis. One Bulgarian member of the European Parliament publicly called for the closure of Roma neighborhoods for the duration of the pandemic because, in his view, "Roma have a very low health culture [and] lack personal hygiene." In addition to such generalised prejudices, he also called organisations defending Roma "anti-Bulgarian traitors."³⁶⁹

A study on hate crimes in **Canada** shows that there has been a significant increase in hate crimes against Asian Canadians since the COVID-19 pandemic began, with major cities reporting crime rates 6 and 7 per cent higher than the previous year. Police in cities such as Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal. and Ottawa also reported an increase in harassment, violence, and graffiti based on race, ethnicity. or colour during the pandemic. Verbal abuse, targeted coughing and spitting, and physical aggression reportedly accounted for the majority of incidents. According to the Vancouver Police Department, hate crimes against Asians in the city increased sevenfold in 2020. A survey conducted by the Angus Reid Institute on 8 June 2021 found that 58 per cent of Asian respondents said they had experienced at least one incident of anti-Asian discrimination in the previous year; 86 per cent said the discrimination was social rather than institutional.³⁷⁰

Canada's Prime Minister and government ministers condemned anti-Asian racism and so-called scapegoating during the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, the federal budget allocated C\$11

³⁶⁷ 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Bulgaria, JUNE 2, 2022, URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/bulgaria/>

³⁶⁸ Annual report on human rights in 2021, 12 April 2022, URL: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2071249.html>

³⁶⁹ ECRI Report, 2022, URL: <https://rm.coe.int/ecri-sixth-report-on-bulgaria/1680a83581>

³⁷⁰ Reports of Anti-Asian hate crimes are surging in Canada during the COVID-19 pandemic//CTV News, 17.03.2021. URL: <https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/reports-of-anti-asian-hate-crimes-are-surging-in-canada-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-1.5351481>

million (\$8.6 million) over two years to the Canadian Foundation for Interracial Relations to combat racism during the pandemic and build a national coalition to support Asian-Canadian communities.

It's worth noting that, according to an analysis released in 2022, the number of reported incidents targeting Indigenous people more than doubled during the pandemic, from 29 in 2019 to 73 in 2020.³⁷¹ The biggest jump occurred in Ontario, where 24 incidents were reported. Overall, 51 of the 73 incidents occurred in rural areas, more than two-thirds.

— Ukrainian Migration Crisis as a Factor of the Xenophobic Sentiments in the Monitoring Countries

Military action is always a factor of xenophobia and racism, and not only in warring countries. It has long been proven, for example, that one of the main reasons for the outbreak of anti-Semitism in Europe is the periodic military escalation of the Middle East conflict. However, in cases where military actions also entail waves of migration, xenophobia usually gets an additional chance to develop in the recipient countries.

The military action in Ukraine was a powerful challenge for many countries of the world, especially in Europe, which faced serious problems related, first of all, to the fact that an unprecedented number of Ukrainian refugees found themselves in a short period of time outside their country. Obviously, the response to the Ukrainian migration crisis has been unprecedented and very effective, as a number of European and national procedures for the reception of refugees have been activated, such as the activation of EU Directive no. 55/2001 (see Chapter 2), and enormous financial resources have been allocated to assist those arriving from Ukraine.

At the same time, some EU countries, including Germany, as one of the main recipients of migrants over the past decade, have been criticised by the media, the human rights community, and especially immigrant associations for giving Ukrainian refugees greater rights than asylum seekers from other crisis regions of the world. In June 2022, for example, 57 organisations in the Federal Republic of Germany addressed the Ministry of Social Protection demanding an end to the unequal treatment of Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian refugees. Particular attention was paid in the Open Letter to medical care.³⁷² It also criticised the treatment of persons without Ukrainian citizenship who resided in Ukraine as of 23.02.2022. This particularly affected foreign students

³⁷¹ Hate crimes against Indigenous people spiked 152 per cent in 2020: report//National News, 18.03.2022. URL: <https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/hate-crimes-against-indigenous-people-spiked-2020-statistics-canada/>

³⁷² Offener Brief. Diskriminierung von nicht-ukrainischen Flüchtlingen beenden! Migazin, 01.06.2022, URL: <https://www.migazin.de/2022/06/01/offener-brief-diskriminierung-von-nicht-ukrainischen-fluechtlingen-beenden/>

who had a limited Ukrainian residence permit. Human rights defenders recorded cases of discrimination against students from African countries who arrived in Germany from the territory of Ukraine.³⁷³

The war in Ukraine introduced a new hierarchy of asylum eligibility in the EU, the US, and Canada, separating Ukrainian refugees from all others who are treated differently, even if they experience and suffer from the same dramatic circumstances. The media gave the conflict exceptional attention, with the press covering the dramatic situation facing the Ukrainian people on a daily basis. This has not been the case with other conflicts still taking place in the world, which attract a different level of attention from the national and international media system. According to a number of experts, in the paradigm of the Russian-Ukrainian war we see the emergence of prejudices and stereotypes that structure white Eurocentrism.³⁷⁴ Thus, the Ukrainian-Russian crisis shows us that the choice of industrialised countries to accept or reject war refugees is a purely political choice.

For example, after the start of the conflict in Ukraine, **Canada** opened its doors wide to Ukrainians by creating a special permit for them to travel to Canada in Emergency Situations (CUAET),³⁷⁵ cancelling the usual visa requirements and not limiting the number of Ukrainian citizens who could apply. Their applications were prioritised and they could stay there for up to three years.

However, the experience of Afghan refugees is a sharp rebuke to Canada's discriminatory policies and practices compared to its current treatment of Ukrainians. Furthermore, while Canada has set numerical limits for refugees from Syria and Afghanistan - pledging to accept 25,000 Syrian refugees during the Syrian crisis in 2015 and 40,000 Afghans after the Taliban seized Kabul - it has not set any limits for Ukrainian refugees fleeing war in their country.

Therefore, while Canada's assistance to Ukrainian refugees was generally welcomed by the Canadian public, critics urged the government to avoid "the apparent differential treatment of refugees based on the region from which they came." These were primarily Afghans, Syrians, Iraqis, and Palestinians, for whom the same open-door policy was not applied.

³⁷³ Faktencheck. Bevorzugen EU-Länder ukrainische Flüchtlinge? DW, 09.11.2022, URL:

<https://www.dw.com/de/faktencheck-bevorzugen-eu-l%C3%A4nder-ukrainische-fl%C3%BCchtlinge/a-63548244>

³⁷⁴ Chief Commissioner for Human Rights of the European Council, 'Pushed Beyond the Limits Four Areas for Urgent Action to End Human Rights Violation at European Borders'. URL:

https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/view/-/asset_publisher/ugj3i6qSEkhZ/content/id/122662110?com_liferay_asset_publisher_web_portlet_AssetPublisherPortlet_INSTANCE_ugj3i6qSEkhZ_languageId=en_GB#p_com_liferay_asset_publisher_web_portlet_AssetPublisherPortlet_INSTANCE_ugj3i6qSEkhZ

³⁷⁵ Canada to welcome those fleeing the war in Ukraine/Government of Canada, March 3, 2022. URL:

<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2022/03/canada-to-welcome-those-fleeing-the-war-in-ukraine.html>

Canadian publication *Policy Options* explained that this is based on prejudice and stereotypes: "These contrasts imply a racist logic that positions some people as vulnerable and others as having no moral obligation to receive protection. The imagined racial boundary between the chosen and the non-chosen explains this difference in treatment. This boundary is so entrenched that even when racism is pointed out, many find it difficult to avoid."³⁷⁶

At the same time, Canadian Immigration Minister Sean Fraser said delays in accepting Afghan refugees are a logistical problem on the ground, not a political issue.³⁷⁷

Nevertheless, in Canada, unlike in many other countries, the policy of openness and support for Ukrainian refugees has not provoked anti-Ukrainian sentiments. This may be due to the large Ukrainian community living in this country and the Ukrainian culture rooted there.

As you know, Canada has strongly condemned Russia's actions in Ukraine and imposed sanctions on more than 1,070 organisations and individuals from Russia and Belarus. In response, Russia imposed sanctions on several dozen Canadian officials and public figures. Tensions at the state level also affected the population, with a wave of anti-Russian protests sweeping across Canada. Anti-Russian and even Russophobic sentiments have erupted in the country, reports *New Canadian Media*. It is reported that Russian Canadians have been harassed. In addition, Russian heritage sites in Canada have been vandalised. For example, on March 5, 2022, the doors of the Russian Community Centre (RCC) in Kitsilano, British Columbia, established in 1956 as a cultural and social centre with no political affiliation, were vandalised. Online harassment on social media targeting members of the Russian ethnic community has increased.³⁷⁸

The situation in **Britain** followed a similar scenario. After the start of hostilities in 2022, there was a sharp upsurge of anti-Russian sentiment in British society. Since the start of the invasion, ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking immigrants from post-Soviet states in Britain (not only from Russia) have reported an increase in cases of open hostility and discrimination towards them.³⁷⁹ This hostility towards Russians³⁸⁰ was complemented by sanctions against Russian

³⁷⁶ Why are some refugees more welcome in Canada than others? //Policy Options, February 27, 2023. URL: <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/february-2023/ukrainian-afghan-refugees/>

³⁷⁷ Bringing 'unlimited' Ukrainians to Canada won't stall Afghan resettlement, minister vows//CBC, 02/03/2022. URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-the-thursday-edition-1.6371738/bringing-unlimited-ukrainians-to-canada-won-t-stall-afghan-resettlement-minister-vows-1.6371740>

³⁷⁸ An anti-Russian wave sweeps over Canada/New Canadian Media, March 29, 2022. URL: <https://newcanadianmedia.ca/an-anti-russian-wave-sweeps-over-canada/>

³⁷⁹ Gladkauskaite, S., 'Russophobia on the rise in Britain', *The Breaker*, 20 September 2022. URL: <https://www.thebreaker.co.uk/russophobia-on-the-rise-in-britain/> & Mercer, D., 'Russians assaulted, threatened and abused in UK as hate crimes linked to Ukraine war surge', *Sky News*, 3 March 2023. URL: <https://news.sky.com/story/russians-assaulted-threatened-and-abused-in-uk-as-hate-crimes-linked-to-ukraine-war-surge-12821923>

³⁸⁰ Orla, B., 'Russians in the UK face hate speech, verbal abuse as war rages in Ukraine', *The World*, 14 March 2022. URL: <https://theworld.org/stories/2022-03-14/russians-uk-face-hate-speech-verbal-abuse-war-rages-ukraine>

businesses.³⁸¹ Sanctions imposed by the UK government and boycotts of Russian goods have become the norm, despite the lack of evidence that such strategies are effective and sustainable in the long term and will help Ukraine win this war.³⁸²

In total the UK, despite a number of scandals surrounding the initial reluctance of UK migration authorities to let Ukrainian refugees into the country,³⁸³ has accepted over 206,000 people as of early July 2023.³⁸⁴

Nevertheless, pro-Russian sympathies are also apparent. Although the eurosceptic UKIP party has made no official statements (unlike its leader Richard Tyce, who has supported anti-Russian sanctions in a personal capacity), an article posted on the party website on 25 January 2022 under the headline "Britain must stop meddling in Ukraine" argued that EU and NATO involvement in Ukrainian affairs was only "an attempt to wrest Ukraine from Russia's sphere of influence." David Kurten, leader of the tiny Heritage Party, went even further, endorsing Putin, citing a poll of his Twitter followers, and stating that "9 times more people trust Putin than the current duplicitous, lying and despotic leaders who bring shame to the West."

In terms of radical and extremist Islamists, there were reports of ISIL, for example, praising the war as "crusader against crusader" and seeing it as a vector for destroying "the enemies of Islam" in the West more broadly through a bloody and protracted military campaign at the start of the war in 2022.³⁸⁵ Meanwhile, more localised Islamist groups in the UK saw the war as "exposing the hypocrisy and blatant double standards" of the West over its previous withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq.³⁸⁶

The Hungarian government's reaction to the situation in the neighbouring country was rather slow in terms of condemning Russia and later blocked EU support for Ukraine, saying that it was not a "Hungarian war."³⁸⁷ At the time of writing, the official position of the Hungarian government has not changed significantly.

³⁸¹ Bottaro, G., 'Ban on Russian bank deposits over £50,000 is illegal, warn finance chiefs', *The Telegraph*, 31 March 2022. URL : <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/03/31/ban-russian-bank-deposits-50000-illegal-warn-finance-chiefs/>

³⁸² Haas, R., 'Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing', Brookings Institute, 1 June 1998. URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing/>

³⁸³ Simon Jenkins, Ukrainian refugees, meet Britain's 'hostile environment'. We should be ashamed//The Guardian, March 7, 2022. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/07/ukrainian-refugees-britain-hostile-environment-europe>

³⁸⁴ Ukraine Refugee Situation//UN Operational Data Portal. URL: https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine#_ga=2.258444429.668655194.1673470828-999211601.1673470828

³⁸⁵ Newman, J., 'ISIS praises Ukraine war as 'crusaders against crusaders' and says it hopes it will destroy 'enemies of Islam'', *Daily Mail*, 9 March 2022. URL: <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10593271/ISIS-praises-Ukraine-war-crusaders-against-crusaders-destroy-enemies-Islam.html>

³⁸⁶ Hiz Bu'Tahrir, 'OUR ROLE IN THE UKRAINE WAR IS TO EXPOSE THE PROPAGANDA', Hiz Bu'Tahrir Britain, 2 March 2022. URL: <https://www.hizb.org.uk/viewpoint/our-role-in-the-ukraine-war-is-to-expose-the-propaganda/>

³⁸⁷ Hungary: What's Viktor Orban's Problem with Ukraine// DW. 2022. URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/hungary-whats-viktor-orbans-problem-with-ukraine/a-64063750>

Comparing the attitude of Hungarians towards Ukrainian refugees and refugees from other countries, the more favourable attitude towards Ukrainians should certainly be noted, although the majority of those several tens of thousands of refugees who have settled in Hungary are ethnic Hungarians from the Pre-Carpathian region. Overall, 81% of Hungarians responded that they had never noticed inappropriate behaviour on the part of Ukrainian refugees, which is much higher than in other countries of the V4 region.³⁸⁸

The outbreak of large-scale hostilities in Ukraine in February 2022 has led to an aggravation of the situation in the migrant communities of people from the USSR and post-Soviet states in **Germany**. Up to four million people with "post-Soviet migrant roots" live in the FRG. They hold different political positions, which could not but cause conflicts. The number of potential participants in conflict situations has statistically increased since the arrival in the country during 2022 of citizens of various states directly involved in the war or perceived to be involved. The activity of various NGOs, informal associations, and social media communities holding their offline activities increased sharply.

The German authorities generally allowed demonstrations of various political orientations, imposing only certain restrictions on symbols that were either prohibited by law or could be the subject of provocation or a source of offence. The public demonstration of the "Z" symbol used to mark Russian military equipment in the war against Ukraine was prohibited. After the ban, public display of the symbol became an offence under the previously existing § 140 StGB ("approval and justification of crimes") within the meaning of approval of aggressive war in public space, punishable by a monetary fine or imprisonment for up to three years. For example, an FRG citizen of Russian origin who appeared at work wearing clothes with the symbol was sentenced to a fine of 1,500 euros.³⁸⁹ In another case (placing the symbol on a private car), the fine was EUR 4,000.³⁹⁰

In 2022, data on offences related to the war in Ukraine appeared in state federal statistics for the first time. There were 5,510 such offences recorded. The report cites the categories "endorsement of criminal acts" (1,169), property damage (613), and insults (194).³⁹¹ The real data may be much higher. For example, the response of the Berlin police alone to the parliamentary

2023.

³⁸⁸ GLOBSEC. 2023. Despite challenges, V4 societies generally remain supportive of Ukrainian refugees, with more negative attitudes apparent in Slovakia. 18 January 2023. URL: <https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/press-releases/despite-challenges-v4-societies-generally-remain-supportive-ukrainian>

³⁸⁹ Christoph Hasselbach, Vom Z-Symbol bis zum Hakenkreuz: verbotene Kennzeichen, Deutsche Welle, 22.03.2023. URL: <https://www.dw.com/de/vom-z-symbol-bis-zum-hakenkreuz-verbotene-kennzeichen/a-65075915>

³⁹⁰ Rechtsprechung AG Hamburg, 25.10.2022, DE JURE. URL: <https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=240+Cs+121%2F22>

³⁹¹ 58.916 Delikte im Jahr. Kriminalität auf Höchststand, TAZ. URL: <https://taz.de/58916-Delikte-im-Jahr-2022/!5932762/>

enquiry reports 3,250 offences in which at least one Ukrainian citizen was injured. However, the police could not clarify what percentage of these crimes were "politically motivated" and what percentage had a non-political background.³⁹² The media also published state-specific police data on crimes with a clear anti-Ukrainian political motivation for various periods. For example, between April and June 2022, only 38 such offences were committed in Brandenburg.³⁹³

The police and human rights activists have noted facts of discrimination against both Russian-speakers, i.e. the entire community of residents of Germany, for whom Russian is their native language or one of the main communication tools, and citizens of Russia and Belarus.³⁹⁴ Facts of discrimination that are not offences within the meaning of criminal and administrative legislation are much more difficult to record. For example, many complaints are received from citizens of Russia and Belarus about discrimination in the banking sector. NPO representatives have to distinguish between discriminatory actions and compliance with EU sanctions against these citizens.

During the period under review, there were isolated cases of racial profiling by Ukrainian private companies in the EU. Ethnic Russians, as well as people whose mother tongue is Russian, were discriminated against, despite their European citizenship. For example, during a recruitment interview on the LinkedIn.com social network conducted by managers of the Ukrainian IT company Intellias,³⁹⁵ widely represented in EU countries, Latvian citizen Juris Jazdanovs was denied employment in the Spanish branch of Intellias in Malaga because of his Russian ethnic origin he indicated free in his Latvian passport 14 years ago.³⁹⁶ The manager of the company informed him that Intellias always (!) performs an ethnicity test during interviews with its potential employees, as the ethnic origin of a person, from the company's point of view, is an important identification of a person. Characteristically, Intellias states on its website that it is committed to equality, diversity, and inclusion and that it "provides a level playing field for all employees regardless of their race, colour, religion, gender, nationality, age, disability, sexual preference, language, social origin, or political affiliation."³⁹⁷

³⁹² Seit Kriegsbeginn: 3250 Straftaten gegen Ukrainer in Berlin, Berliner Zeitung, 30.30.2023. URL: <https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/news/3250-straftaten-gegen-ukrainer-in-berlin-viele-korperverletzungen-li.333110>

³⁹³ Marion Kaufmann, Ermittlungen wegen Verwendung des Z-Symbols: Ukrainische Geflüchtete in Brandenburg beleidigt und bedroht, Tagesspiegel, 17.01.2023. URL: <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/potsdam/brandenburg/ermittlungen-wegen-verwendung-des-z-symbols-ukrainische-gefluchtete-in-brandenburg-beleidigt-und-bedroht-9188061.html>

³⁹⁴ Anne Jenton, Wegen Angriffskrieg gegen die Ukraine. Anfeindungen gegen Deutsche aus Russland: So bekommen Betroffene Hilfe, SWR, 09.03.2022. URL: <https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/baden-wuerttemberg/diskriminierung-deutsche-aus-russland-100.html>

³⁹⁵ See: <http://intellias.ua>

³⁹⁶ Juris Jazdanovs//LinkedIn.com. URL:// <https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:7080236213944623105/>

³⁹⁷ Corporate Responsibility//Intellias. URL: <https://intellias.com/corporate-responsibility/>

In **Italian** public opinion, a polarisation between "pro-Putin" and "pro-Ukrainian" citizens emerged very quickly after the outbreak of the war. While the majority followed the official "pro-Ukrainian" doctrine of the government with a series of official initiatives together with the participation of civil society institutions, a smaller part solidarised with Russia. At the same time, we can observe unanimous solidarity with the Ukrainian people suffering from the hostilities. However, during the ten months of the conflict (February-November 2022), a binary logic of "fighting the enemy" emerged in the Italian art, sports, and cultural world, resulting in several cases of Russophobic ostracism against Russian writers, athletes, and artists, and against ordinary citizens of Russian origin.³⁹⁸

This is certainly the first time since World War II that Italians and Europeans have experienced war so close to their borders, and Russia's position, proximity to its borders, and a sense of cultural and ethnic commonality with Ukrainians has influenced the way the Italian public has responded to the conflict. However, the fundamentally different approaches to refugees from Ukraine and other dangerous regions of the world have been noted by many Italian observers. The war has also sparked polarised and volatile political debates that have deeply divided Italian public opinion on the Ukraine-Russia conflict.³⁹⁹ The creation of 'pro-Russian' and 'pro-Ukrainian' positions in public and political debate has often led to strong polarisation towards the US and NATO. In Italy, the parties that have expressed solidarity or at least not immediately condemned Russia in the war with Ukraine are the "League of the North" and the "Five Star Movement." In the European Parliament, Italian parties such as the Democratic Party and the Five Star Movement actually supported Moscow, while the centre-right and centre-right forces - the "Brothers of Italy" and "C'non Italy" strongly condemned Russia.

With the onset of the armed conflict, observers expected an increase in tensions between Ukrainians, on the one hand, and Russian citizens and Russian-speaking citizens of **Poland** and other countries living in the country, on the other. However, the "Brown Book" (the most comprehensive list of ethno-political events in the Polish Republic)⁴⁰⁰ did not record a single report of mutual attacks. The institutions of the Polish state insist on the protection of the rights of the Russian national minority, citizens of Poland, on the separation of foreign citizens of Russian

³⁹⁸ Simona Gautieri, 'Russofobia: Boom Dopo la Guerra in Ucraina (Ma il Fenomeno Non Nasce Oggi)'. URL: <https://www.tio.ch/dal-mondo/attualita/161881739-russi-russia-guerra-ucraina-dischiarato-scuola>; Nicoletta Pasqualini, 'Guerra Russo-Ucraina. Siamo Alla Russofobia?'. URL: <https://www.semprenews.it/news/Siamo-in-preda-alla-russofobia.html>; Fabio Marcelli, 'Ucraina, Un Appello alla Russofobia. Bisogna Porre le Basi di Una Giusta Pace'. URL: <https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2022/11/17/ucraina-un-appello-contro-la-russofobia-bisogna-porre-le-basi-di-una-giusta-pace/6876228>

³⁹⁹ Guerra in Ucraina. Tutte le analisi e le opinion/MicroMega, 16.06.2022. URL: <https://www.micromega.net/analisi-opinioni-guerra-ucraina-russia/>

⁴⁰⁰ Brunatna Księga (2020-2023). - Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie "Nigdy więcej," 2023. 319 s.

nationality from the politics of the Russian Federation. Moreover, Poland does not share the pro-Ukrainian doctrine of collective responsibility of all Russian citizens for the foreign policy course pursued by the Russian leadership.

Despite this, several xenophobic acts against both one group and the other were recorded. For example, on 24 February 2022, in Poznan, the owners of the Akamed clinic located on Przemysłowa Street posted a message in Russian on the door of the institution: "We do not accept Russians." After the incident at the Akamed clinic was publicised in the local media, the content of the discriminatory notice was changed: the word "Russians" was crossed out and added in Polish: "Supporters of the military operation in Ukraine."

In 2022, due to the influx of war refugees from Ukraine, the population of Poland for the first time in history exceeded 40 million people (according to official statistics on 31.12.2020 this figure was 38,265 thousand, and on 1.04.2022 already 41,452 thousand). Poland has become the second country in the world (after Turkey) with the largest number of refugees.⁴⁰¹ It should be assumed that, regardless of the outcome of the armed conflict and its consequences for Ukraine's economic development, Poland is likely to become a bicomunal country with a clear predominance of the Polish nation, but with a growing participation of the Ukrainian national community. This opens up new opportunities, but also creates problems in areas such as the housing market, education, labour market, health care, and culture. This situation will require the adoption of a different public perception of the presence of foreigners in the country. The perception of foreigners living in Poland as temporary immigrants must give way to the belief that Poland is turning into a country where the presence of foreigners, especially from Ukraine, is a permanent element of the functioning of the state and the society is becoming more diverse than before.

Governor Ron DeSantis of Florida, **USA**, called the war in Ukraine a "territorial dispute" in March 2023 and questioned whether the US should continue its involvement in supporting that country.⁴⁰² He supported the view of most Republicans who believe that supporting Ukraine is not one of the most pressing American national interests.

On the other hand, the Biden administration has said it will support Ukraine as long as necessary and has taken a number of measures against Russia and Russian citizens, including

⁴⁰¹ Szonert M., Łodziński S. Polityka migracyjna "bez polityki." Antynomie tworzenia polityki migracyjnej w Polsce w okresie 2016-2022 // CMR Working Papers. 2023, Luty. № 130/188. URL: <https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CMR-WP-130-188-1.pdf>

⁴⁰² Tucker Carlson//Twitter, 14.03.2023. URL: <https://twitter.com/TuckerCarlson/status/1635442071073955841?s=20>

sanctions and deportation of asylum seekers.⁴⁰³ While refugee deportations to nine countries (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Georgia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) were initially suspended in March 2022 due to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, they resumed a year later, in March 2023.⁴⁰⁴

Despite the fact that more Americans support isolationism in foreign policy, a year after the outbreak of hostilities, 65% of respondents wanted their country to continue supporting Ukraine even if it led to a protracted crisis; and only 31% thought the U.S. should seek an early end to the war.⁴⁰⁵ About 75% of Americans support continued economic (71%) and military (72%) aid to Ukraine, and 58% are willing to provide support "for as long as it takes," even if it leads to higher domestic food and gas prices.⁴⁰⁶

Interestingly, the situation has led to a split among the American left, with many supporters of the left siding with the far right in support of Russia.⁴⁰⁷ Both camps believe that Russia was provoked by NATO expansion and that the war is the result of Russia's legitimate security concerns. Both camps also oppose U.S. intervention abroad in general.⁴⁰⁸

In **France**, the armed conflict has not led to an increase in either anti-Ukrainian or anti-Russian rhetoric. Since the beginning of the conflict, the country has received 109,000 Ukrainian refugees, 34,000 of whom have returned to Ukraine or emigrated to another country. Ukrainian citizens can apply for refugee status under the same conditions as any other foreigner. Those who did not apply, 65,833 people, were granted "temporary protection status" under European Union regulations.⁴⁰⁹

The latest opinion polls in **Greece** show that more than one in two Greeks do not support the government's policy towards Russia.⁴¹⁰ While refugees from Ukraine are being welcomed with open arms in Greece, many Greeks reject EU measures against Russia. According to one poll,

⁴⁰³ Brett Samuels, Biden announces \$500M in new military aid to Ukraine during surprise visit//The Hill, 02/20/2023. URL: <https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3866266-biden-announces-500m-in-new-military-aid-to-ukraine-during-surprise-visit/>

⁴⁰⁴ U.S. suspends deportations to Ukraine, Russia and 7 other European countries, citing "humanitarian crisis"//CBS News, 03.03.2022. URL: <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ukraine-russia-ice-deportations-suspended/>

⁴⁰⁵ Mohamed Younis, One Year Later, Americans Still Stand by Ukraine/Gallup, 06.02.2023. URL: <https://news.gallup.com/poll/469328/one-year-later-americans-stand-ukraine.aspx>

⁴⁰⁶ Poll: U.S. Public Opinion on Foreign Policy Pivots to Europe, Unites on Ukraine Support/GlobNewsWire, 19.10.2022. URL: <https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-release/2022/10/20/2537948/0/en/Poll-US-Public-Opinion-on-Foreign-Policy-Pivots-to-%20Europe-Unites-on-Ukraine-Support.html>

⁴⁰⁷ Why America's Far Right and Far Left Have Aligned Against Helping Ukraine//FP, July 04, 2022. URL: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/04/us-politics-ukraine-russia-far-right-left-progressive-horseshoe-theory/>

⁴⁰⁸ A Responsible, Comprehensive Foreign Policy/Bernie. URL: <https://berniesanders.com/issues/responsible-foreign-policy/>

⁴⁰⁹ Sanctions contre la Russie et la Biélorussie/France Diplomatie. URL: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/ukraine/guerre-en-ukraine-l-action-diplomatique-de-la-france/sanctions-contre-la-russie-et-la-bielorussie/>

⁴¹⁰ In Greece, Russia Sympathies Die Hard Despite Ukraine War, 2022, URL: <https://www.voanews.com/a/in-greece-russia-sympathies-die-hard-despite-ukraine-war-/6481936.html> .

more than 60 per cent strongly oppose arms deliveries - they blame both Moscow and Kyiv for the war. One reason for the mixed attitudes is that Greek conservatives have traditionally viewed Russia as an ally.⁴¹¹

Interestingly, the extreme Greek political forces - both left-wing and far-right – actually solidarized on the issue of attitudes towards the war. Dimitris Koutsoumpas, leader of the communist party KKE, argued that Greece should not participate and follow the lead of NATO and the EU in the conflict. He stated that "the US and NATO are advancing their positions through NATO enlargement, seeking to militarily encircle Russia." The far-right National Solution party said in an official statement that Greece should find a diplomatic solution and not get directly involved in the military conflict without endangering the ethnic Greeks of Ukraine. In addition, the statement argued that Greece should not allow Turkey to act as a "peacemaker" instead of apologising for its ongoing crimes against Greece and Cyprus.⁴¹²

Attitudes of the country's general population towards refugees and immigrants in Greece seem to have become more favourable and positive since the start of the conflict, as evidenced by international and domestic reports. The open welcome of those leaving Ukraine is seen by many as a stark contrast to attitudes towards previous waves of refugees from places such as Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. That said, at the start of February 2022, the proportion of respondents with a favourable view of 'refugees' was 47.1 per cent (compared to just 40.6 per cent in 2019). In March 2022, already 55.4 per cent had a good attitude towards refugees.⁴¹³ It is also worth noting that the number of Greeks who had a favourable attitude towards Russians was 58% in February 2022, while in March 2022 the number of such respondents had dropped to 48.7%. Observers note that "this was the first time that Greeks, albeit slightly, became more positive towards Americans (49.3 per cent) than towards Russians."⁴¹⁴

The war in Ukraine has intensified the split within **Bulgaria** between pro-Western and pro-Russian forces. The population of the poorest and most corrupt EU member state appears more divided than ever, and there is no obvious path to unification. Although these divisions existed before the war, the conflict has contributed to even greater polarisation. Those who consider themselves liberal and pro-Western are pro-Ukraine and support the refugees. Another group, who believe that the country should abandon its pro-Western path and return to the Russian orbit, are

⁴¹¹ Why some Greek residents are reluctant to condemn Russia, 2022. URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-russia-war-greek-government-and-public-dont-see-eye-to-eye/a-61585099>

⁴¹² The Greek response to the war in Ukraine, 2022. URL: <https://china-cee.eu/2022/03/08/greece-external-relations-briefing-the-greek-response-to-the-war-in-ukraine/>

⁴¹³ The attitudes of Greeks towards refugees and migrants (in Greek), 2022, URL: <https://www.dianeosis.org/2022/05/oi-staseis-twn-ellinwn-apananti-stoys-prosfyges-kai-toys-metanastes/>

⁴¹⁴ What Greeks Believe In 2022 - Part A//diaNeosis, September, 2022. URL: <https://www.dianeosis.org/en/2022/09/what-greeks-believe-in-2022-part-a/>

concerned about issues such as the loss of Bulgaria's sovereignty if the country joins the eurozone or the "perversion of young people's minds" as a result of the teaching of so-called "gender ideology" in schools.

Bulgaria has traditionally been one of the most pro-Russian countries in Europe. Between 55% and 58% of Bulgarians expressed a favourable assessment of Russia and Vladimir Putin's policies between 2020 and 2022. This largely explains the contradictory results of a survey conducted by Eurostat in March 2022. Thus, 16% of Bulgarians thought at that time that Russia's military invasion of Ukraine was justified, while 61% held the opposite view. More than two-thirds thought that Bulgaria should accept Ukrainian refugees. At the same time, 77 per cent of respondents believed that NATO should not intervene militarily and side with Ukraine in the war with Russia. Only 9% did not share this position.⁴¹⁵

Attitudes towards Russia and Russians in **Serbia** remain even more positive. Half of the country's population sees Russia as the main foreign policy partner, and 2/3 have a positive attitude towards Russia, with the pro-government media clearly siding with Russia in its longstanding conflict with Ukraine. Despite the fact that the geopolitical situation in the world has changed, the perception in Serbia has remained the same. After Russia, the most popular country in Serbia is China. Moreover, polls show that NATO and the US are perceived as bitter enemies, while the EU is perceived even more hostile than before - as an actor driven by its own interests. Experts note that the narratives of the Serbian political elite, which are transmitted through the pro-government media, strongly influence public opinion. Therefore, depending on which TV channel citizens watch, they are pro-Western or pro-Russian.⁴¹⁶

In **Russia**, even before the outbreak of hostilities, according to polls, many people considered Ukraine a hostile country (35% in a Levada Centre poll in August 2020 and 43% in November 2021). As for Ukrainians, according to this data, in 2020-2021, 22% and 15% of respondents said they would let them into Russia only temporarily, and 19% and 17% would close their entry to the country altogether. After the outbreak of hostilities, Russians' attitude towards Ukraine has seriously deteriorated - in August 2022, according to the Levada Centre, 66% considered it a hostile country.⁴¹⁷

Anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has also occasionally affected other national and religious minorities in Russia. The scandal was caused by a column published on 25 October 2022 in the

⁴¹⁵ Russia loses Bulgarian supporters due to Ukraine war//18.03.2022. URL:

https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/russia-loses-bulgarian-supporters-due-to-ukraine-war/

⁴¹⁶ After the beginning of a war in Ukraine, citizens of Serbia still have positive attitudes towards Russia//BCSP, 15.12.2022. URL: <https://bezbednost.org/en/after-the-beginning-of-a-war-in-ukraine-citizens-of-serbia-still-have-positive-attitudes-towards-russia/>

⁴¹⁷ Отношение россиян к странам: ноябрь 2022 г.//Левада – Центр, 13.12. 2022. URL: <https://www.levada.ru/2022/12/13/otnoshenie-rossiyan-k-stranam-noyabr-2022-goda/>

“Argumenty i Fakty” newspaper by Alexei Pavlov, assistant secretary of the Russian Security Council, in which he claimed that since 2014 the Ukrainian authorities had "turned Ukraine from a state into a totalitarian hypersect." There are "hundreds" of sects in the country, he said. Listing the various "sects," Pavlov accused the Chabad Lubavitch movement, to which most of Russia's Jewish communities belong, of extremism. The next day the leadership of the Jewish community reacted sharply to this material. Berl Lazar, Chief Rabbi of Russia according to the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia (FEOR), which belongs to the Chabad direction, said that Pavlov's words "could have been called vulgar anti-Semitic nonsense and squeamishly passed by, but his position does not allow him to do so." "New repetitions of old blood libels on behalf of an employee of the Russian Security Council represents a huge danger and therefore should cause an immediate and unambiguous reaction of the society and the authorities of the country." FEOR President Alexander Boroda called Pavlov's statement unacceptable and offensive ignorance and emphasised that "the broadcasting of this opinion in the media contributes to the emergence of inter-confessional conflicts and real discord between people."

On 27 October the head of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev apologized to the newspaper's readers and called his assistant's words about the Hasidim erroneous: "This interpretation reflects Pavlov's personal point of view and is by no means the official position of the Security Council of the Russian Federation." He added that "appropriate work" had been "carried out" with Pavlov.⁴¹⁸ He was dismissed in January 2023.

We can also note anti-Semitic publications with statements that military actions are favourable to Jews. Usually, the Jewishness of Ukrainian President Zelensky is mentioned, but, for example, the nationalist S. Lada-Rus (Peunova) on 25 November 2022 published a post on the page of her organisation "All-People's Union for the Revival of Russia" (APRU) of the Internet resource "Live Journal" that the conflict with Ukraine is beneficial to Israel and even attributed Jewishness to Russian President V. Putin.

The right-wing radicals themselves split after the outbreak of hostilities. Most of them remained neutral or supported the Russian Federation. But there were no anti-Ukrainian actions on their part. The minority made strong statements in favour of Ukraine and tried to move to "direct action" actions. Radicals claimed responsibility for the arson attacks on military recruitment centres across Russia - several dozen buildings were set on fire (but it is unclear how many arson attacks were actually committed by nationalists). Some of the radicals who travelled to Ukraine created the Russian Volunteer Corps, which in March 2023 conducted an armed sortie into the

⁴¹⁸ Николай Патрушев разъяснил ситуацию с опубликованной в «АиФ» статьей//Аргументы и Факты, 27.10.2022. URL: https://aif.ru/politics/russia/nikolay_patrushev_razyasnil_situaciyu_s_opublikovannoy_v_aif_statey

Bryansk region of the Russian Federation, but did not meet with the support of the local population there.

The situation in **Ukraine** itself is ambiguous. After the outbreak of the war, according to a study by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, the lowest level of ethnic prejudice in Ukraine was formed against Russian-speaking Ukrainians, Poles, Canadians, Americans, and Jews, and the highest against citizens of Russia and Belarus, Roma, and blacks.⁴¹⁹

At the same time, the overall level of xenophobia in Ukraine increased the most from 1994 to 2007 - from 3.5 to 4.3 points on the Bogardus scale. From 2008 to 2013 the index decreased to 4.0 points and further fluctuated around this value. In October 2022, it was actually still 4.0. The Bogardus scale shows on a 7-point scale how much the majority of a particular social group would or would not want minority members to be members of their family, close friends, etc.

In this case, the analysis showed that the majority of ethnic Ukrainians do not want mixed marriages but are still willing to see representatives of other nations as their neighbors, friends, work colleagues, and residents of Ukraine in general. At the same time, if we compare the data of 2022 with 2021, when the level of xenophobic attitudes increased by 0.16 points (from 3.83 to 3.99), the attitude towards Poles has significantly improved and very much worsened in relation to citizens of Russia and Belarus living in Ukraine - the social distance increased from 3.24 in 2018 to 5.03 in 2022. The attitude towards citizens of these states living in their countries deteriorated even more - from 3.89 to 6.39. At the same time, Ukraine officially adheres to the doctrine of the responsibility of all Russian citizens for the actions of its authorities, which largely influenced the sanctions decisions of the EU, the US, and Canada.

At the same time, the study introduces such a concept as "Russian-speaking Ukrainian." They account for more than 40 per cent of the total population. At the same time, the social distance between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking Ukrainians remains the shortest. In September 2022, it was 2.74 points, having improved by 0.02 points since November 2021.⁴²⁰ Perhaps this was explained by the fact that among the respondents there were also many people for whom Russian is a native language. In any case, we can state that there is no direct and severe interethnic conflict between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine.

⁴¹⁹ ПРЕС-РЕЛІЗИ ТА ЗВІТИ МІЖЕТНІЧНІ УПЕРЕДЖЕННЯ В УКРАЇНІ, ВЕРЕСЕНЬ 2022. URL: <https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=1150&page=6>

⁴²⁰ Ibid.

CHAPTER 4. HATE CRIME

Hate crimes in this chapter include all crimes motivated by hostility or prejudice against someone based on the victim's personal characteristics, i.e. the victim's race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, social class, and political or ideological views. Under the legislation of monitoring countries, such offences may be separately codified (generally in those states that follow the "European" or "Shanghai" model of countering extremism) or may be aggravating circumstances for ordinary offences (in countries mainly oriented towards the "American" model of violent extremism).

The main source of data on hate crimes in monitoring countries is data provided by governments to the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). However, as ODIHR itself has repeatedly noted, this information is far from always complete and sufficient, so in some cases we also include data from national police, statistical and prosecutorial authorities, which tend to provide a larger sample, as well as statistics from non-governmental organisations. At the time of writing, OSCE/ODIHR only had data up to and including 2021, with the exception of a number of States that did not provide this information.

Obviously, different countries have different legal criteria for such crimes, as well as different methodologies and tools for recording them, resulting in significant differences in their statistics, including for these reasons. There is also a difference between hate crimes that are considered hate crimes by the OSCE and hate crimes that are hate crimes under the laws of individual member states.

ENGLAND & WALES


Under British law, hate crimes may extend to individuals who are wrongfully victimized if they believe they have been mistreated on the basis of their personal characteristics. Finally, hate crimes based on age, gender, and terrorist acts are excluded from officially recorded data because they are not considered sufficiently specific in nature to be considered a hate crime.

There have been several spikes in bias-based criminal activity in the UK between 2020 and 2023. Some of these were linked to unprecedented xenophobic incidents during the Black Lives Matters protests and counter-protests by far-right groups in England and Wales following the death of George Floyd on 25 May 2020 in the US.⁴²¹

⁴²¹ 'Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2019/20'//Home Office, London: HM Government, 28 October 2020. URL: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2019-to-2020/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2019-to-2020>

Overall, the pattern of such offences in England and Wales is as follows:

Diagram # 2: Trends in hate crime in the England & Wales.⁴²²



Racially motivated hate crimes were the most common, with 92,063 in 2020/21 and 109,843 in 2021/22, followed by sexual orientation offences with 18,596 in 2020/21 and 26,152 in 2021/22, followed by sexual orientation crimes – 18,596 in 2020/21 and 26,152 in 2021/22, disability hate crimes – 9,945 in 2020/21, and 14,242 in 2021/22, Islamophobic crimes – 2,703 in 2020/21 and 3,459 in 2021/22. This is followed by anti-Semitic offences with 1,288 and 1,919 respectively.

The unprecedented increase in hate crime since 2016/17 in England and Wales is largely attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic and the emergence of a range of criminological theories relating to people of Asian, Muslim, and Jewish origin. At the same time, the assumptions of some experts that violent crime would decrease during the quarantine period proved to be unfounded.

In addition to official statistics, hate crimes reported by British NGOs also showed a notable spike in anti-Semitic, homophobic, and anti-Muslim acts over the period in question. In particular, CST found that these figures were linked to the number of anti-Jewish reactions to the escalation of conflict in Israel and Palestine in 2021. In May, when the conflict peaked, CST

⁴²² Ibid; Home Office, England and Wales, 2021 to 2022// Home Office, London: HM Government, 06 October, 2022. URL: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2021-to-2022/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2021-to-2022>; United Kingdom//ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/united-kingdom?year=2021>

recorded the highest monthly volume at 661 anti-Semitic incidents.⁴²³ In 2022, CST recorded a return to what they call the "new normal" after 2016 year-on-year - with a 27% decrease to 1,652 anti-Jewish hate incidents recorded nationwide.⁴²⁴

Other NPOs noted a record increase in homophobic hate crime during the reporting period. In February 2022, gay rights charity Stonewall responded to statistics published by the Home Office which showed a doubling of homophobic hate crime compared to four years earlier.⁴²⁵ Furthermore, a December 2021 Freedom of Information request by the UK Press Association revealed that police recorded 2,389 homophobic and 371 transphobic offences in June 2021, the highest number for any calendar month in three years.⁴²⁶ This increase in offences came after the removal of all restrictive measures in England and was seen as a demonstration of the blame for the pandemic on minority communities in the UK.⁴²⁷

FRANCE

While France saw a slight increase in hate crimes in 2020 compared to 2019 (an increase of just 30 cases), in 2021 the country experienced a sharp rise in bias and hostility crimes. In both cases, racist crimes were the most prevalent, followed by gender hate crimes, Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism.

Separately, attacks on religious temples of different faiths to desecrate and steal religious artefacts are noteworthy. On 7 January 2022, Conservative Senator Valerie Boyer asked the Government to undertake a comprehensive review of these desecrations, whether they occurred at Christian, Muslim, or Jewish places of worship or burial sites.⁴²⁸

According to her, 686 anti-Christian acts were recorded in 2021 compared to 921 in 2019. Jewish and Muslim cemeteries are also a problem. The latest desecration took place on 17 May 2023 in Toulouse, where 4 Christian graves and 2 Jewish graves were desecrated, but the offenders

⁴²³ 'Anti-Semitic Incidents: Report 2021'// Community Security Trust, 2022. URL: <https://cst.org.uk/public/data/file/f/f/Incidents%20Report%202021.pdf>, p.4.

⁴²⁴ 'Anti-Semitic Incidents: Report 2022'// Community Security Trust, 2023. URL: <https://cst.org.uk/public/data/file/e/6/CST%20Incidents%20Report%202022.pdf>

⁴²⁵ Stonewall UK, 'Stonewall Response to increase in anti-LGBT hate crime figures'// Press Release. URL: <https://www.stonewall.org.uk/about-us/media-statements/stonewall-response-increase-anti-lgbt-hate-crime-figures>


⁴²⁶ Chao-Fong, L., 'Recorded homophobic hate crimes soared in pandemic, figures show'//The Guardian, 3 December 2021. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/03/recorded-homophobic-hate-crimes-soared-in-pandemic-figures-show>

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Lutte contre les profanations dans les lieux de culte et les cimetières. Texte n° 330 (2021-2022) de Mme Valérie BOYER et plusieurs de ses collègues, déposé au Sénat le 7 janvier 2022//Senat. URL: <https://www.senat.fr/leg/exposes-des-motifs/ppr21-330-expose.html>

left no specific symbol that could shed light on the nature of the crime. The police have set up a special task force to deal with such acts of vandalism, but so far this has had no effect.

Diagram # 3: Dynamics of hate crimes in France.⁴²⁹



During the pandemic in France, intimidation of doctors and other health professionals in favour of mandatory vaccination against COVID-19 increased, and there were many threats, including death threats, from conspiracy theory proponents, including even some doctors.⁴³⁰

GERMANY

The Federal Statistical Office provides information on "politically motivated offences and acts of violence on a right-wing extremist and left-wing extremist" basis. Statistics for the monitoring period show that the number of offences with a right-wing extremist background has for a long time noticeably exceeded the number of offences based on a left-wing extremist worldview. Crimes committed by ultra-right-wing extremists are mostly more dangerous and cause direct harm to a person (murders, attempted murders, bodily harm, threats). Left-wing extremists are more prone to arson, property damage, organising riots, and resisting the police.

⁴²⁹ France. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/france?year=2021>


⁴³⁰ FRANÇOIS BARRÈRE, Covid: l'antivax Denis Agret condamné à Montpellier à six mois de prison avec sursis pour menaces de mort/Midi Libre, 10/10/22. URL: <https://www.midilibre.fr/2022/10/10/covid-lantivax-denis-agret-condamne-a-montpellier-a-six-mois-de-prison-avec-sursis-pour-menaces-de-mort-10726240.php>

FRG national data on some types of such offences: right-wing radical 21,964 (-6.95% vs. 2020), left-wing radical 10,113 (-7.82%),⁴³¹ on the grounds of foreign ideologies 1,153 (+13.48%),⁴³² on religious-ideological grounds 479 (+0.42%), uncategorised 21,339 (+147.44%), the latter predominantly related to radical covid-sceptics.⁴³³

The peculiarities of the statistics of "politically motivated crimes" for 2021 is that about 40% of their total number do not fit into the classic groups of "right-left-Islamists." Experts attribute this to the COVID-19 pandemic and the radicalisation of a section of society protesting against sanitary restrictions. The protests (discussed below) went far beyond the established ideological palette.

According to the OSCE ODIHR, whose criteria for hate crimes diverge from the legal criteria of the Federal Republic of Germany, the evolution of hate crimes in Germany in recent years is as follows:

Diagram # 4: Dynamics of hate crimes in Germany.⁴³⁴



We see a rather significant increase in the total number of crimes in 2020 compared to 2019, with a drop in violent crime, which is most likely due to the specificity of the anti-violent

⁴³¹ Discrepancies with the data of the statistical agency and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are due to different interpretation of this type of offence - *author's note*.

⁴³² The report further states that this section mainly includes hate crimes resulting from conflicts within FRG residents with Turkish roots, as well as between residents with Turkish and Kurdish roots - *author's note*.

⁴³³ Politisch motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2021, bundesweite Fallzahlen// Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat. URL:

https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/nachrichten/2022/pmk2021-factsheets.pdf;jsessionid=2BBAA9F9D1AC4013C0C1326338AB5A15.1_cid364?_blob=publicationFile&v=2

⁴³⁴ Germany. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/index.php/germany>

measures related to quarantine restrictions. We can assume that the crimes committed during this period were mainly those related to the spread of hate online. We can also observe a slight increase in hate crime in 2021. That is to say, in this sense, Germany experienced the pandemic period less painfully than many of its neighbours. Overall, however, the level of bias-based crime came close in this period to the record of 2015, when Germany experienced its first migration crisis due to the massive influx of refugees from Syria and Iraq.

This record appears to have been broken in 2022. At the time of writing this report, the data for 2022 is not yet available in full, but nevertheless, when it comes to the total number of "politically motivated offences," we can say that we have very negative results here: 58,916 cases (2021: 55,048). In the area of right-wing extremism, an increase was again recorded: 23,493 cases. About 14,000 of these are regarded as "manifestations of propaganda." 1,170 acts of violence resulted in bodily injuries to 675 people. In the field of Islamism, 481 offences were recorded (almost unchanged compared to 2021). However, 74 cases were found to have "terrorist features" - the highest number among all "politically motivated offences."⁴³⁵

German statistics also provide information on the detection rate of politically motivated offences. The following detection rates for 2021 are noted: in the area of "politically motivated crime" 40.97% (2020: 43.08%) in general, and 67.16% (58.6%) in the area of violence against the person.⁴³⁶

Public organisations in Germany, which independently keep statistics on manifestations of hatred and discrimination against minorities, traditionally provide different and higher data than the police and other law enforcement agencies. They record xenophobic leaflets, stickers, graffiti and stickers, verbal abuse in public transport and on the street, discrimination in public institutions, etc. NGOs are better placed to record such manifestations, as victims have more trust in non-governmental organisations than in official law enforcement agencies. This is not least true for migrants from non-democratic countries, who often have experience of negative contact with the police and other state institutions, or lack confidence that their application will be properly considered. In addition, certain forms of discrimination, threats, neglect, and other violations of citizens' rights are difficult to prove legally. For example, the Amadeu Antonio Foundation has collected 201 anti-Semitic incidents in its data bank for 2020, 309 in 2021, and 132 in 2022.⁴³⁷ These are assaults, vandalism, insults, and other acts. A few examples are from the media. The

⁴³⁵ 58.916 Delikte im Jahr. Kriminalität auf Höchststand, TAZ. URL: <https://taz.de/58916-Delikte-im-Jahr-2022/!5932762/>

⁴³⁶ Bundesministerium des Innern und für die Heimat, Politisch motivierte Kriminalität im Jahr 2021, bundesweite Fallzahlen. URL: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/veroeffentlichungen/nachrichten/2022/pmk2021-factsheets.pdf;jsessionid=2BBAA9F9D1AC4013C0C1326338AB5A15.1_cid364?_blob=publicationFile&v=2


⁴³⁷ Amadeu-Antonio-Stiftung, Chronik. URL: <https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/chronik/>

platform brandeilig.org records manifestations of Islamophobia against mosques in Germany: offensive graffiti, vandalism, arson, attempts to disrupt services, written and verbal threats to imams, mullahs and worshippers, far-right gatherings directly outside the mosque building, etc. In 2020 there were 149 such incidents, in 2021 63, and in 2022 10.⁴³⁸ Presumably the sharp drop in reported cases does not mean a marked decline in Islamophobia, but is due to the difficulty of fixation, which is more or less favourable in different periods. As a rule, victims do not rush to contact the police or public organisations, not wanting unnecessary publicity.

The Berlin Register for Documentation of Right-Wing Extremism and Discrimination, which has branches in all districts of the city, cited the following figures in its final report for 2020. In the capital alone, there were 3,822 cases of racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsyism, far-right manifestations, hatred of Muslims, hatred of the LGBTI community, discrimination against people with disabilities, social chauvinism. and glorification of Nazism.⁴³⁹ In 2021, 4,841 such incidents were recorded,⁴⁴⁰ in 2022 - 4,156.⁴⁴¹

ITALY

Diagram # 5: Evolution of hate crime in Italy.⁴⁴²



⁴³⁸ Brandeilig. Initiative gegen Moscheeangriffe. URL: <https://brandeilig.org/>

⁴³⁹ Berliner Register, Jahresbericht 2020. URL: https://www.berliner-register.de/documents/25/20210903_2020-Jahresbrosch%C3%BCre-fertig-web.pdf

⁴⁴⁰ Berliner Register, Jahresbericht 2021. URL: <https://www.berliner-register.de/publikationen/jahresbericht-2021-der-berliner-register-426/>

⁴⁴¹ Berliner Register, Jahresauswertung 2022. URL: <https://www.berliner-register.de/artikel/auswertung-fuer-2022-467/>


⁴⁴² Italy. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/index.php/italy?year=2021>

In 2020, violent hate crimes are sharply reduced in Italy, primarily due to strict quarantine restrictions against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, there is a sharp increase in crime, but we see a significant excess of threat-related offences, which tends to be specifically related to hate speech on the Internet.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States did not provide ODIHR with hate crime statistics for 2021. The overall trend of such crimes up to and including 2020 is as follows:

Diagram # 6: Dynamics of Hate Crimes in the United States.⁴⁴³



National statistics allow us to reproduce the following picture. In 2021, there were 77 terrorist attacks and plots,⁴⁴⁴ which is 30 per cent fewer than in 2020 (there were 110 attacks then).⁴⁴⁵ According to the US Government Accountability Office's February 2023 report, from 2013 to 2021, domestic terrorism increased by 357%, from 1,981 to 9,049 cases.⁴⁴⁶ Between 2010 and 2021, there were 231 acts of domestic terrorism (most of them racially or

⁴⁴³ United States of America. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/index.php/united-states-america>

⁴⁴⁴ The Evolution of Domestic Terrorism//CSIS, February 17, 2022. URL: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-domestic-terrorism>

⁴⁴⁵ The Military, Police, and the Rise of Terrorism in the United States// CSIS, April 12, 2021. URL: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/military-police-and-rise-terrorism-united-states>

⁴⁴⁶ Domestic Terrorism: Further Actions Needed to Strengthen FBI and DHS Collaboration to Counter Threats//GAO, Feb. 22, 2023. URL: <https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-104720>

ethnically motivated).⁴⁴⁷ 2020 and 2021 saw the highest number of domestic terrorist attacks in thirty years. The recent increase in domestic terrorist activity began around 2014. From 2014 to 2021, there was an average of 31 deaths per year, indicating that 30 deaths in 2021 was typical for this period. This is significantly higher than the period from 1994 to 2013, when more than eight people died in terrorist attacks in the U.S. in just three years: 1995, 2001, and 2009. The return to a higher death rate in 2021 may indicate that the lower number of deaths in 2020 was an outlier and may have been caused by the lockdowns and quarantines imposed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, the majority of terrorist attacks occurred in Portland, Oregon (18). The next highest number of terrorist attacks occurred in New York City, where there were 7 attacks and terrorist plots that year.⁴⁴⁸

There was also a significant increase in attacks and plots by anarchists, anti-fascists, and other left-wing violent extremists in 2021. While nearly half (49 per cent) of all attacks and plots were carried out by right-wing violent extremists (and these attacks were significantly more likely to be fatal due to the weapons used and the number of fatalities), left-wing violent extremists were responsible for 40 per cent of all attacks in 2021 (up from 23 per cent in 2020).

During 2022, domestic extremists killed at least 25 people in the United States in 12 separate incidents. 60 per cent of these killings resulted from two incidents - mass shootings in Buffalo, New York, and Colorado Springs, Colorado. Almost all homicides in 2022 (93%) were committed with firearms (which are more readily available in the US than in many other OSCE countries). Over the past five years, 80 per cent of victims of fatal extremist violence have been killed with a firearm.⁴⁴⁹

Right-wing extremists commit the most extremist murders each year, but such extremists committed all the murders in 2022. The last time this occurred was in 2012. White supremacy supporters committed 21 of the 25 murders (84 per cent), including five committed by members or associates of prison gangs of white supremacy supporters such as the Universal Aryan Brotherhood, the United Aryan Brotherhood, or the Nazi Society, the Horsemen. The two most serious incidents were fatal shootings: the attack on Club Q, an LGBT bar in Colorado Springs in November 2022 and the attack on a Tops supermarket in Buffalo in May 2022.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁷ DOMESTIC TERRORISM Further Actions Needed to Strengthen FBI and DHS Collaboration to Counter Threats//GAO. February, 2023. URL: <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-104720.pdf>

⁴⁴⁸ Catrina Doxsee, Seth G. Jones, Jared Thompson, Grace Hwang, and Kateryna Halstead, Pushed to Extremes Domestic Terrorism amid Polarisation and Protest//CSIS, May 2022. URL: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/220517_Doxsee_PushedtoExtremes_DomesticTerrorism_0.pdf?VersionId=SdmZXk20Ymr7YNuRz3_hHVqMpyfbcM2t

⁴⁴⁹ Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2022//ADL. URL: <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2023-02/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2022.pdf>

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

The number of anti-Muslim incidents also increased from 2020 to 2021. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) received 6,720 complaints of anti-Muslim discrimination in the workplace, immigration, denial of service in public places, abuse of power, hate and bias incidents, prisoners' rights, school incidents, hate speech, and law enforcement profiling. This was the highest number of civil rights complaints in 27 years, including a 28% increase in hate and bias incidents (including reports of forced removal of hijab, harassment, vandalism, physical assault, and other complaints). There were 2,823 complaints related to immigration and travel, the most frequently reported for the second year in a row. 35% of law enforcement and government overreach complaints involved the FBI terrorist watchlist. There was also a 13% increase in workplace and public discrimination complaints.⁴⁵¹

There was also an increase in anti-Semitic incidents: namely, there were 34% more such incidents in 2020 than in the previous year. There was also a 43% increase in harassment and a 167% increase in anti-Semitic assaults in 2021, making it the highest number of anti-Semitic incidents since 1979 (when ADL began recording and analysing such incidents).⁴⁵² Anti-Semitic incidents continued to rise in 2022, and so far ADL has tracked a total of 3,697 incidents of assault, harassment, and vandalism.⁴⁵³ This is already a 36% increase from the 2,717 incidents that occurred in 2021.⁴⁵⁴ This surge in anti-Semitism included increased anti-Semitic propaganda by supporters of white supremacy (up 102% to 852 incidents), anti-Semitism in schools (up 49% to 494 incidents), and on college campuses (up 41% to 219 incidents). There was also an increase in attacks on orthodox Jews (up 69% to 59 incidents) and bomb threats against Jewish institutions (up from 8 to 91 incidents).⁴⁵⁵

CANADA

Data from Canada's national statistics and law enforcement agencies paint the following picture. According to a Statistics Canada report released in August 2022, the number of police-reported hate crimes motivated by race or ethnicity increased by 80% between 2019 and 2020, from 884 to 1,594. Much of this increase was the result of increases in police-reported hate crimes targeting Black people (+318 incidents), East or Southeast Asians (+202 incidents), Indigenous people (+44 incidents), and South Asians (+38 incidents). In 2020 alone, Canadian police reported

⁴⁵¹ STILL SUSPECT: The Impact of Structural Islamophobia. Civil Rights Report, 2022//CAIR. URL: <https://www.cair.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Still-Suspect-Report-2022.pdf>

⁴⁵² Audit of Antisemitic Incidents, 2022// Anti-Defamation League. URL: <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/audit-antisemitic-incidents-2022>

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

2,669 criminal offences motivated by hostility. This was the highest number reported since comparable data became available in 2009.

Offences against Black and Jewish people remained the most common types of hate crime reported to the police, accounting for 26% and 13% of all hate crimes respectively. This was followed by hate crimes directed against people of East or South East Asian origin (11%) and crimes against sexual orientation (10%).

According to Statistics Canada, Islamophobic offences jumped 71 per cent in 2021.⁴⁵⁶ The study found that the number of reported attacks against Muslims increased from 84 incidents in 2020 to 144 in 2021.

In addition to the increase in hate crimes against Muslims, Statistics Canada also found an alarming 293 per cent increase in hate crimes against East or Southeast Asians from 2019 to 2020, which continued to rise from 2020 to 2021, taking its roots from conspiracy theories about the COVID-19 virus.⁴⁵⁷ The report also shows a 260 per cent increase in hate-motivated attacks against Catholics and a 71 per cent increase against Muslims in Canada from 2020 to 2021. The China-Canada National Council for Social Justice called for a "National Anti-Racism Act" to "provide an accountability framework to prescribe comprehensive government action to combat racism, which should be based on the collection and use of disaggregated data reflecting the experiences of diverse communities[.]"⁴⁵⁸

Like the rest of the world, gender hatred, and above all hatred of women (incel), is on the rise in Canada. In May 2020, terrorism charges were laid against a 17-year-old boy, who cannot be identified under the Juvenile Criminal Justice Act, after a knife attack at a Toronto massage parlour that resulted in the death of Ashley Noel, one of the female employees.⁴⁵⁹ Another woman was seriously injured. The juvenile was initially charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder, but Public Safety Canada said Toronto police allegedly found evidence suggesting the attack was motivated by incel ideology. According to the Moonshot think tank, proponents of this ideology include mostly young heterosexual men who feel they cannot attract romantic partners because of their looks or social status. The offender was subsequently charged with two terrorist offences. The case is still in court and neither charge has been proven at the time of writing.

⁴⁵⁶ Maisa, Islamophobic Hate Crimes In Canada Increased By 71%//The Islamic Information. August 7, 2022. URL: <https://theislamicinformation.com/news/islamophobic-hate-crimes-in-canada-increased/>


⁴⁵⁷ Rebekah Yeager-Malkin, Surge in hate crimes in Canada, advocates call for anti-racism legislation//Jurist, August 5, 2022. URL: <https://www.jurist.org/news/2022/08/surge-in-hate-crimes-in-canada-advocates-call-for-anti-racism-legislation/>

⁴⁵⁸ Government Actions Needed to Stop Daily Anti-Asian Hate Crime//CCNC-SJ, August 3, 2022.URL: <https://ccncsj.ca/government-actions-needed-to-stop-daily-anti-asian-hate-crime/>

⁴⁵⁹ Experts disagree on violent threat posed by incels in Canada//CBC, Mar. 28. 2022. URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/incels-canada-threat-1.6399777>

According to OSCE/ODIHR, there was a consistent increase in hate crimes, including violent hate crimes, in 2020-221:

Diagram #7: Trends in Hate Crimes in Canada.⁴⁶⁰



Annual statistics from the Ottawa Police Service's Hate and Bias Crimes Unit for 2022 show that the number of hate crimes in the unit increased by 13 per cent this year compared to 2021.⁴⁶¹ The most serious hate crime offences, meanwhile, were: property damage, threats, physical assaults, and assault with a weapon. According to police, the most affected groups were: Jews, Muslims, Blacks, LGBTQ+, Arabs, and people of Asian appearance. According to Statistics Canada, the most affected groups "were identical" in 2021 and 2022, emphasising that Jews remain the "religious group most frequently targeted by hate crimes" from 2020 or after COVID-19.⁴⁶²

HUNGARY

The data on hate crimes provided by Hungary to OSCE/ODIHR raises more questions than answers and raises doubts about the relevance of the information. ODIHR itself notes, however, that Hungary would benefit from reviewing the existing legal framework to ensure that bias motivations are effectively recognised and appropriate penalties imposed on perpetrators. While


⁴⁶⁰ Canada. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/index.php/canada>

⁴⁶¹ Canada sees surge in hate crimes during pandemic, new data shows/AlJazeera, 5 Aug. 2022. URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/5/canada-sees-surge-in-hate-crimes-during-pandemic-new-data-shows>

⁴⁶² Hate crimes reported to Ottawa police rise in 2022//CBC, 12.01.2023. URL: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ottawa-police-hate-crime-reports-2022-1.6711534>

"official" data on hate crimes, usually provided by police reports, are the most cited source of information, they provide only a fraction of the reality, according to civil society.

Diagram # 9: Trends in Hate Crimes in Hungary.⁴⁶³



The information provided by the OSCE suggests that virtually Hungary does not record socially motivated threats and focuses mainly on violent offences.

However, the data additionally available to the monitoring is as follows. Vandalism of cemeteries in Hungary continued after the pandemic began in 2020. Jewish gravestones in Kechel, south of Budapest, were vandalised, some broken and others desecrated.⁴⁶⁴ In 2022, gravestones in Budakesi, on the outskirts of the Hungarian capital, were vandalised.⁴⁶⁵

Inter-ethnic clashes continue to be frequent in Hungary, especially with Romani communities. The right-wing Our Fatherland party (Mi Hazánk) continues to promote the "Roma Crimes" and "No-go areas" program, putting pressure on local authorities, e.g. in Miskolc.⁴⁶⁶

Despite these tensions and sporadic clashes, there have been no hate killings or terrorist attacks in the country so far.

⁴⁶³ Hungary. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/index.php/hungary>

⁴⁶⁴ 2020. Jewish Cemeteries Vandalized in Hungary and Moldova// I24News. URL: <https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/europe/1604423070-jewish-cemeteries-vandalized-in-hungary-moldova>


⁴⁶⁵ Gravestones vandalised in Jewish Cemetery in Budakeszi// Hungary Today. 2022. URL: <https://hungarytoday.hu/gravestones-vandalised-jewish-cemetery-budakeszi-budapest/>

⁴⁶⁶ Mi Hazánk Protests Against 'Roma Crime' and 'No-go Zones' in Hungary// Hungary Today. 2020. URL: <https://hungarytoday.hu/mi-hazank-protest-roma-crime-no-go-zones-hungary/>

GREECE

According to data provided by the Greek authorities to OSCE/ODIHR, a total of 171 hate crimes were reported in 2020, of which 34 were investigated in court.⁴⁶⁷

Diagram # 10. Trends in Hate Crimes in Greece.⁴⁶⁸



Meanwhile, in 2020, the Greek Racist Violence Registration Network (RVRN)⁴⁶⁹ recorded, through interviews with victims, 107 cases of racist violence with the following characteristics:

- In 74 cases, migrants, refugees or asylum seekers were targeted because of their ethnic origin, religion and/or skin colour, human rights defenders because of their association with refugees and migrants, and shelters or institutions providing services to these groups.
- In 30 incidents, the victims were LGBTQ+.
- In three incidents, the victims were Greek nationals who were targeted because of their ethnic origin.

As for the profile of the perpetrators:

⁴⁶⁷ Greece. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/index.php/greece?year=2021>

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ The Racist Violence Registration Network - RVRN (2020:8), established in 2011 by the Hellenic National Commission for Human Rights (GNCHR) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Greece (UNHCR), today consists of 52 NGOs. RVRN was established based on the following two findings: "a) the identified lack of an official and effective system of data collection on racially motivated violence in Greece and b) the need to coordinate the activities of organisations that, on their own initiative, recorded cases of racially motivated violence against people who sought their assistance" - *note by author*.

- Law enforcement officers were responsible for 23 incidents and public officials were responsible for 4 incidents.
- In 59 cases, the perpetrators were persons unrelated to the public service.
- In three cases, the employers were the perpetrators.
- In three cases, victims believed that the perpetrators were linked to extremist organisations.
- In 13 incidents, victims identified the perpetrators as a mix of civilians and members of extremist groups, and in two cases victims reported being harassed by law enforcement officers called by the perpetrators.⁴⁷⁰

The qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the attacks show a periodically increasing intensity in areas where there are Reception and Identification Centres or accommodation facilities for asylum seekers and unaccompanied minors. Attacks are seen to be carried out by organised or informal xenophobic groups acting as organised services against refugees and human rights defenders, with repeated attacks until the target is reached. During incidents, these groups claim to be imbued with xenophobic ideology, use appropriate vocabulary and practices, in some cases carry weapons, mostly homemade, and behave as if they are on a mission. They do not hesitate to resort to extreme forms of violence, such as setting fire to facilities, obstructing movement (roadblocks), or preventing the disembarkation of newly arrived refugees, while making racist comments, attacking and damaging the property and equipment of organisations providing services to refugees, and intimidating and physically harming refugees and those who volunteer to assist them.

According to statistics collected by the Hellenic Police, there were 51 incidents of hate speech in 2020, 34 of which occurred online. The corresponding figures were 92 (38 online) in 2019, 63 (39 online) in 2018, 88 (48 online) in 2017, and 29 (15 online) in 2016. Beyond these figures, there is little systematic collection of data on hate speech.

In 2021, RVRN recorded 72 cases of racist violence recorded during interviews. In addition, both racist rhetoric and institutionalised persecution of refugees and migrants increased significantly in 2021.

Of the 72 incidents recorded in 2021, 28 involved migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, as well as relevant human rights defenders. Most of the racist violence was perpetrated by uniformed officers. 5 incidents targeted Greek citizens because of their ethnic origin. In two cases,

⁴⁷⁰ Racist Violence Recording Network: Annual Report 2020//UNHCR, 22.04. 2021. URL: <https://www.unhcr.org/gr/en/19763-racist-violence-recording-network-annual-report-2020.html>

Jewish holy sites were attacked. One incident involved a person's disability. The majority of incidents (36) involved attacks against the LGBTQI+ community and associated human rights defenders.⁴⁷¹

Between January and December 2022, RVRN recorded, through interviews with victims, 74 incidents of racist violence.

- In 33 incidents, migrants, refugees or asylum seekers were targeted because of their national origin, religion or skin colour. In one of these incidents, a person was targeted on the basis of both national origin and sexual orientation and gender identity.

- In 1 case Greek Roma citizens (ethnicity) were targeted.

- In two cases, a mosque and a Holocaust memorial were targeted.

- In 38 incidents, LGBTQ+ persons, as well as human rights defenders, were targeted due to their association with LGBTQ+ people/individuals. In this context, RVRN recorded cases of domestic violence as well as intra-school or intra-university attacks targeting LGBTQ+ people.

- In 22 incidents, victims stated that they had experienced racist violence in the past.

In 39 cases, the attack was committed by a group, and in 28 cases only one perpetrator was named.

As for the profile of the perpetrators, the victims said:

- Forty-one incidents involved persons unrelated to the civil service.

- In 15 cases, the perpetrators were law enforcement officers. According to victim testimonies, almost half of these incidents occurred close to the country's borders.

- In 7 cases, the perpetrators were other public servants.

- In two cases, the perpetrators were employers on agricultural farms.

- In 6 cases, victims identified the perpetrators as members of racist extremist organisations.

- In 3 incidents the perpetrators were identified as mixed groups of citizens and extremist organisations.

Regarding victims' access to complaint mechanisms:

In the majority of cases (44), victims stated that they would not take further action. The main factors appear to be fears of secondary or repeat victimisation. 14 incidents were reported to the police at the time they were registered with the RVRN. Five incidents resulted in criminal


⁴⁷¹ National report on racist violence in Greece, 2021/European Website on Integration. European Commission, 19 August 2022. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/national-report-racist-violence-greece-2021_en

prosecutions. In 4 cases, the victims stated that they had not reported the incident to the police but were intending to do so.

The above shows that underreporting of racist violence has continued as a trend.

POLAND

Diagram # 11. Trends in Hate Crimes in Poland.



Poland officially reported 826 hate crimes to OSCE/ODIHR in 2020, of which 363 were violent in nature. In 2021, 997 offences were reported, but data on the nature of these crimes were not properly specified.⁴⁷² Several hundred cases of such offences are given by the NGO "Never Again!" in the Brown Paper.⁴⁷³

RUSSIAN FEDERATION


Russia did not provide ODIHR with data on hate crimes for 2021. However, according to information from the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, 1,057 extremist crimes were committed in the country in 2021, of which 95 were violent and 928 non-violent, including 486 crimes related to the spread of hatred, of which 456 were committed via the Internet.

⁴⁷² Poland. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/index.php/ru/poland?year=2021>

⁴⁷³ DOKUMENTACJA UPREDZEŃ I POGARDY - NOWA 'BRUNATNA KSIĘGA'//Never Again Association, 20.03.2023. URL: <https://www.nigdywiecej.org/komunikaty/rok-2023/5080-dokumentacja-uprzedze%C5%84-i-pogardy-%E2%80%93-nowa-%E2%80%98brunatna-ksi%C4%99ga%E2%80%99>

Thus, we see that after a sharp drop in crime in 2019 (after the liberalisation of Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - spreading hatred), the total number of extremist crimes reached the 2014 figures for the first time. In 2020, only 833 extremist crimes were committed, of which only 72 offences were violent and 761 were non-violent, including 367 related to the spread of hatred (339 via the Internet).

Diagram # 12. Trends in Hate Crimes in Russia.




In terms of xenophobic attacks, in 2020 the monitoring recorded two deaths and 33 victims, in 2021 - two deaths and 50 victims (in addition, four cases of death threats were noted), in 2022 - two deaths and 17 victims. Despite the fact that every such attack is a tragedy, it can be stated that the number of attacks is still at a low level compared to the second half of the 2000s, when the number of deaths sometimes reached up to a hundred people per year. In addition, 50 terrorist attacks were prevented in the Russian Federation in 2020 and 40 in 2021.

UKRAINE

Ukraine did not provide OSCE ODIHR with data on hate crimes for 2021. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine also did not provide information on how many criminal cases under Article 161 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine "Violation of equal rights of citizens on the basis of their race, nationality or attitude to religion" were registered and taken on record. But if we consider the results of statistics for the past years, when in more than 90% of cases no decisions

were taken in respect of criminal offences under this article, we can assume that the situation has not improved significantly.


Diagram # 8: Trends in Hate Crimes in Ukraine.⁴⁷⁴



SERBIA

According to official data provided by Serbia to OSCE/ODIHR, the overall picture of hate crimes is as follows:

Diagram # 13. Trends in Hate Crimes in Serbia.⁴⁷⁵



⁴⁷⁴ Ukraine. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/index.php/ukraine>

⁴⁷⁵ Serbia. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/index.php/serbia?year=2021>

According to the country's non-governmental organisations, several violent crimes were committed during the period under review, the most high-profile of which are as follows:

In January 2020, the area around a building intended to house Afghan asylum-seekers was set on fire by members of a far-right group. Tents and personal belongings were set on fire, and the wheel of a van used by volunteers was damaged.

In the same month, a far-right group once again set fire to a building intended to house Afghan asylum-seekers. Three volunteers were directly attacked, one was doused with petrol and a small explosive was thrown at the other victim. The attackers also destroyed the volunteer's phone with a baton. After the incident, the volunteers were detained by police and expelled from the country. This was the second time in a fortnight that the shelter was attacked by the same extreme right-wing group.

Also in January, a group of LGBTI representatives at the LGBTI Club were physically attacked with chains by a group of ten men wearing clothes with nationalist symbols. In February, city walls were vandalised with anti-Semitic and racist graffiti with the Star of David and Nazi symbols.

In May, residents of a migrant camp were rammed by a man who drove his car into the camp shouting anti-Muslim and xenophobic slurs. The attacker broadcast the incident live on social media.

In November 2020, a prominent Jewish male epidemiologist was subjected to anti-Semitic death threats in the form of graffiti spray-painted with a spray can in a public place near an anti-Covid medical centre.

In December of that year, during the Jewish religious holiday of Hanukkah, several public places, including a billboard depicting a local synagogue, were vandalised with anti-Semitic graffiti that included death threats.

With regard to the Romani community, a Romani woman was beaten on a bus in June. The victim and two other Romani women travelling with her were also subjected to anti-Romani insults and death threats. In the same month, three Romani women were physically assaulted on a bus by a drunken man. In August, four Romani women were subjected to anti-Roma insults and beaten by a group, resulting in bodily injuries. In September, a Roma man and a Roma woman were beaten with fists and kicked in the head by a neo-Nazi teenager. In October, a Roma child with developmental disabilities was beaten by the husband of a teacher in a classroom. The incident caused unrest in the local Romani community.

In addition, the number of murders motivated by hatred of women is on the rise in Serbia (incel). Observers consider the hatred of women to be the result of their poor social and economic security, patriarchy, and the consequences of the war of the 1990s.

BULGARIA.

Bulgaria is among the countries that lack a comprehensive data collection platform on hate crimes. The standards for such crimes are not fully correlated with OSCE standards. As a result, the data for 2021 can be considered as not provided, as it repeats the information for 2020, but with a refraction of ODIHR requirements, resulting in artificial underreporting.⁴⁷⁶ If we restrict ourselves to the 2020 data, we get data on 727 offences, of which 705 were physical assaults, one murder, and 21 incitements to violence.

Thus, we see that those countries that keep objective statistics on hate crimes mostly recorded a 25-35% increase in hate crimes during the monitoring period, which is a record high in most states since 2015.

CHAPTER 5. RADICALS AND EXTREMISTS

5.1 Right-wing Radicals and Extremists

The COVID-19 pandemic and the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine have led to the activation of right-wing radical forces in most monitoring countries. Thus, in 2020, reports emerged of the emergence of two new **British** groups in the racial-nationalist sector of the extreme right-wing spectrum. One of these was the racist Patriotic Alternative (PA), whose activities were largely limited to leaflet distribution, video blogs, and offline events focusing on issues of “white marginalisation” and the “white lives matter” discourse.⁴⁷⁷ They have become a key player in the racial nationalist scene in the UK, taking the place of the English Defence League as one of the most active street groups. Several of their activists come from other far-right organisations, and two key organisers have been charged with terrorism and incitement to distribute racist and terrorist material. Avoiding party politics, Patriotic Alternative describes itself as a form of social activism that proved successful during and after the pandemic - the group has over 5,000 members.

⁴⁷⁶ Bulgaria. ODIHR Hate Crime Reporting. URL: <https://hatecrime.osce.org/index.php/bulgaria?year=2021>

⁴⁷⁷ Murdoch, S., 'Patriotic Alternative: Uniting the Fascist Right?'// Hope not Hate, 17 August 2020. URL: <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/2020/08/17/patriotic-alternative-uniting-the-fascist-right/>

At the same time, the actual number is closer to 300-500 dedicated activists. Observers note the group's use of indirect soft recruitment tactics (e.g. film nights, baking contests. and live gaming), which has attracted a younger audience to the organisation.

Another, more sinister group in the UK racial nationalist scene during the reporting period is the Independent Nationalist Network (INN). Founded by former British National Party (BNP) organiser Richard Lambie, who split from the PA in 2021. Lambie told INN members in January that the group's "main focus" would be "resistance to global cliques," promising to "get involved in group actions, especially on the issue of vaccines, COVID passports etc." More worrying, however, are the INN's links with openly neo-Nazi and "sovereign citizen" movements in the UK, which puts it on the far right. For example, a recent addition to the group is Andrew Barnes of Dudley, who describes himself as a lifelong National Socialist and has previously expressed support for a number of Nazi terrorist groups, including the Atomwaffen Division (described by Barnes as "the way forward") and National Action, both of which have been banned in the UK by anti-terrorism laws. Barnes also wrote on social media that Christchurch killer Brenton Tarrant was a "good bloke" and expressed support for the Nazi occult network the Order of Nine Corners (O9A).⁴⁷⁸

In **Poland** during the period under review, several active extreme right-wing organisations can be identified. These include Robert Bonkiewicz's Independence March Association, which every year on 11 November holds marches that gather thousands of ultranationalist supporters. During this event, participants display racist banners including: "It's OK to stay white" and flags with the Celtic cross symbol (signifying support for so-called white supremacy). In addition, the banners contained slogans such as "Today immigrants, tomorrow terrorists" (with Islamophobic overtones), "This is Poland, not Polin" ("Polin" is the Hebrew word for Poland), etc.

Also noteworthy is the ultra-nationalist extreme right-wing "revolutionary" party National Renaissance of Poland (NRP), which practices violent forms of neo-fascism and anti-Semitism, including Holocaust denial. For example, on 6 December 2022 in Wrocław, members of the (PLP) took part in an organised meeting with a group of children of various ages under the slogan "Nationalist Father Christmas 2022." One of the activists, dressed as Father Christmas, wore an armband with the Phalanx symbol, which was used in the interwar period by Polish fascist organisations. Another member of the ALP wore a T-shirt with an image of two rifles as well as a neo-Nazi slogan (the so-called "14 words"): "We must ensure the existence of our people and a future for white children"; this slogan was coined by David Lane, the racist terrorist leader of the American group The Order. The text was inspired by a passage from Adolf Hitler's book *Mein*

⁴⁷⁸ 'State of Hate 2023: Rhetoric, Race and Resentment'// Hope Not Hate, February 2023, P.51. URL: <https://hopenothate.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/state-of-hate-2023-v7-1.pdf>

Kampf. The T-shirt also featured the so-called "rune of life," a sign used by SS units, a modern symbol of hatred used by racist organisations in many countries.

We can also mention certain regional far-right groups, such as the "National Częstochowa," which held a march in Częstochowa on 6 March 2022. The participants in this gathering chanted racist slogans and ideologically motivated threats: "White Europe," "There will be a stick for the Leftist snout," "Once with a sickle, once with a hammer - Leftist scum," and "Death to the enemies of the fatherland." They also expressed support for Janusz Walusz, a Polish immigrant sentenced to life imprisonment for a racist murder committed in 1993 in South Africa. On 21 November 2022, a South African court ordered his parole from prison. The demonstrators in Czestochowa shouted "Janusz Walus is our role model" and displayed a banner reading "Free Walus!" and a symbol of the Celtic cross. A representative of the Częstochowa City Hall monitored the procession, but the assembly was not dispersed.

The gradual radicalisation of the right-conservative forces in Poland can be noted. For example, the monarchist political party "Confederation of the Polish Crown," part of the federal party "Confederation of Freedom and Independence," held a march in Warsaw on 24 September 2022 titled "Stop the Ukrainianisation of Poland." Participants displayed banners: "Here is Poland, not Ukropolis!" (a vision of Poland taken over by Ukraine) and "Stop changing the ethnic structure of Poland." They also shouted, "There will be a stick for the Banderite snout!"

In **Hungary**, after Jobbik's rebranding into a "national conservative" party, i.e. a shift towards the centre around the mid-2010s, the Mi Hazank party and Fidesz took most of its electorate. Thus, as of 2020-23, and especially after the 2022 parliamentary elections, the main right-wing parties in the country remain the ruling Fidesz with almost 54.13 per cent of the vote (in coalition with KDNP, a minority partner) and Our Fatherland (*Mi Hazank*) with 5.88 per cent. As one of the rare European countries where the radical right is in power and in opposition, Hungarian radical-right politics has relatively reliable leverage on a variety of issues, including minority issues.

As for the comparison between the actual influence of far-right movements and parties in the period 2020-23, it was, as in other cases, due to the pandemic and the war. Regarding the former, supporters of both Fidesz and Mi Hazank were highly sceptical of the measures taken in the face of the pandemic. The same cannot be said of the party leadership in the case of Fidesz, which is somewhat understandable given that the party is the ruling party. However, Mi Hazank was among the leaders of the anti-vaccination movement (along with so-called "health influencers"), putting forward many conspiracy theories - including those with anti-Semitic

overtones.⁴⁷⁹ The party not only organised street protests, but was also active in spreading anti-vaxxing propaganda through its media. Some of the activities included addressing politicians at the Council of Europe and even organising roundtables with anti-vaccination doctors, which were then broadcast on the party's YouTube channel.⁴⁸⁰

When it came to the war in Ukraine, the Hungarian radical right was less active in the conflict, at least when it came to taking sides. Nevertheless, there were discussions in extreme right-wing circles about presenting the Ukrainian authorities with a paramilitary unit that could ideally be integrated as a reserve force. Expectedly, such a project was rejected by the government, which even dismissed a number of employees for their links to the far-right.⁴⁸¹

With regard to attitudes towards minorities and hate crimes, some far-right organisations such as Betyársereg continue their activities as vigilantes, patrolling trams in Budapest with the aim of "eradicating anti-social behaviour."⁴⁸² These activities are often limited to the ill-treatment of minorities, mainly Roma and LGBT people, or foreigners (migrants from Asian countries).

Being in a relatively comfortable political position, right-wing parties and groups extend their influence to other areas not directly related to minorities, such as the environment. Nevertheless, their discourse on the environment often repeats theses on immigration, for example, linking climate change to illegal immigration or emphasising the danger that migrants pose to the ecosystem.⁴⁸³

Several new right-wing radical organisations emerged in **Russia** during the period under review. For example, in 2021, the Ethnic National Association (ENO) publicly announced itself (mainly on the Internet). It promotes the ideas of National Socialism and "race war." ENO claimed responsibility for the 2019 attacks on the FSB headquarters in Moscow, murder, and arson, as well as a number of other "actions," including the desecration of Holocaust memorials (only the desecration of the Holocaust memorial in Pushkin was actually confirmed). The movement itself is decentralised and anonymous. Its Russian social network "VKontakte" account has 2.5 thousand followers and its Telegram channel has 6.8 thousand followers.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁷⁹ Antisemitism and anti-vax discourse in Europe// Media Diversity. 2021. URL: https://www.media-diversity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Antisemitism-and-anti-vax-discourse-in-Europe_MDI_GTTO.pdf

⁴⁸⁰ "You lied to the people!" (Debate on Covid vaccines in the Council of Europe)// Mi Hazank Youtube. 2023. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ufEfG8l_gk0

⁴⁸¹ The extreme right as a national defence force ["A szélsőjobb, mint egy potenciális honvédő erő" - Incze Béla gondolatai]// Betyársereg. 2023. URL: <https://betyarsereg.hu/a-szelsojobb-mint-egy-potencialis-honvedo-ero-incze-bela-gondolatai/>

⁴⁸² Újra az 1es villamos vonalán a Betyársereg ["Betyársereg is back on tram line 1]// Betyársereg. 2023. URL: <https://betyarsereg.hu/ujra-az-1-es-villamos-vonalan-a-betyarsereg/>

⁴⁸³ Lubarda, B. 2023. Far-Right Ecologism: Environmental Politics and the Far Right in Hungary and Poland. Routledge.

⁴⁸⁴ Крайняя правая ЭНОмания//Коммерсантъ, 14.04.2021. URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4771939>

We can speak of a number of new local far-right organisations that have emerged in recent years. In 2020 in Bryansk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur and Perm, the "National-Revolutionary Path of Russian Patriotism" ("NVSRP") emerged, which was defeated by the authorities in 2021.⁴⁸⁵ In Astrakhan, the "Astrakhan National Movement" operated from October 2020 to March 2021, desecrating monuments to Turkic writers and planning armed attacks.⁴⁸⁶ Much less is known about their ideology. In the case of the Astrakhan National Movement, it was the propaganda of violence against LGBT and national minorities combined with veneration of Hitler. Nothing is known about the ideology of the Astrakhan National Movement. In form, they were cells formed by ideologically "charged" youth representatives - initially with the help of social networks.

In 2021 it became known that an organisation imitating the neo-Nazi terrorist group Atomwaffen Division was uncovered in Ulan-Ude.⁴⁸⁷ Such a phenomenon is quite natural, since among the ultra-right there are also admirers of foreign white supremacists. In 2021, for example, 7 people were convicted for praising a white racist terrorist attack in Christchurch, and in 2022 three more were convicted for the same.

Public activity of the far-right has been suppressed by the authorities in recent years. In 2021-2022, public actions, including even the Russian March on 4 November, which has become a symbol of the ultra-right, have virtually ceased. In the few cities where it did take place, it was attended by only a handful of supporters. In the 2021 elections, most far-right candidates were also unsuccessful (even in local elections).

The extreme right has been present in **Serbia** since the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed during the war of the 1990s. Between 1988 and 1989, Serbian intellectuals, elites, and politicians joined forces to promote a national revolution to create a "united Serbia," appealing to the socio-economic and national grievances of Serbs in the former Yugoslav republic. In the years that followed, Serbia undertook significant reforms as part of the EU accession process, but the breakup of Yugoslavia and its aftermath haunt Serbia to this day. This difficulty in reconciling with the past, combined with the effects of the 1999 NATO air bombing, as well as vulnerabilities such as deep economic instability and an uncritical media, have been used by right-wing extremists for radicalisation.

⁴⁸⁵ В Брянской области завершено расследование уголовного дела по обвинению местного жителя в создании экстремистского сообщества//Следственное Управление Следственного комитета РФ по Брянской области, 09 ноября 2021. URL: <https://bryansk.sledcom.ru/news/item/1627285/>

⁴⁸⁶ Суд вынес приговор участникам "Астраханского национального движения"//Idel. Реалии. 07.06.2022. URL: <https://www.idelreal.org/a/31887631.html>

⁴⁸⁷ «Атомная дивизия»: в Бурятии задержаны неонацисты, подражавшие банде из США//Газета. RU, 29.10.2021. URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/social/2021/10/29/14149513.shtml?utm_source=yxnews&utm_medium=desktop&utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fyandex.ru%2Fnews%2Fsearch%3Ftext%3D&updated

Far-right ideologies are both mainstream and underground; they include identity-related, ultra-nationalist, neo-Nazi, and Orthodox extremist movements. Violence and threats against migrants, as well as hate and ethnicity-based attacks, are part of their activities.

Organisations such as 1389, the Serbian Sworn Party, and the Serbian People's Movement Nashi declaratively reject fascism, while Storm Front Serbia, Obraz ("Honour"), the National Serbian Front, Blood and Honor, and Serbian Action, on the contrary, agree are either clerical-fascist or neo-Nazi. Especially groups such as Blood and Honor Serbia and the National Serbian Front openly advocate white supremacy and national socialism.⁴⁸⁸

Leaders of far-right organisations are very influential on social media. For example, the leader of the National Serbian Front, referred to as the Führer, publishes anti-Semitic and racist posts that are often repeated by other right-wing extremist leaders and organisations. In addition, Serbian Action is affiliated with the National Serbian Front and has a hierarchical military structure.

The Serbian party Oath-bearers, Dveri and the Movement for People's Freedom are anti-establishment and base their political position on religious conservatism. Orthodoxy is at the core of Serbian far-right ideology. They all rely on religion and emphasise the religious elements of Serbian identity promoted by the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The official narrative of the Serbian Orthodox Church in some cases suggests the "basic framework" within which these organisations operate, including anti-European, anti-NATO, and anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments, Kosovo status issues, the unification of "Serbian lands and people" and the punishment of war crimes perpetrators. Some far-right organisations spread conspiracy theories related to the pandemic, such as Life for Serbia, which widely spread disinformation and used the pandemic as an opportunity to attract public attention. It is in turn linked to the Leviathan movement, an extreme right-wing group that publicly positions itself as an animal rights organisation. Their violent actions target Roma, migrants, and LGBTQ+ people. "People's Patrols" is a predominantly anti-government, anti-migrant, anti-LGBTQ+ far-right organisation of supporters of conspiracy theories. People's Patrols actively use the online space to recruit their supporters.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁸ Overview of research on far right extremism in the Western Balkans//University of Manchester, 4 June 2019, p.6. URL:

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5d309f7aed915d2fe9ea6aec/620_Western_Balkans_far_Right.pdf

⁴⁸⁹ Marija Vucuc, Hate, Lies and Vigilantes: Serbian "Anti-Vaxxer" Brigade Plays with Fire//Balkan Inside, 21.09.2021. URL: <https://balkaninsight.com/2021/09/21/hate-lies-and-vigilantes-serbian-anti-vaxxer-brigade-plays-with-fire/>

Although far-right political organisations occupy a marginal place in the political decision-making process, they have a significant influence on public opinion, and some of them are closely linked or indirectly cooperate with political parties with real political power.

According to the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), white supremacy advocates and Salafi-jihadists were the deadliest violent extremists between 2016 and 2022.⁴⁹⁰

The following three white supremacy advocacy groups were the most active (accounting for 93 per cent of all activity) in spreading propaganda in 2022: Patriot Front, Goyim Defence League (GDL), and White Lives Matter (WLM).⁴⁹¹

Patriot Front is a white supremacy advocacy group that split from Vanguard America in 2017. It is a Texas-based neo-Nazi group led by Thomas Ryan Russo and formerly Dillon Hopper (Dillon Irizarry). Its supporters (numbering 200-300 at the end of 2021) identify themselves as American fascists.⁴⁹² The group mainly disseminates propaganda via the Internet. It also organises "instant demonstrations" and training camps where they practice shooting and martial arts across the States. The group claims allegiance to the US, but also wants to form a *new* white ethno-state. They advocate what they call "American nationalism," are proponents of a racist ideology that appeals to conservatives, using such "innocuous" symbols as the American flag, as well as an image of a fascia, the original symbol of fascism, surrounded by thirteen stars as the "American Symbol of the Revolutionary Spirit."

According to the group's manifesto published on its website in 2022, "America is suffering under the rule of an occupying government. ... Our national way of life is on the verge of total destruction as our culture and heritage are under attack from all sides. ... Americans are on the verge of becoming a subjugated people."⁴⁹³ During demonstrations, members of the group raise the American flag upside down to show that the U.S. is in crisis because its existing state no longer represents the American people. While the group's earlier incarnation, Vanguard America, was explicitly anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi, Patriot Front is more flexible: it uses seemingly politically acceptable language in its propaganda, i.e. "America First," "We Stand Together," and "Take Back America." Patriot Front regularly appears at anti-abortion events in the U.S., justifying them as necessary to protect white American children.

⁴⁹⁰ ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, February 7, 2022. URL: <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf>

⁴⁹¹ White Supremacist Propaganda Soars to All-Time High in 2022//ADL, 02.03.2022. URL: <https://www.adl.org/resources/report/white-supremacist-propaganda-soars-all-time-high-2022>

⁴⁹² 'We are desperate for new people': inside a hate group's leaked online chats//The Guardian, 28.01.2022. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/28/leaked-online-chats-white-nationalist-patriot-front>

⁴⁹³ Life, Liberty, Victory. Manifesto//Patriot Front. URL: <https://patriotfront.us/manifesto/>

The Goyim Defence League (GDL) is a small loose network of supporters, led by Job Minadeo, who are rabid anti-Semites. In addition to spreading anti-Semitic conspiracy theories such as Holocaust denial and Jewish responsibility for 11 September 2001, the ideology of white supremacy, which hates all minorities (not just Jews), is increasingly prevalent in the GDL. In July 2022, Minadeo openly declared himself a supporter of white supremacy. The organisation is known for its online threats against the Anti-Defamation League,⁴⁹⁴ as well as homophobic attacks.⁴⁹⁵

White Lives Matter (WLM) is another white supremacy group that has gained popularity as a racist response to the Black Lives Matter movement. WLM began organising in Telegram channels in March 2021. The first rallies and demonstrations took place in April 2021 in several states. Three WLM marchers were arrested in Huntington Beach, California.⁴⁹⁶ There are several international branches of the organisation, including in the Netherlands and Canada. The WLM network cooperates with other neo-Nazi white supremacy groups, including the National Socialist Movement, the Nationalist Social Club, the American National Socialist Party, and the GDL.

Following the criminal prosecution of Golden Dawn and the conviction of its leadership, the landscape of the far-right in **Greece** has been in disarray. Golden Dawn was declared a criminal organisation by the court after it had already collapsed electorally, losing its representation in parliament in the summer of 2019, as well as splitting from within between the parent organisation of Nikos Michaloliakos and various clones launched by previous Golden Dawn deputy leaders Ioannis Lagos and Ilias Kasidiaris.

The Golden Dawn audience (in addition to Kyriakos Velopoulos, whose Greek Solution party entered parliament, albeit with a smaller percentage) is sought after by many far-right groups, which in most cases range from extremely small to one-man organisations and are often communicating vessels, sometimes announcing mergers and pacts, and sometimes splits.

There are small Nazi and fascist organisations that operate entirely illegally and are trying to fill the gap left by the Golden Dawn storm troopers.

Despite the existence of all these forms, the fragmentation of the far-right following the revelations arising from the Golden Dawn trial, and the fact that part of this ideological space is

⁴⁹⁴ Denton County Man Sentenced for Threatening Jewish Ofranization//United States Attorney's Office, April 11, 2023. URL: <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edtx/pr/denton-county-man-sentenced-threatening-jewish-organization>

⁴⁹⁵ Chula Vista man charged with anti-gay hate-crime attack on neighbour, hanging antisemitic banner//The San Diego Union-Tribune, Dec.27, 2021. URL: <https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/story/2021-12-27/chula-vista-man-charged-with-anti-gay-hate-crime-attack-on-neighbor-hanging-antisemitic-banner>

⁴⁹⁶ Unlawful Assembly Declared at Site of 'White Lives Matter' Rally, Counter-Protest in Huntington Beach//NBC, April 11, 2021. URL: <https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/white-lives-matter-rally-in-huntington-beach/2570704/>

filled by New Democracy, the ruling liberal-conservative party, there remains a void in the far-right part of the political spectrum that does not exclude the emergence of other contenders.

The activities of far-right extremists were also curtailed following the arrests of members of Combat 18 and the Non-Aligned Meandering Nationalists (AME), as well as the conviction of the Golden Dawn leadership, according to a secret report prepared by Greece's anti-terrorist service.⁴⁹⁷ Among its many findings is the absence of an active terrorist organisation in Greece. Nevertheless, the report notes that the economic crisis, migration, and the pandemic have led to the spread of far-right ideology. Moreover, the repression against Golden Dawn has led to the fragmentation of the far-right, and the war between Russia and Ukraine has caused further divisions within it.

Among the new radical right parties and organisations that entered the Greek political scene during the period under review, the following can be highlighted:

National Creation - Coalition of Liberals, Patriots, Reformers - was formed in May 2022. It claims a "national urban space" (alt-right), combining neoliberalism ("the Ottoman-Soviet model of the Greek state, hostile to entrepreneurship"), authoritarianism on security, immigration and Islam, ultra-nationalism, and anti-communism.

Panhellenic Patriotic Union - was founded in November 2021 and soon renamed the **Patriotic Union**. Its 85-year-old founder, Prodromos Emfietzoglou, is the owner of the construction company Mihaniki, operating in Russia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Egypt, as well as being involved in state projects in Greece. Since 2007, he has openly joined the oldest right-wing radical party, LAOS. The Patriotic Union sees hydrocarbon extraction as a solution that could prevent social unrest and shares the Nazi conspiracy theory of "replacing" the Greek population with immigrants. Its president appeals to "all patriots, without ideological differences." In 2020, it founded the "Averof II Greek Navy Foundation" to privately finance a naval frigate of the same name to fight Turkey. The party united some former members of Golden Dawn.

Patriotic Forces of Change (PATRIDA) - Party leader Konstantinos Bogdanos was elected in 2019 as a member of parliament from the now ruling New Democracy party, from which he was expelled in 2021 due to "sharp disagreements." In April 2022, he announced the formation of the National Accord Front and began co-operating with opposition party leaders. He was briefly vice-president in the new organisation, but in August 2022 two other leaders removed him from his position. He then founded the Patriotic Force for Change (PATRIDA) with Afrodita

⁴⁹⁷ The secret report of Anti-terror service on Far right (in Greek), 2022, URL:<https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/562261546/fakelos-akrodexia-stin-ellada-i-aporriti-ekthesi-tis-antitromokratikis/>

Latinopoulou as vice president, known for her very reactionary far-right political positions. Bogdanos expresses xenophobic views, favours violent repression, supports the forcible return of refugees to the countries from which they came to Greece, and proposes settling them on uninhabited islands. He favours the right to own guns and proposes banning the burqa and niqab. At the same time, he supports same-sex marriage.

In its development, **Ukraine's** far-right environment has evolved in two different directions: the creation of official political parties and the creation of online communities, radical groups and paramilitary formations consisting of volunteers with right-wing radical views. They share a similar ideology, the key elements of which are xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, and the ideology of a united and ethnically homogeneous nation. Often this ideological foundation is linked to Holocaust denial and the downplaying of the crimes of National Socialism and Nazi Germany.

Nationalist and far-right parties in Ukraine have weak electoral positions. The results of the 2020 local elections showed that, overall, only 2.6 per cent of voters in the country supported the oldest right-wing party Svoboda.⁴⁹⁸ Due to the fact that the central government systematically demonstrated its inability to implement coherent policies and overcome the socio-economic crisis, the overall rating of the nationalists in 2020 compared to 2019 (3.2 per cent) rose slightly to 4.4 per cent, which is still quite low. This is mainly explained by the fact that part of the nationalist electorate votes for more electorally promising right-wing parties - European Solidarity, Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party, and Golos, which widely used nationalist and anti-Russian rhetoric during the election campaign. The only candidate from radical nationalists, Ruslan Koshulinsky, deputy head of the Freedom Party, won only 1.63 per cent of votes in the presidential election.⁴⁹⁹

But at the same time, using the instrument of serious street pressure, these organisations manage to influence some decisions of the courts and the authorities. Cases of confrontation between far-right groups and law enforcement agencies have often demonstrated the unacceptable passivity of the latter.

The most influential among right-wing radical parties are Svoboda, Right Sector, Azov and the National Corps formed on its basis, and C14.

From 2014 to 2016, there was a noticeable increase in the social role of right-wing radical groups due to their participation in military operations in eastern Ukraine. This process was aggravated after the start of a full-scale war with Russia on 24 February 2022. The main ideological

⁴⁹⁸ Юлия Устимович, «Слуга народа», «Батькивщина» и ОПЗЖ: за кого украинцы отдали больше всего всего голосов на местных выборах//Page. UA, 19.11.2020. URL: <https://thepage.ua/news/mestnye-vybory-2020-cik-rezultaty-partij-po-vsej-ukraine>

⁴⁹⁹ Единственным кандидатом на пост президента от "националистов" стал Руслан Кошулинский//Interfax Ukraine, 19.11.2018. URL: <https://interfax.com.ua/news/election/546022.html>

reference point for radical right in Ukraine is the historical nationalist organisations OUN and UPA. In July 2022, Ukraine's ambassador to Germany Andriy Melnyk was dismissed after his praise of OUN (b) leader S. Bandera as a "freedom fighter" in an interview with a German journalist caused widespread public outcry.⁵⁰⁰

The war in Ukraine provided an opportunity for radical right-wing groups to prove themselves as "defenders of the homeland" and thus expand their social influence in the country, and even increase their profile outside of Ukraine. For example, the prolonged defence of the Azovstal plant in Mariupol from 18 March to 20 May 2022 attracted the attention and sympathy of many countries around the world and largely led to a reassessment of the activities of the far-right extremist military-political formation Azov. In September 2022, a significant part of Ukrainian society hailed as heroes 215 Ukrainian servicemen, 108 of them fighters of the Azov regiment, who were captured and then exchanged for Russian prisoners of war.⁵⁰¹

In general, the period under review saw a marked increase in the social role of Ukraine's right-wing radical groups due to their participation in military operations against the Russian Federation. Nowadays, society often adds the image of defenders of the homeland to the right-radicals. All this led to the fact that the influence of right-wing radical ideology in the country increased dramatically after the outbreak of the war.

During the monitoring period, the **French** far-right was strongly affected by restrictions on demonstrations and other mass actions during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021 and until the spring of 2022, Florian Philippot, leader of the Patriotes party and former number two man in the Front National, was at the forefront of demonstrations against pandemic restrictions, trying to promote conspiracy theories that the vaccine was part of an Orwellian scheme to enslave society and suppress civil liberties, and suggesting that COVID-19 was nothing more than a flu.

His goal was to use the demonstrations to run for president, but he failed to get the necessary endorsement from 500 elected officials: in fact, he only got the approval of one.⁵⁰² A consequence of the pandemic was a growing audience of far-right conspiracists, mostly active on social media, who during 2020-2022 either disputed the reality of the pandemic, suggested the use of alternative medicines to eradicate the virus, or criticised the government for allegedly improper anti-quarantine measures and the alleged subordination of several cabinet members to Big Pharma.

⁵⁰⁰ "В ФРГ за такое судят": слова Мельника о Бандере возмутили//DW, 01.07.2022. URL:

<https://www.dw.com/ru/v-frg-za-takoe-sudjat-slova-posla-ukrainy-o-bandere-vozmutili-nemcev/a-62329182>

⁵⁰¹ Святослав Хоменко, Елизавета Фохт, Украина обменяла Медведчука и 55 россиян на 215 своих пленных, в том числе пять командиров с "Азовстали">//22 сентября 2022 г. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-62990303>

⁵⁰² Mouvement anti-pass sanitaire: le pari de Florian Philippot, qui veut profiter de la discrétion du RN//Franceinfo, 14.08.2021. URL: https://www.francetvinfo.fr/sante/maladie/coronavirus/pass-sanitaire/mouvement-anti-pass-sanitaire-le-pari-de-florian-philippot-qui-veut-profiter-de-la-discretion-du-rn_4737309.html

Despite this, the far-right continued to engage in street clashes with leftists and anti-fascists. The most famous of these groups is "Les Zouaves,"⁵⁰³ which was banned on 5 January 2022 after its participation in a violent action against activists from SOS- Racism.⁵⁰⁴

There were no significant changes on the far-right political flank in **Germany** either. "Alternative for Germany" (AfG) has consolidated its position as the main extreme right-wing political force, expressing the ideas of a relatively broad group of voters, ranging from the far right and neo-Nazis to right-wing populists and anti-migrant communities. No other political party has succeeded (or is likely to succeed in the near future) in competing with the AfG in this niche.

In the period 2020-2022, the AfG received the following electoral support. Land elections: Hamburg, 2020: 5.3%, Rhineland-Palatinate, 2021: 8.3%, Baden-Württemberg, 2021: 9.7%, Saxony-Anhalt, 2021: 20.8%, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 2021: 16.7 per cent, Saarland, 2021: 5.7 per cent, Schleswig-Holstein, 2022: 4.4 per cent, North Rhine-Westphalia, 2022: 5.4 per cent, Lower Saxony, 2022: 11 per cent,⁵⁰⁵ Berlin, 2021: 8.4 per cent⁵⁰⁶ and Bundestag elections, 2021: 10.3 per cent.⁵⁰⁷ A trend that emerged shortly after the AfG's emergence on the German political scene continues: the party has significantly higher support in the east of the country than in the west.

At the same time, the AfG can achieve relatively high results in the West German regions if it manages to mobilise voters who usually ignore elections and temporarily attract right-wing supporters of the CDU. Other circumstances also play into the AfG's hands, such as the poor performance of Democratic Party deputies in certain constituencies or political events (the migration crisis, terrorist attacks) that encourage people to make an "emotional," situational choice. Overall, even in Saxony-Anhalt, where the AfG has strong primary structures and a significant number of regular supporters, the party only managed to cross the 20 per cent electoral threshold set by pollsters by 0.8 per cent. In all other Länder, the AfG's results were far below this threshold. The fact that the AfG's ratings are highly situational is confirmed by its significant drop in the first half of 2020. Then, after the start of the pandemic, AfG leaders either tacitly supported the government's actions or even demanded tougher measures, such as an immediate ban on mass

⁵⁰³ Les "Zouaves," nouveaux petits soldats de l'extrême droite radicale//Liberation, 20.01.2020. URL: https://www.liberation.fr/france/2020/01/20/les-zouaves-nouveaux-petits-soldats-de-l-extreme-droite-radicale_1774210/

⁵⁰⁴ Dissolution du groupuscule d'ultradroite les Zouaves Paris//L'express, 05/01/2022. URL: https://www.lexpress.fr/societe/dissolution-du-groupuscule-d-ultradroite-les-zouaves-paris_2165513.html

⁵⁰⁵ Ergebnisse der AfD bei den Landtagswahlen// Statista. URL: <https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/320946/umfrage/ergebnisse-der-afd-bei-den-landtagswahlen/>

⁵⁰⁶ Bundewahlleiterin, Bundestagswahl 2021. URL: <https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2021/ergebnisse/bund-99/land-11.html>

⁵⁰⁷ Bundewahlleiterin, Bundestagswahl 2021. Endgültiges Ergebnis. URL: https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/info/presse/mitteilungen/bundestagswahl-2021/52_21_endgueltiges-ergebnis.html

events or a lockdown modelled on Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic (such actions were not taken in Germany until later). This did not please the party's electorate, which is largely susceptible to conspiracy theories, denied the existence of the virus, or markedly downplayed its danger. As time passed, the AfG politicians changed their rhetoric, criticised the epidemiological measures and took part in coronasceptic demonstrations, but the trust of a part of the electorate was undermined. The consequences of this were evident in the Bundestag elections in September 2021, when the AfG won 2.3 per cent less votes than in 2017 and lost 11 seats in parliament.⁵⁰⁸

Some politicians, regional branches and inner-party factions of the AfG, as well as the entire youth organisation of the party, were previously under surveillance by the German security services due to suspicions of right-wing extremism. This was the case, for example, with the far-right intra-party group Wing. Although this platform was dissolved by a decision of the AfG board in March 2020,⁵⁰⁹ its leaders continued to retain influence in the party. In March 2022, a court in Cologne issued a judgement allowing the Office for the Protection of the Constitution to monitor the entire party as such.⁵¹⁰ This legal verdict could have far-reaching consequences. The party may be restricted in its political activities. This is a negative signal for the sponsors as well. It may also create a situation in which civil servants and judges will have to choose between membership in the AfG and their professional activities.

The rest of Germany's far-right parties remain statist on this field. Germany's oldest existing neo-Nazi party, the National Democratic Party (NPD), continues to lose members (2018: 4,000, 2021: 3,150) and struggles for political survival. The relatively new, Third Way Party (2022: 650 members), established in 2013, is also not showing significant electoral success. In 2020, the party tried to be at the forefront of protests against pandemic restrictions but was quickly pushed back by more significant players with the same agenda. Another small far-right party, the Right (2022: 500 members), chose a similar strategy, organising a "national solidarity action" in Dortmund against measures to contain the spread of the coronavirus. A number of its planned marches were banned as neo-Nazi.⁵¹¹ The strategy was also unsuccessful in this case.

Some small far-right parties still fulfil the prescriptions for participation in elections and conduct campaigns. But their results are within the statistical margin of error. For example, in

⁵⁰⁸ Bundewahlleiterin, Bundestagswahl 2021. URL:

<https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/bundestagswahlen/2021/ergebnisse/bund-99.html>

⁵⁰⁹ So kämpft der "Flügel" der AfD ums Überleben//Frankfurter Allgemeine, 20.03.2020. URL:

<https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/afd-gegen-afd-der-fluegel-kaempft-ums-ueberleben-16687932.html>

⁵¹⁰ Reiner Burger, Markus Wehner, So kämpft der "Flügel" der AfD ums Überleben// FAZ, 20.03.2020. URL:

<https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/afd-beobachtung-verfassungsschutz-101.html>

⁵¹¹ Lucius Teiderbaum, Rechte Reaktionen auf Corona, Hagalil Jüdisches Leben online, 24.03.2020, URL:

<https://www.hagalil.com/2020/03/rechte-reaktionen-auf-corona/>

2021, the NPD showed the worst result in its history in the Bundestag elections with 0.1 per cent of the vote.⁵¹²

The so-called "Citizens of the Reich" ("Reichsbürgers") should be presented separately. Representatives of a network of such groups, often unconnected, believe that with the surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945, the "Third Reich" did not cease to exist. They do not recognise the FRG as a legitimate state. Some groups print their own "passports" and "banknotes" and hold "elections" for "deputies" to self-proclaimed "Reichstags." Manifestations, rallies and other actions are also organised. A certain percentage of "Reich citizens" live in isolated communes and, wishing to minimise contact with the state, are engaged in agriculture and their own handicrafts. For a long time, "Reichsbürgers" were not considered dangerous or violent. Rather, they were perceived as members of a strange subculture. This changed after the murder of a police officer by a member of the group in 2016. The killer was sentenced to life imprisonment.⁵¹³ Firearms were found in the possession of members of the group. Currently, the "citizens of the Reich" are under surveillance by the German security services. In the 2020s, the flats of members of the group were regularly searched. Activists of the NGO "United German Peoples and Tribes" are considered particularly dangerous (search of 21 flats in March 2020 by 400 police officers).⁵¹⁴ The NGO was recognised as extremist and banned. Also, in the ranks of this movement sectarianism, denial not only of the FRG as a state, but also of democracy in general, anti-Semitism, and Holocaust denial intensified. Of the total number of "Reichsbürger," estimated at 19,000 people, 950 are recognised as right-wing extremists.⁵¹⁵

In 2020-2021, The "Reichsbürgers" were active participants in protests against pandemic control measures. In August 2020, during one demonstration, the movement managed to break through a police cordon and symbolically "storm" the steps of the Reichstag building in Berlin, displaying their flags. The police quickly pushed back the offenders. Criminal proceedings were initiated.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹² Stimmanteile der NPD bei den Bundestagswahlen, Statista, URL:

<https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/368838/umfrage/stimmenanteile-der-npd-bei-den-bundestagswahlen/>

⁵¹³ Lebenslange Haft für Reichsbürger für Mord an Polizisten, DIE ZEIT, 23.10.2017, URL:

<https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-10/reichsbuergerbewegung-urteil-mord-polizisten-wolfgang-p>

⁵¹⁴ Reiner Burger, Peter Karstens, "Reichsbürger"-Gruppierung. Hochgefährliche Spinner//FAZ,19.03.2020. URL: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/verbotene-reichsbuerger-gruppe-rechtsextrem-und-hochgefahrlch-16686793.html>

⁵¹⁵ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021. URL:

https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/DE/publikationen/themen/sicherheit/vsb-2019-kurzfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3

⁵¹⁶ Markus Decker, Nach Sturm auf den Reichstag laufen 34 Ermittlungsverfahren gegen 40 Verdächtige//RND, 16.01.2021. URL: <https://www.rnd.de/politik/reichstag-sturm-2020-34-ermittlungsverfahren-gegen-40-verdaechtige-PL7S65SDPZEDJGWXVVV3BQIR3M.html>

The most high-profile event was the exposure of the attempted coup d'état prepared by Citizens of the Reich. In December, dozens of people were arrested, including the well-known conspiracy theorist Prince Heinrich XIII, a former Bundestag deputy from the AfD and at the time a judge, former members of the Bundeswehr and the GDR People's Army, and representatives of other security agencies, including special forces.⁵¹⁷ The police found 90 firearms. According to the German security services, the conspirators planned to overthrow the current government and establish a monarchist-authoritarian model in the country. Experts believe that the conspirators had insufficient capabilities to realise their plans or even to pose any significant threat to the German statehood, but the special services naturally acted proactively and stopped the dangerous activities.

One of the most significant formats of public manifestations of the extreme right is the "Monday demonstrations." The far-right tries to voice its vision of the main topics (2020-2021: pandemic, 2022: military action in Ukraine) and thus make itself known in the public space. These demonstrations rarely gather more than 100 people. The above-mentioned extreme right-wing parties are joined by right-wing regional social movements such as Free Saxony, the Leipzig Civic Movement, and others. One of the most numerous events and examples of a rare "successful" mobilisation was the march in September 2022 with slogans of support for Russia, priority of German interests, resumption of gas supplies from the Russian Federation, etc., which according to the organisers was attended by up to 3,000 people, according to the police, 1,500-1,700.⁵¹⁸ The relative success of this far-right event was linked precisely to the pro-Russian agenda: the march was joined by "GDR nostalgics" and other citizens sympathetic to Russia, who usually do not or have not previously taken part in far-right rallies.⁵¹⁹

Ultra-right-wing organisations and structures that were not formalised into a political party or social movement remained under the surveillance of the German security services during this period. Examples include the magazine Compact, the One Percent community, the Institute for Public Policy, the Antaios publishing house, and others,⁵²⁰ around which their own right-wing radical milieu was formed.

⁵¹⁷ Florian Flade u.a., Reichsbürger planten Staatsstreich. Fantasien vom Umsturz, Tagesschau, 07.12.2022. URL: <https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/ndr-wdr/razzia-reichsbuerger-staatsstreich-geplant-101.html>

⁵¹⁸ Michael Freitag, Rechte Montagsdemonstrationen. Die Radikalisierung ist abgeschlossen// Leipziger Zeitung, 29.09.2022. URL: <https://www.l-iz.de/leben/gesellschaft/2022/09/rechte-montagsdemonstrationen-1-die-radikalisierung-ist-abgeschlossen-video-474207>

⁵¹⁹ Lars Wienand, Thomas Terhorst, Polizei durchsucht das Haus von Rusenkorso-Organisatorin// T-Online, 27.03.2023. URL: https://www.t-online.de/region/koeln/id_100151052/pro-russischer-autokorso-in-koeln-durchsuchung-bei-organisatorin.html

⁵²⁰ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021. URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/verfassungsschutzberichte/2022-06-07-verfassungsschutzbericht-2021.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4

The activity of right-wing groups in **Italy** in the period 2020-2022 is mainly related to the anti-vaccination movement. However, the electoral victory of the far-right Fratelli d'Italia (FdI) party in the September 2022 general elections represents a turn to the right of a significant part of the Italian electorate (over 26%). Giorgia Meloni, the leader of this party, was the first Italian female Prime Minister, but above all she was the first far-right Italian Prime Minister since B. Mussolini. She currently leads a right-wing coalition government with the Lega and C'mon Italy parties. The Brothers of Italy party is the latest variation of the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (Movimento) party.

The most prominent and influential far-right party in **Bulgaria** is the Vrazrazhdene (Revival) party, an anti-vaccination nationalist party. It was founded in 2014 but became prominent in 2021 when it opposed health measures and vaccination against COVID-19. "Revival" entered parliament after the November 2021 elections and won seats in Bulgaria's highest legislative body after the October 2022 snap elections, posting its best result. In its last election campaign, Revival called for a referendum on Bulgaria's NATO and EU membership, a more patriotic and religious approach in the education system, and favoured the introduction of the euro currency.⁵²¹

A year before the October 2020 elections, Renaissance Party vice-presidential candidate Elena Guncheva addressed local politicians of Jewish and Turkish origin on social media, saying they should consider themselves "guests" in this country. After the «Shalom» Jewish Society complained about "xenophobia and hate speech" to the Central Election Commission, which condemned her words but said it could not interfere in the political campaign, Guncheva addressed «Shalom» on social media, repeating that "Bulgaria is the land of Bulgarians." Jewish community leaders also expressed concern over periodic vandalism of Jewish cemeteries and monuments and, they said, a growing trend of anti-Semitic and xenophobic propaganda and graffiti.

Several other right-wing parties, ATAKA and VMRO, which were part of the government until 2021, are active in Bulgaria. In fact, they shared responsibility for the activities of the pre-2021 ruling coalition, which lost the parliamentary elections. Therefore, the vote for Revival was a protest vote by far-right voters disillusioned with the old nationalist parties. In addition, the Russian theme remains very popular in Bulgaria, as well as in Serbia, with a significant proportion of voters favouring a strong alliance with Russia, "Orthodox brotherhood," and Slavophilism.

Revival has its own profile on Facebook, Telegram, and other social networks. Other parties such as Ataka, National Front, and VMRO have not only social media profiles, but also their own television and open propaganda channels.

⁵²¹ Outcry in Bulgaria Over Far-right's Plan to Punish 'Foreign agents'//Balkan Insight, 02.11.2022. URL: <https://balkaninsight.com/2022/11/02/outcry-in-bulgaria-over-far-rights-plan-to-punish-foreign-agents/>

There are some other marginalised, pro-Nazi groups, such as the Bulgarian National Union, which regularly holds the "Lukov March" and others, also actively use the internet to spread hatred.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the threat of right-wing extremism in **Canada** increased and was reportedly increasingly influenced by the rise of right-wing radicalism in the United States. Seventeen Canadian radical groups were identified on the social network Telegram alone, including seven channels hosting white supremacy communities, seven hosting ethno-nationalist communities, and one hosting an anti-Muslim community account.

In 2021, Canada declared the far-right group Proud Boys a "terrorist organisation," adding it to its list of 13 terrorist groups and stating that "ideological [far-right] extremism [as opposed to religious or Islamist extremism] poses the most serious security threat."⁵²² The decision followed pressure from lawmakers to take a tougher stance on far-right extremism following the bloody riots at the US Capitol on 6 January 2021. Canada can impose sanctions on people and groups that do business with a listed organisation, can strip registered groups of charitable status, and can deny entry to the country to anyone found to be associated with a listed group.

As previously stated, in response to the rise of online hate speech, Bill C-36 was passed in 2021, which included an addition to the Canadian Human Rights Act and categorised online hate speech as a form of discrimination.⁵²³

In 2021, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service reported that "the pandemic was exploited by extremists who used the situation to spread disinformation, reinforce anti-authoritarian narratives and encourage acts of violence."⁵²⁴ No other phenomenon illustrates this more vividly than the Freedom Convoy anti-violence movement that began in January 2022. On 22 January 2022, hundreds of vehicles formed convoys from several points and crisscrossed the Canadian provinces, aiming to gather in Ottawa. Ahead of their arrival in Ottawa, it was reported that far-right and white supremacy groups hoped to capitalise on the protest to cause violence on Parliament Hill by repeating the attack on the US Capitol in 2021.⁵²⁵ Although many members of the convoy condemned the participation of extremist groups,⁵²⁶ the lead organisers were linked to conspiracy theory QAnon, COVID-19 scepticism and anti-vaccination sentiment, as well as anti-

⁵²² Canada declares far-right Proud Boys a 'terrorist' organization/AlJazeera, 3.02.2021. URL:

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/3/canada-declares-far-right-proud-boys-terrorist-group>

⁵²³ Bill C-36. House of Commons of Canada, June 23, 2021. URL: <https://parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/bill/C-36/first-reading>

⁵²⁴ Threats Within: Canada's spy service boosts attention to 'ideological' domestic extremism/Global News, March 29, 2022. URL: <https://globalnews.ca/news/8719009/threats-within-canadas-spy-service-boosts-attention-to-ideological-domestic-extremism/>

⁵²⁵ Alex Boutilier & Rachel Gilmore, Far-right groups hope trucker protest will be Canada's 'January 6th'//Global News, 25.01.2022. URL: <https://globalnews.ca/news/8537433/far-right-groups-trucker-protest-jan-6/>

⁵²⁶ Isabelle Docto "Freedom Convoy" organiser says it's not affiliated with extremist groups//DH News, Jan. 26, 2022. URL: <https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/freedom-convoy-extremists>

LGBTQIA+ and Islamophobic hate groups.⁵²⁷ In addition, some protesters were photographed waving Nazi flags at the rally, as well as holding placards comparing vaccination mandates to the Holocaust. Such symbols of hate were not limited to the offline space: Freedom Convoy's online groups were dominated by anti-Semitic conspiracy theories about a secret "global elite" working to the detriment of "the people."⁵²⁸

The strong influence that right-wing narratives have had on the development of these protests cannot be underestimated. It was in the wake of the Freedom Convoy lockdown of Ottawa's Parliament in February 2022 that the Government of Canada announced the launch of a process to develop a national Strategy to Counter Radicalisation and Violence.⁵²⁹ Importantly, the strategy includes measures to address the threat of right-wing extremism and other forms of violent extremism. The development of the strategy will include consultation with community organisations, law enforcement, and other stakeholders.

5.2. Islamists

Although the threats from right-wing extremism have significantly strengthened in Europe, the risks associated with Islamist terrorism should not be discounted. The monitoring countries counter these risks by having approved strategic plans to combat terrorism and effective countermeasures related to a well-developed system of prevention, control of social networks and preventive deprivation of citizenship of persons suspected of participation in terrorist groups. At the same time, the system does not always work smoothly.

For example, one high-profile case involving Islamist extremism in **Britain** that continued to generate much public debate and media attention during the reporting period is that of Shamima Begum. The British-born woman travelled to Syria to join the terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) at the age of 15, along with two other school friends at Bethnal Green Academy in London. Begum married another ISIL member 10 days after her arrival and gave birth to three children who all died. In 2019, UK Home Secretary Sajid Javid announced that he had issued an order revoking Begum's British citizenship. Under international law, the UK government

⁵²⁷ Justin Ling, MPs Told to Hide From Anti-Vaxxer Convoy by Parliament Security Chief//Vice News, 28.01.2022. URL: <https://www.vice.com/en/article/bvnd34/mps-told-to-hide-from-anti-vaxxer-trucker-convoy-by-parliament-security-chief>

⁵²⁸ Barbara Molas, "Victims of the Holocaust: The 'Freedom Convoy' Subreddits as Spaces for Antisemitism and Far-Right Radicalisation//Global Network on Extremism & Technology, 14.03.2022. URL: <https://gnet-research.org/2022/03/14/victims-of-the-holocaust-the-freedom-convoy-subreddits-as-spaces-for-antisemitism-and-far-right-radicalisation/>

⁵²⁹ Countering Radicalisation to Violence/Government of Canada. URL: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc/index-en.aspx>

could not revoke her British citizenship if such revocation would render her stateless. However, the UK government wrongly claimed that Begum also held Bangladeshi nationality. On 22 February 2023, it was reported that the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) ruled that the deprivation of her citizenship was lawful. This sparked a series of debates in the UK about the extent to which foreign fighters fully realise or know their role in a foreign conflict.⁵³⁰ In addition, the case has once again drawn attention to legal Islamist recruitment organisations, such as Hiz Butt Tahrir, which, acting non-violently, are highly successful in ideologically radicalizing Muslims in Britain.

Often Islamist radicalism is given the necessary conditions for its development in countries where the number of Muslims is small, but Islamophobic government policies are in place. In **Hungary**, for example, the Hungarian government's rhetoric towards Muslims was not significantly softened during the period under review, and tensions against Muslims persist. In his extensive criticism of EU migration policy, Viktor Orbán has rarely made exclusionary remarks about Muslims. An example was his statement that Hungary would not support a "parallel" society consisting of a mixture of Christians and Muslims.⁵³¹ Moving from these remarks to actual policy, the Muslim Organisation of Hungary reiterated that Muslims serving prison sentences continue to regularly receive meals containing pig meat or pork fat, despite complaints that this violates their religious dietary practices.⁵³²

This context is conducive to the growth of Islamist sentiment and radicalisation of local Muslims, although their share of the Hungarian population is small, and so is the number of such proven cases. Perhaps one of the few developments in the last two years was the arrest of a Hungarian who was allegedly spreading Islamist propaganda via the Internet. An excerpt from the arrest report notes the following:

"The suspect registered on a music-sharing platform in Germany and uploaded content under two usernames, some of which were created by "Islamic State" spokesmen. In them, "Islamic State" was glorified or indirectly incited to use terrorist methods. The channel created by the suspect had 41 subscribers and the uploaded content could be viewed by anyone. Some of the songs received 733 "likes."⁵³³

⁵³⁰ 'Shamima Begum: IS teenager to lose UK citizenship'// BBC News, 20 February 2019. URL: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-47299907>

⁵³¹ Mix of Muslim and Christian society not possibly peaceful Hungary's Orbán says// Daily Sabah, 2020. URL: <https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/mix-of-muslim-christian-society-not-possibly-peaceful-hungarys-orban-says>

⁵³² Report on Religious Freedoms: Hungary// US Government, 2021. URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/hungary/>

⁵³³ Hungarian man charged for spreading Islamist propaganda// Hungary Today, 2022. URL: <https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-man-charged-for-spreading-islamic-state-propaganda/>

A more serious case also occurred in 2022, when a 22-year-old man who had previously sworn allegiance to Islamic State intended to drive his car into a crowd while his partner was to detonate a homemade bomb during the 2021 European Football Championship.⁵³⁴

Radical Islamists are quite widely represented in **Russia**. The main organisations are Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat. Less popular organisations are "Takfir va-al Hijra" and "Nurjular." There are also adherents of the "Islamic State" in Russia. All of them are on the list of extremist organisations and special services are working effectively against them. Of the new Islamist organisations, the only new one is the "People's Movement Adat" (included in the Federal List of Extremist Organisations in 2022), which, according to some sources, is backed by the family of former Chechen Supreme Court Judge S. Yangulbayev. With social media accounts, it claims to be in favour of "stopping the genocide of the Chechen people, uniting the Chechen people and de-occupation of Chechnya."⁵³⁵

If we talk about public manifestations of Islamism, we can note the demonstrative cutting down of a cross on one of the graves in the cemetery in the village of Aktanysh in the Aktanyshsky district of Tatarstan - in the autumn of 2021 and in June 2022. At the same time, it turned out that in the district there is an unspoken ban on the installation of Orthodox crosses in cemeteries. Relatives of the deceased were invited to the district administration in autumn 2021, where they were persuaded not to restore the cross on the grave: "They said that Aktanysh is a purely Tatar district, that here they are trying their best to preserve the Tatar language and the existing "national purity." And Galimyanova, deputy head of the district administration, said that Engel Fattakhov, head of the Aktanysh district, was also against the installation of crosses in the cemetery." The district police officer advised his relatives to rebury him elsewhere, although the cemetery itself was formally a common cemetery, i.e. not a Muslim cemetery.⁵³⁶

In 2020, 40 people were convicted on extremism charges in Russia, 4 in 2021, and 52 in 2022.

Serbia, and more specifically the Muslim-dominated Sandzak region, has proven to be very resilient to Islamist extremism. Compared to other Western Balkan countries, relatively few Serbians (49, including women and children) have joined militant Islamist groups in Syria. There

⁵³⁴ Elítélte a bíróság az Iszlám Állam terroristáját, aki a budapesti foci-Eb-n akart robbantani// Origo, 25 February 2022. URL: <https://www.origo.hu/itthon/20220225-tobb-merenyletet-tervezett-magyarorszagon-a-birosag-elitelte.html>

⁵³⁵ «Народное движение "Адат"» внесено в перечень запрещенных организаций//Коммерсантъ, 17.07.2022. URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5458349>

⁵³⁶ В ТАТАРСТАНЕ НА СЕЛЬСКОМ КЛАДБИЩЕ СПИЛИЛИ ПРАВОСЛАВНЫЙ КРЕСТ, А МЕСТНЫЕ ВЛАСТИ ПОСОВЕТОВАЛИ РОДСТВЕННИКАМ ПОКОЙНОГО НЕ СТАВИТЬ НОВЫЙ//ВЕЧЕРНЯЯ КАЗАНЬ, 15..12.2021. URL: [HTTPS://WWW.EVENING-KAZAN.RU/ARTICLES/V-TATARSTANE-NA-SELSKOM-KLADBISHCHE-SPILILI-PRAVOSLAVNYY-KREST-A-MESTNYE-VLASTI-POSOVETOVALI-RODSTVENNIKAM-POKOYNOGO-NE](https://www.evening-kazan.ru/articles/v-tatarstane-na-selskom-kladbishche-spilili-pravoslavnyy-krest-a-mestnye-vlasti-posovetovali-rodstvennikam-pokoynogo-ne)

have been only a few incidents involving militant Salafists and failed terrorist plots. The inhabitants of Sandzak have demonstrated resilience to both violent extremism and the spread of an ultra-conservative interpretation of Islam. Of the 49 Serbian citizens who left for Syria, about 9 have returned to Europe, but only 4 have returned to Serbia. 12 are believed to have died in the conflict zone, the rest are still in Syria or on the run. Among them are about 20 women, the number of children is unknown.⁵³⁷

In 2014, amendments to the Criminal Code criminalised participation in hostilities outside Serbia's borders. Participation of Serbian citizens in foreign hostilities is punishable by imprisonment from 6 months to 5 years, while organising participation in a war or armed conflict in a foreign country is punishable by imprisonment from 2 to 10 years.

Fatal incidents attributed to Islamists have declined in the **United States** over the past five years due to the decline of the ISIS terrorist movement. However, when comparing violent extremists across the ideological spectrum, from 2011 to 2022, Islamists were involved in six mass murder incidents (or 23% of all mass murder incidents) resulting in 81 deaths (43.5% of all domestic violent extremism deaths).⁵³⁸ Between March 2014 and January 2023, 246 people were charged with offences related to the Islamic State, and 198 of them pleaded guilty or were found guilty.⁵³⁹

With the end of the Trump presidency, Islam and Islamism no longer play such a defining role in US domestic and foreign policy. Republicans had traditionally argued that the Muslim Brotherhood posed a threat to radical Islam, and during the previous administration there were several unsuccessful attempts to declare them a terrorist organisation. In a radical departure from these attempts and in an attempt to gain additional support among Muslim voters, Biden appointed Mohamed Hag Magid, a prominent Virginia imam with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, to the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF).⁵⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the following organisations have been designated as terrorist under Biden: Harakat Sawa'd Misr (HASM) (January 2021); ISIS-DRC (March 2021); and ISIS-Mozambique (March 2021).⁵⁴¹ According to

⁵³⁷ Lado Azinović and Edina Bećirević, "A Waiting Game: Assessing and Responding to the Threat from Returning Foreign Fighters in the Western Balkans", Regional Cooperation Council, November 30, 2017.

⁵³⁸ Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2022//ADL, 2022. URL: <https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2023-02/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2022.pdf>

⁵³⁹ Islamic State in America/GW Extremism Tracker. URL: https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/2023-02/december_2022_is_in_us_tracker_preview.png

⁵⁴⁰ USCIRF Welcomes President Joe Biden's Appointment of Mohamed Hag Magid to U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom//U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 12.08.2022. URL: <https://www.uscifr.gov/release-statements/uscifr-welcomes-president-joe-bidens-appointment-mohamed-hag-magid-us-commission>

⁵⁴¹ Foreign Terrorist Organizations//U.S. Department of State. URL: <https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-organizations/>

Christine Abizadb, director of the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC), following the collapse of al-Qaida and ISIL, these organisations pose the greatest threat in the world.

Despite various opinions and reports of radical Islamist links in **Greece**, no Islamist terrorist attacks have occurred in the country so far. This is impressive considering that Greece has a history of importing international terrorism, as Middle Eastern and Arab terrorist groups moved their activities to the country in the late 1960s. Moreover, according to official sources, there are no recorded cases of organised Islamist radicalisation on Greek soil or of Greek Islamists fighting abroad. These facts are impressive when one considers that Greek anarchists have recently allied themselves with Kurdish fighters against ISIS in Syria. Moreover, not so long ago, during the Kosovo war, members of the Albanian migrant community in Greece joined the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) and Greek nationalists participated in the genocide in Srebrenica during the Bosnian war.

However, according to intelligence agencies, Greece has been known in recent years to be used as a transit country by individuals travelling to and from conflict zones with "unclear motives." In 2016 alone, 15 alleged jihadists transiting Greece were arrested, according to Europol's latest annual report. In September 2019, CBS News reported that clandestine human smuggling syndicates were operating throughout Athens. These operations not only smuggle migrants and refugees through Greece to other parts of Europe, but also family members of prominent jihadists such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. A significant number of European foreign fighters who have returned to Europe have used Greece as a transit point. For example, several members of the cell responsible for the 2015 Paris and 2016 Brussels attacks travelled through the Greek island of Leros posing as Syrian refugees. Thus, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the mastermind of the November 2015 Paris attacks, allegedly communicated by mobile phone from a flat in Athens with several members of an ISIS cell in Belgium to plan a major terrorist attack involving weapons and bombs (Source: CTC Sentinel).⁵⁴²

At the same time, there are various risk factors that make the country a potential target for Islamist terrorists, even though it lacks the symbolism and strategic interest that such people are looking for. In particular, regimes in the Arab world with which Greece had good diplomatic relations in the past no longer exist. Radical Islamist groups could engage in low-risk assignments such as recruiting, funding, propaganda, and training in this country. In addition, Greece is in close geographical proximity to countries that "export" Islamism. Finally, Greece appears on ISIS maps as part of the so-called Islamic Caliphate.

⁵⁴² CNC Sentinel//Combating Terrorism Centre at West Point. URL: <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/ctc-sentinel/>

According to Greek officials, Islamist radicalisation does not yet pose a serious threat to the country. Greece has not been a major player in the “war on terror,” as the country has not deployed any troops in Iraq except for a mobile medical unit, and troops in Afghanistan have been involved mainly in low-profile engineering and medical activities, as well as training missions. In addition, Greece has not participated in the recent airstrikes against ISIS in Syria. Moreover, Greek and Islamic civilizations are ancient and have co-existed with each other for centuries, and Greece has not been involved in colonial wars. Finally, Greece has long-term good relations with the Arab world, which began to develop since the early 1980s.

ISIL supporters apparently established logistical, recruitment, and financial cells in Greece to facilitate the flow of their supporters to and from the Middle East. Members of the terrorist group also provided accommodation for foreign fighters and returnees in transit and helped them to evade security services. Similarly, some of them used Greece as a transshipment point for transporting weapons to Syria. Moreover, ISIS militants have used Greece to coordinate attack plans in Europe. According to experts, this is the reason why Islamists do not consider Greece as a target and arena for their operations. It is a "transit territory" that needs to be "kept clean."

Compared to other EU countries, Greece demonstrates a significantly lower threat of radicalisation by Greek Islamists proper. While Greece's secular Muslim minorities have largely resisted radicalisation attempts, there are concerns about radicalisation among immigrant communities. In particular, the presence of unregistered mosques in large immigrant communities has created a potential information black hole for authorities. Since 2015, some 80 improvised mosques have sprung up in the Athens area, none of which have been registered, including some allegedly linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.

At the same time, several facts came to light in 2022 that prompted talk of a change in the perception of Greece as a "terror-free" country by Islamists. In 2023, Greek authorities arrested two suspects for planning an attack on a Jewish centre in the busy centre of the Greek capital. Two men of Pakistani origin were charged with terrorism, while a third man, believed to be from Iran, was charged in absentia. Rabbi Mendel Hendel, who runs the Chabad Jewish Centre, said he learned of the planned attack from news reports when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said his country's Mossad intelligence service had helped Greece prevent the attack. A statement from his office claimed the attackers were linked to Iran. The paid terrorists, in addition to attacking a synagogue-restaurant in Athens' Psirri district, planned to plant a bomb in the centre of Athens, carry out a blind attack on an island, and assassinate individuals of Jewish origin.⁵⁴³

⁵⁴³ Terror plot in Greece, 2023, URL:<https://greekcitytimes.com/2023/04/03/terror-plot-in-greece-pakistanis/>

In **Bulgaria** we can speak of minor Islamist tendencies, which nevertheless take place. During the period under review, 12 persons were convicted for such activities. This was a group based in Saudi Arabia. On 19 February 2020, the Plovdiv Court of Appeal confirmed the verdict of the Pazardzhik District Court, which convicted 12 Islamists on charges of supporting ISIL, aiding foreign fighters, and spreading Salafi Islam, described by the government as an anti-democratic ideology, and incitement to war. The appeals court also upheld the lower court's sentences: 8.5 years in prison for the group's leader, Islamic preacher Ahmed Moussa, and prison terms ranging from 12 to 42 months for 10 other men. The only woman in the group received a two-year suspended sentence.⁵⁴⁴

The main challenge for the **French** authorities is the continued activity of Salafist groups and mosques, as well as the more sophisticated, more intellectual influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the interior minister, 41 terrorist plots by Islamist radicals have been uncovered between 2017 and 2023.⁵⁴⁵ According to the same source, following the vote in 2021 of the "Separatism" Law, aimed at countering Islamic practices contrary to the law, 7 Islamist associations were banned, 800 Islamic radicals were deported, and 55.9 million euros were seized in the accounts of Islamic associations (frozen assets or unpaid taxes).⁵⁴⁶ This action by Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin followed the murder of Samuel Paty, a high school teacher who was beheaded on 16 October 2020 by Chechen Islamist Abdulkh Anzorov, an 18-year-old Muslim refugee from Russia.

In 2022, the Office for the Protection of the **German** Constitution estimated the potential for Islamists in the Federal Republic of Germany at 28,290 (slight decrease compared to the previous year: 28,715).⁵⁴⁷ Upon enquiry in the Bundestag, the Federal Government informed the public that as of 1 June 2022, the intelligence services had recorded 531 of the most dangerous Islamists in the country who pose a threat (so-called Gefährder) and 516 Islamists also under surveillance but assessed as less dangerous (so-called relevante Personen).⁵⁴⁸

Salafists remain the largest Islamist group in the FRG. They claim to have the "only correct" interpretation of Islam, rooted in literal adherence to the Koran, and tolerate violence

⁵⁴⁴ 2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Bulgaria, 2022, URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/bulgaria/>

⁵⁴⁵ Guillaume Dosda, 41 attentats islamistes ont été déjoués depuis 2017 selon Gérald Darmanin//Le Journal du Dimanche, 05.04.2023. URL: <https://www.lejdd.fr/societe/41-attentats-islamistes-ont-ete-dejoues-depuis-2017-selon-gerald-darmanin-134418>

⁵⁴⁶ Séparatisme : 836 établissements fermés et près de 800 étrangers radicalisés expulsés, selon Gérald Darmanin//TFI Info, 14.10.2022. URL: <https://www.tf1info.fr/societe/separatisme-836-etablissements-fermes-et-pres-de-800-etrangers-radicalises-expulses-selon-gerald-darmanin-2235446.html>

⁵⁴⁷ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Islamismus und islamischer Terrorismus, Zahlen und Fakten. URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/themen/islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/zahlen-und-fakten/zahlen-und-fakten_node.html

⁵⁴⁸ Bundestag. Inneres und Heimat - Antwort - hib 336/2022//Zahl sogenannter Gefährder in Deutschland, vom 29.06.2022. URL: <https://www.bundestag.de/presse/hib/kurzmeldungen-901570>

against "apostates" from their dogma. The Salafists have largely lost their influence and funding channels since the defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS) militia but remain the most organised and structured Islamist group in the country. It is one of the few Islamist groups that propagandises directly on the street, handing out copies of the Koran to passers-by, attending "secular" events, and trying to communicate with people from the Muslim world, from the Middle East to the Central Asian countries of the CIS and Africa, living in Germany. Various small jihadist groups are associated with the Salafists, who in one way or another (either openly or by means of hints, "coded" language) call on German Muslims to take the path of struggle against Western society, which, in their opinion, is the antithesis of the Islamic world and the Muslim worldview.⁵⁴⁹

The structures of the Muslim Brotherhood also remain in place. It is the oldest Sunni Islamist network in Germany and has existed since 1994. In 2018, it was renamed the "German Muslim Community." The network is largely legalised through registered NGOs. The group's goal is the widespread application of Sharia law as the "only acceptable system" of ethical, moral, legal, and religious norms. Members are particularly harsh on those violations of their value system that are not "criminal" from the point of view of German law: alcohol consumption, adultery and renunciation of Islam.

A number of mosques and Islamic centres in Germany, for example in Aachen and Munich, are either closely associated with or controlled by the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood also influences the Central Council of Muslims of the Federal Republic of Germany, the largest official representation of Muslim interests in contacts with government institutions, and is part of the international structures of this network.⁵⁵⁰ Within it, there is an officially registered NGO "Muslim Youth of Germany."

"Hizbollah, which does not recognise the right to exist of the State of Israel and calls for an armed struggle against it, was banned in Germany in March 2020, following a series of searches of activists' flats and offices in various cities in Germany. However, it retained the same number of activists in 2021.

Other influential Islamist communities include the Milli-Gerus Islamic Community (founded in 1995), the Furqan community, which was founded in Germany in 1994, Tablighi Jamaat, which is the world's largest Islamic network (80 million people), founded in India and spreading in Asia, the Middle East, and partly in Europe.⁵⁵¹

⁵⁴⁹ Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Islamismus und islamischer Terrorismus, Begriff und Erscheinungsformen. URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/DE/themen/islamismus-und-islamistischer-terrorismus/begriff-und-erscheinungsformen/begriff-und-erscheinungsformen_node.html#doc714104bodyText1

⁵⁵⁰ Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Islamismus. Muslimbruderschaft in Deutschland. URL: <https://www.bpb.de/politik/extremismus/islamismus/290422/die-muslimbruderschaft-in-deutschland>

⁵⁵¹ See Xenophobia, Radicalism and Hate Crime in the OSCE Area, 2018-2020. Report, pp.150-151/Civic Nation. URL: https://www.civic-nation.org/pan-european-report/Report_radicalism_2018_2020.pdf

German security services separately point to the so-called legalist structures of Islamists. These are, as a rule, officially registered NGOs, self-help groups, cultural associations, and religious communities that exist in a legal public space and have the right to organise events, activities, conduct worship services, Koran recitation courses, etc. A classic example of such an organisation is the radical Islamic Centre Hamburg. It is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, its activists profess a similar ideology, but it is to a large extent an independent structure.

The number of these and other organisations in 2020-2021 is set out below in the summary table of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution report:⁵⁵²

Organisation	2020	2021
Islamic State, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Shabab, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham	No precise data	No precise data
Salafists	12.150	11.900
Hezb-e-Islami of Afghanistan	160	160
Hezbollah	1.250	1.250
Muslim Brotherhood/Muslim Community in Germany	1.450	1.450
Hamas	450	450
Turkish Hezbollah	400	400
Tablighi Jamaat	650	550
Islamic Centre Hamburg	No precise data	No precise data
Milli-Gerus and adjoining organisations	10.000	10.000
Furkan Community	400	400
Caliphate State	--	700
Others	1.250	330

In 2021, the charitable association for solidarity with the Palestinian people in **Italy** (*Associazione Benefica per la Solidarieta' con il Popolo Palestinese - ABSPP*), headquartered in Genoa, was considered by Israel's Shin Bet internal security agency as an Italian emissary of the Hamas organisation and was linked to the Union of Good confederation, which is known for its

⁵⁵² Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2021. URL: https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/publikationen/DE/verfassungsschutzberichte/2022-06-07-verfassungsschutzbericht-2021.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4

funding of Hamas groups. ABSPP's bank account was closed in 2021 due to a series of suspicious transactions possibly aimed at funding terrorist activities.⁵⁵³

Undoubtedly, Italian radical Islamism is part of a transnational network within Europe and has links to the Middle East.⁵⁵⁴ In Italy, the presence of Muslims is rather modest when compared to other European countries such as Germany, France, or the UK, as there are only 2.7 million (4.9 per cent) in 2020. Although most Italian Muslims or Muslim migrants do not have any contact with the above-mentioned organisations and centres, the Italian authorities show concern about their activity in the country. They are mainly interested in possible links between Islamist and Italian radical right-wing and left-wing groups, as well as the possible influence of Islamists on refugees and migrants arriving from political hotspots such as Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria, and others.

In 2021, the **Canadian** government reported that radical Islamism is still a threat because of its association with militant Islamic groups, particularly al-Qaida, as a major threat. Also, the Arab-Israeli conflict is considered one of the sources of anti-Semitism in Canada. At the same time, Islamic extremist groups are also seen as opponents of democracy, secularism and Western-style liberal values.⁵⁵⁵

Meanwhile, the country's Ministry of Public Security identifies two groups, ISIS and al-Qaeda, as the main Islamist groups involved in radicalisation in the country.⁵⁵⁶

5.3. Left-wing Radicals

The extreme left as a political movement has existed since the 1940s. With the formation of various organisations following ideologies such as Marxism, revolutionary socialism, communism, anarchism, and syndicalism, their numbers multiplied worldwide. After the 1917 revolution in Russia and the development of the international communist movement, new organisations of left radicalism, Marxism-Leninism, left communism, and Trotskyism grew substantially in the world. After the Chinese revolution of 1949, further international developments in the 1960s led to the emergence of Maoist and then Khojai groups. Political splits within these

⁵⁵³ Israeli Security Agency, 'The Union of Good-Analysis and Mapping of Terrorist Fund Network', n.d. URL: https://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollection/Images/english/Terror/info/coalition_en_pdf; Massimiliano Coccia, 'Finanzia Hamas. Bloccati i Conti a Una Onlus di Genova', La Repubblica, 12 Settembre, 2021. URL: https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2021/12/09/news/finanzia_hamas_bloccati_i_conti_a_una_onlus_di_genova-329600616/

⁵⁵⁴ Tommaso Virgili and Giovanni Giacalone, 'Muslim Brotherhood and Khomeinism, The Told and the Untold', European Eye on Radicalisation, 28 May, 2022.

⁵⁵⁵ The Views of Canadian Scholars on the Impact of the Anti-Terrorism Act// Government of Canada. URL: https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/ci-jp/antiter/rr05_1/p4.html

⁵⁵⁶ Departmental Result Report, 2019-20/Public Safety Canada, p.6. URL: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/dprtmntl-rslts-rprt-2019-20/dprtmntl-rslts-rprt-2019-20-en.pdf>

tendencies created a large number of new political organisations, especially between the 1960s and 1990s. Many of these are radical and extremist in nature.

In **UK**, for example, the mid-1990s saw a series of joint initiatives by the extreme left to create “alternative electoral arrangements” in “political space outside the Labour Party” following Labour's continuing reorientation towards the political centre.

The first of these attempts at reorganisation was the Socialist Workers Party (1996) led by Arthur Scargill, a left-wing (but not extreme left-wing) party that nevertheless became a competitor for extreme left influence and subsequent splits. This was followed by a succession of left-wing campaigns, coalitions, and parties, some of which have also been labelled extreme left, including Respect (2004) and the Trade Union and Socialist Coalition (2010). None of these achieved an electoral breakthrough, and with Jeremy Corbyn's ascension to the leadership of the Labour Party in 2015, most left-wing groups (both left and extreme left) suspended their activities. Some smaller groups such as Workers Power and Alliance for Workers' Liberty then disbanded or deregistered to join or publicly support Labour.

Apart from involvement in street and electoral extra-parliamentary activity, there is very little active or significant extreme left radicalism in the UK in the current reporting period. Most organisations adhere to more mainstream elements of the labour movement, belong to fringe groups (such as the Socialist Workers Party, Communist Party, or Labour Party) or have a place in eco-radical groups. This latter strand has seen a massive increase in activity - with groups such as Extinction Rebellion, Insulate UK, and Stop Oil! carrying out civil disobedience actions to draw politicians' attention to the looming global climate crisis. Finally, at the level of the street protest movement, there is also a merger with anti-racist and anti-fascist organisations, but these have been largely inactive since the heyday of the English Defense League about a decade ago.

In 2022, following the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine, British Labour opposition leader Sir Keir R. Starmer took a sharp internal stance, threatening to expel Vladimir Putin's apologists from the Labour Party after nearly a dozen of them signed a letter criticizing NATO's role in Ukraine.⁵⁵⁷ At the time, far-left and right-wing populists in the UK expressed sympathy for Putin's claim that NATO expansionism was forcing him to act in Ukraine, including former Labour leader and Stop the War campaigner Jeremy Corbyn.

The radical left in **Hungary** has been trying to emerge from the crisis since 2010 and the return to power of the Fidesz party. However, their activism has not been accompanied by electoral results and victories, with the exception of the 2019 Budapest mayoral elections, which were won by Gergely Karakcsony (Dialogue), an eco-socialist party. That the radical left is gradually

⁵⁵⁷ Pickard, J. & Parker, G., 'British politicians put on spot by Ukraine invasion'//The Financial Times, 25 February 2022. URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/0e691bac-76e3-4631-ac98-d81051d4f762>

declining and a shrinking space for political manoeuvring is shown by the disintegration of activist groups such as the Hungarian branch of DiEM25, which disbanded in 2022 after lack of success among Hungarians and lack of support from the movement's (international) leadership.⁵⁵⁸ The Hungarian Labour Party (*Magyar Munkaspárt*) led by Gyula Túrmer and the radical left-wing party Táncsics continue to exist to this day, albeit as extra-parliamentary groups, as both failed to make it to parliament in the 2022 elections.

The position and influence of the radical left in Hungary is further complicated by the fact that the ruling Fidesz party and its associated right-wing and far-right organisations have control over the media and public space. After the Central European University moved out of Hungary in 2018, the now virtually inactive Szabad Egyetem (Free University) is attempting to become one of many centres of radical-left resistance in Budapest. Other organisations include a number of music groups, as well as all sorts of ultra-left groups from a diverse range of LGBT organisations, such as Pink Blokk⁵⁵⁹ and a number of others.

The influence of these radical-left foci is most often limited to cities and university centres such as Budapest and Szeged, but without much likelihood of seriously disrupting the current political situation. The same can be said about the overall impact of the radical left on (reducing) xenophobia and radical nationalism in Hungary: apart from individual events and motives, there is very little evidence that the radical left can be an important corrective factor in combating xenophobia and hatred of minorities in Hungary.

In **Russia**, back in 2016, according to sociological surveys, not only elderly people, but also every third young person, regretted the collapse of the USSR.⁵⁶⁰ The same trend has continued in 2020⁵⁶¹ and, in all likelihood, later. The main reasons are the "robber" capitalism that was created in Russia in the 1990s, the myths that in "[in] the USSR everything was for the people and almost free of charge," and nostalgia for the greatness of the USSR in the international arena.

Nevertheless, organised left-radical groups have long been absent from the country's political scene. The left in the Russian Federation has traditionally been weak since its defeat back in 1993 during the suppression of the putsch in Moscow. Formally left-wing and the CPRF, which is a member of parliament, is more of a "brand carrier," often speaking from quite right-wing and

⁵⁵⁸ DiEM25 Blog. 2022. URL: <https://diem25budapest.wordpress.com/blog/>

⁵⁵⁹ Pink Blokk. Facebook. URL: https://www.facebook.com/people/PINK-BLOKK/100070005853928/?paipv=0&eav=AfZousdOuShiEPO3Nf0_N_3zv5ur5tNHYKFGwsJ1c61Qwifxky5Qx1j4xGU_LVdUWAas&_rdr

⁵⁶⁰ Анна Шор-Чудновская, Советское прошлое в представлениях молодых россиян//Новое литературное обозрение, сс. 173-189. URL: https://www.nlobooks.ru/magazines/neprikosnovennyi_zapas/116/article/19485/

⁵⁶¹ Совок небесный Россияне мечтают возродить СССР. Кому выгоден миф о коммунистическом рае?//Lenta.RU, 20.10.2020. URL: <https://lenta.ru/articles/2020/10/20/myth2/>

sometimes even ultra-right-wing positions. It is premature to talk about any influence of the ultra-left on the population or the authorities. There was some activity before the pandemic began on the Internet, where Marxist supporters tried to establish a study of the works of Marx and Lenin, but very soon they ceased visible activity.

The same can be said about the contemporary ultra-left movement in **Serbia**. Leftist ideas in Serbia have been compromised. Milosevic's left-wing nationalism was the last serious political movement that defined the development of the country, and since then there have been no mainstream left-wing ideas and organisations there.

Approximately the same can be observed in **Bulgaria**. There are small anarchist and communist groups there. They are radical in their ideology, they try to carry out street mobilisation, but such groups do not take any violent actions.

In 2021, there were numerous violent incidents by left-wing and anarchist extremists in **Greece** that were not classified as terrorist attacks. The modus operandi used to carry out the attacks and incidents reported in 2021 is similar to that seen in previous years, including attacks on infrastructure or private companies with arson attacks on buildings and structures. One important area of activism for the anarchist scene is “doxing.” This is an exclusively left-wing phenomenon that is increasingly being used by radicals and anarchists to take down right-wing extremists, conservative and right-wing politicians, journalists and public servants such as police officers, and others. Doxing is the collection of private and confidential information and its publication on the Internet without the consent of the person whose personal data is published. Such actions pose a great risk to the personal safety of victims and their relatives, as it can inspire left-wing extremists to physically attack, threaten the individuals concerned, or damage their property. Websites, blogs, and other social media platforms are used for this purpose. For example, in July 2021, the Greek anarchist group Anarchist Action Organisation published on its website the names and home addresses of 21 police officers serving in various police stations in Thessaloniki.⁵⁶²

Most left-wing violent extremists adhere to Marxist-Leninist ideology. They want to bring about revolutionary changes in the existing political and economic system and establish a socialist alternative to capitalism, which, in their view, will eventually lead to communism. At the same time, the ultra-left often associates various nationalist ideological currents, such as Zionism, with capitalism, which leads leftists to co-operate with Islamist anti-Semitic groups. Left-wing extremists rely on structured groups, often with passionary leaders.

⁵⁶² Europol's annual EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), 2022. URL: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-events/main-reports/tesat-report>, pp.65-66

An anarchist extremist group, also called an autonomous or insurgent group, advocates a life free of rules and rejects authority, the existing political order, and social norms. Its aim is to commit violent acts and destabilise the social order. They are characterised by a strong propensity for violence and destruction. Especially during demonstrations, anarchists, often falling under the umbrella term of the anti-fascist movement (Antifa), actively engage in violent clashes with perceived opponents and the police, sometimes using dangerous weapons. Anarchists usually dress in all-black clothing, very often covering their faces to avoid harassment. The scene has no prominent leaders, consists of unstructured groups and is an informal and rather loose movement with flexible membership. This entails great difficulties for law enforcement agencies in identifying groups and individuals.

Experts believe that the radicalisation of the overall political climate in the US has the potential to escalate the activities of anarchist violent extremists in the very near future.⁵⁶³ The Office of the Director of National Intelligence's (ODNI) 2021 Domestic Violent Extremism (DVE) threat assessment defines anarcho-violent extremists (AVEs) as "DVEs who oppose all forms of capitalism, corporate globalisation, and institutions of governance that they perceive as harmful to society." These militant anarchist extremists are distinct from those who hold constitutionally protected anarchist views. Thus, the government's definition of AVE encompasses anarchists and those who adhere to other left-wing violent extremist ideologies who carry out or threaten to carry out acts that harm people in violation of state or federal laws or otherwise fall within the definition of "domestic terrorism."

Among the most important recent trends in AVEs are the increasing number of victims of their political violent actions; disruption of government institutions; and potentially increased risks of violent attacks, including fatal ones, due to the increasingly polarised political climate in the United States.⁵⁶⁴ While traditionally right-wing extremists have attacked people and left-wing violent extremists have attacked property, both groups are increasingly using violent tactics to target what they perceive to be their ideological enemies.

According to Public Safety **Canada's** annual reports (2020-2022), left-wing extremism is not considered a serious threat in this country compared to right-wing extremism. Nevertheless, there have been some incidents such as attacks on pipelines and railway infrastructure by environmental and indigenous activists,⁵⁶⁵ which can be considered extreme left-wing on the

⁵⁶³ Anarchist/Left-Wing Violent Extremism in America: Trends in Radicalisation, Recruitment, and Mobilization/George Washington University, November 2021. URL: <https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/Anarchist%20-%20Left-Wing%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20America.pdf>

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁵ The Wet'suwet'en conflict disrupting Canada's rail system//BBC News, 20.02.2020. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51550821>

political spectrum because they are collective and violent actions based on the idea that social equality should be absolute. In addition, anarchist and anti-fascist groups have used violence during protests and demonstrations. For example, in 2021, a group of anarchists were involved in a violent confrontation with police during a protest against quarantine in Montreal.⁵⁶⁶

But the most serious left-wing extremist threat in Canada comes from animal rights groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), dubbed "ecoterrorists" by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, and formerly also Earth Liberation Front. These two groups have historically been responsible for arson attacks on fur farms and research centres in Canada, as well as vandalism of businesses and other property.

In October 2021, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said that left-wing extremism, just like right-wing extremism, sows "hatred, fear, and distrust" of Canada and other democratic societies around the world.⁵⁶⁷ By equating left-wing and right-wing extremism, Trudeau was sharply criticised by the Canadian Hate Network on Twitter, which accused the Prime Minister of equating "anti-racists and anti-fascists with white supremacy supporters and the far right."

Despite Trudeau's claims, unlike some far-right groups that are officially recognised as terrorist organisations in Canada, there are actually no left-wing domestic groups recognised as terrorist on the list of terrorist organisations. Given this, we can argue that while the government formally considers all extremism equally dangerous and a threat of equal importance, including the extreme left, the extent of left-wing extremism and violence in Canada appears to be much smaller than the extent of right-wing extremism over the study period.

Since the beginning of demonstrations against the **French** government's policy on labour legislation (2016), during the yellow waistcoats movement (2019-2020), during protests against pension reform (2022-2023), and at several Labour Day protests, the so-called "Black Blocs," groups of black-clad and often masked anarchist protesters have regularly clashed with the police.

Since 2018, there has also been an upsurge in radical leftist activism on environmental issues, with activists settling in areas where authorities plan to build a motorway, airport, or other facilities that they believe are damaging to the environment. In French, they are called ZAD, which stands for "Zones à défendre" ("Areas to be protected"). The tactic of anarchists and radical

⁵⁶⁶ Joe Lafaro, Officers disperse protesters during Montreal march against police brutality//CTV News, 20.03.2022. URL: <https://montreal.ctvnews.ca/officers-disperse-protesters-during-montreal-march-against-police-brutality-1.5821006>

⁵⁶⁷ Justin Trudeau Tells International Conference Left-Wing 'Extremist Groups' Are 'Pushing White Supremacy'//PressProgress, Oct. 14, 2021. URL: <https://pressprogress.ca/justin-trudeau-tells-international-conference-left-wing-extremist-groups-are-pushing-white-supremacy/>

environmentalists who challenge local authorities is to occupy land until the police need to use force to expel them.

For the first time since the 1980s, the threat of violent activity from the radical left prompted the government to ban the anti-fascist group Lyon and the Neighbourhood (GALE), the pro-Palestinian Collectif Palestine Vaincra, and the Bloc Lorraine in 2022. The ban of the latter was upheld in court, the others are now suspended and awaiting a judgement. Although the interior minister has announced that he wants to ban the radical left-wing magazine Nantes révoltée (also in 2022) no action has been taken. A similar action was to be taken against Les soulèvements de la terre, a non-governmental organisation of radical environmentalists. This was announced in May 2023, but no action has also been taken at the time of writing.⁵⁶⁸

Italy has several political parties ideologically aligned with Marxism and communism. In the general elections held in September 2022, several extreme left-wing political parties contested the elections. They are *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista* (Communist Reform Party), *Partito Comunista Italiano* (Italian Communist Party), *Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori* (Communist Workers' Party), *Partito Comunista* (Communist Party), and *Potere al Popolo!* (Power to the People!).⁵⁶⁹

They are rather marginal and small political parties, popular in the north of the country and in Rome because of the strong socialist and communist traditions in these regions. The ideological spectrum of the Italian extreme left is broad and diverse and combines several variants of Marxism and communism, as indicated by the names of the parties. Although they are expressions of different forms of communism, they all share the common goal of abolishing capitalism through decisive action and the use of political activism.

The 2022 elections served as a catalyst for both the extreme right and the extreme left. In the following months, the public became more active in rallies and protests, and in schools and universities, students seemed to initiate more active participation in political debates.

The awakening of the radical left is an indicator of how the political climate is affecting the awakening of Italian society and how exactly the extreme left is expressing its opposition to the country's new political leadership. Topics such as environmental protection and harsh criticism of global production systems have also provided fertile ground for political extremism to become active in politics. Another element of the resurgence of the radical left in the country is the new

⁵⁶⁸ Soulèvements de la Terre : une dissolution opaque? URL: https://www.liberation.fr/societe/police-justice/dissolution-des-soulevements-de-la-terre-simple-retard-ou-vrai-recul-20230501_XXJ6UFTRTFASVLSCOXQXYHMNAE/

⁵⁶⁹ Come si chiama il partito di estrema sinistra in Italia?//Taitcomuse, 28.03.2023. URL: <https://tattooMuse.it/domande-frequenti/come-si-chiama-il-partito-di-estrema-sinistra-in-italia>

government, which has offered old right-wing scenarios that many Italians have historically disagreed with. Whether these groups, parties and movements will become a problem for the country's political stability, the future will show. Right now, this phenomenon is still too much in its infancy to give a full analysis, also due to the lack of sufficient material.

In **Ukraine**, after the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the so-called "left-wing" party field was completely outlawed, which was mainly justified on the grounds of national security, in particular by the fact that the leaders or a number of representatives of these parties were accused of links with the Russian Federation.

On 20 March 2022, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a decision of the National Security Council (NSDC) suspending the activities of 11 political parties for the duration of the war. Later, the Justice Ministry filed lawsuits to ban 12 parties: Opposition Platform - For Life, Opposition Bloc, Shariy's Party, Nashi, Left Opposition, Union of Left Forces, State, Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, Socialist Party of Ukraine, Socialists, Volodymyr Saldo Bloc, and Rus United.⁵⁷⁰⁵⁷¹

Also on 5 July 2022, the panel of judges of the Eighth Administrative Court of Appeal (ACA) completed the consideration of administrative cases on banning the party "Happy Ukraine" ("Successful Ukraine") and the Communist Party of Ukraine (No. 826/9174/18 and No. 826/9751/14 respectively) and satisfied the claims of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine.

The Communist Party of Ukraine was banned by the Kyiv District Administrative Court back in December 2015, but it continued to exist due to a judicial conflict. The CPU itself, which had long been in a close alliance with the former Party of Regions, was officially banned by the AAC decision on 21 February 2023.⁵⁷² The banning of "pro-Russian parties" is an important symbolic step, which is primarily aimed at once again demonstrating to the Ukrainian society the patriotism of the current government. At the same time, it is possible that this way the field is being cleared for new left-wing parties, but already under the control of the Office of the President.

Since 2014, after the Maidan victory, left-wing radical groups and parties in Ukraine have been gradually pushed out of the political space. During this period, two powerful left-wing parties - the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) - fell into decline. The CPU, although it had strong electoral support and an extensive network of party

⁵⁷⁰ В Украине окончательно запретили 12 пророссийских партий//Украинская Правда, 22.10.2022. URL: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2022/10/22/7373035/>

⁵⁷¹ СНБО приостановил любую деятельность ряда политических партий во время военного положения//ZN,UA, 20.03.2022. URL: <https://zn.ua/POLITICS/snbo-priostanovil-ljubuiu-dejatelnost-rjada-politicheskikh-partij-vo-vremja-voennoho-polozhenija-zelenskij.html>

⁵⁷² В Украине запретили "Партию регионов": все имущество передадут государству//Фокус, 21.02.2023. URL: <https://focus.ua/politics/551129-v-ukraine-zapretili-partiyu-regionov-vse-imushchestvo-peredadut-gosudarstvu>

organisations, was unable to survive or reformat itself during the period of decommunisation. The ban on the CPU was justified on the grounds of national security, as communist local centres allegedly actively assisted the self-proclaimed "DNR" and "LNR" in eastern Ukraine.

The information campaign against the Communists and their followers led to the fact that the brand itself - social democracy and socialism - became largely unpopular, and the lion's share of the Communist electorate was concentrated in the now non-Ukrainian-controlled territories of Donbas and Crimea.

The decline of the SPU began even earlier. Voters could not forgive the Socialists for their abrupt turn from the Orange Party, which was in opposition to former President Yanukovich, to an alliance with the same Party of Regions. However, unlike the CPU, the Socialists have had one significant trump card since 2014: their activities have not been directly banned. Representatives of the so-called "New Left" supported the integrity of Ukraine, criticised "Russian imperialism," and some took an active part in military actions in Donbass. However, it was also banned by a decree of President V. Zelensky for the "links to Russia" of some of its leaders (one of its leaders, Ilya Kiva, congratulated before the outbreak of hostilities V. Putin's birthday before the outbreak of hostilities and allegedly justified his policy towards Ukraine).

Individuals from the CPU tried to create some kind of alternative to this party in the form of the NGO Borot'ba, but the events of Maidan and, afterwards, the events in eastern Ukraine, which turned into war, showed that, despite the stated ideological differences between the "Trotskyist" Borot'ba and the outdated CPU, there was no real difference between them. Members of both organisations took part in the confrontation on the pro-Russian side. Borot'ba activists actively tried to proclaim "people's republics" in Kharkiv and Odessa, and participated in clashes with pro-government activists. Borot'ba members were involved in the conflict on Kulikovo Field in Odessa on 2 May 2014, and afterwards two of them were killed in Odessa's House of Trade Unions.⁵⁷³

After the old communists and socialists left, this ideological niche was never filled. But several political parties tried to use their rhetoric. The most notable are two political forces that were represented in the parliament. These are Opposition Platform - For Life and Batkivshchyna.⁵⁷⁴ Both parties have a number of "left-wing" billets in their arsenal. The main themes are: the launch of the land market, poverty, the lack of progress in ending the war in eastern

⁵⁷³ В Одессе вспоминают жертв трагедии 2 мая 2014 года//Про Букви, 02.05.2016. URL: <https://bykvu.com/ua/bukvy/29953-segodnya-v-odesse-vspominayut-zhertv-tragedii-2-maya-2014-goda/>

⁵⁷⁴ Патерналисты или новые коммунисты: куда делись «левые» партии//Сила, 28.05.2020. URL: <https://ru.slovoidilo.ua/2020/05/28/kolonka/aleksandr-radchuk/politika/paternalisty-ili-novye-kommunisty-kuda-delis-levye-partii>

Ukraine, and the mistakes of the pro-government team. OPZZh also actively used the theme of the need for rapprochement with Russia.

The Opposition Platform for Life, with 44 deputies, had the second largest faction in the Verkhovna Rada. All the time of its existence, this faction was reproached with pro-Russian sentiments. After the outbreak of the war, it began to lose members. Subsequently, the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC) suspended the activities of several parties (including OPZZh) with ties to Russia. A month later, some MPs from this political force set up the parliamentary group "Platform for Life and Peace." Such a move was criticised by the NSDC secretary, Oleksiy Danilov, who advised the "scoundrels from OPZZh" to quietly leave the Rada before they were taken out.⁵⁷⁵

Already in wartime, in March 2023, the Security Service of Ukraine announced that underground cells of the so-called "Communist Party of the Soviet Union" had been uncovered in Kyiv and six other regions of the country. Their "activists" were allegedly supposed to call for "mass support for the Russian occupiers" and set up "commandant's offices" to gather intelligence and prepare sabotage in Ukraine.⁵⁷⁶

It is worth noting that the Ukrainian left is mainly in favour of supporting economic equality between people, social assistance, free medicine and education, high taxes, protection of workers' rights, and active state intervention in the economy, for example by regulating prices or creating state-owned enterprises. In its extreme form it is a planned economy and the absence of private property.⁵⁷⁷ At the same time, a significant number of Ukrainians (1/3), having the experience of life in the USSR, consider only limited state intervention in the economy (restraint of consumer prices and tariffs) and social assistance necessary.⁵⁷⁸

President V. Zelensky, however, is increasingly shifting to the right-wing political segment (more politically passionate) and is oriented towards the demands of this electorate, competing with the head of the European Solidarity P. Poroshenko and the mayor of Kyiv V. Klitschko.

Parliament is currently considering two laws that would prohibit persons who were members of banned parties or factions of banned parties from running for elective office. First of

⁵⁷⁵ Что принесет запрет пророссийских партий в Украине//DW, 02/05/2022. URL: <https://www.dw.com/ru/chto-prineset-zapret-prorossijskih-partij-v-ukraine/a-61642097>

⁵⁷⁶ СБУ нашла в Украине подпольные ячейки "компартии большевиков"//Украинская Правда, 20 марта 2023. URL: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2023/03/20/7394189/>

⁵⁷⁷ Левые и левоцентристские: какой идеологии придерживаются украинские партии на самом деле//delo.ua, 19.07.2019. URL: <https://delo.ua/economyandpoliticsinukraine/realnaja-ideologija-ukrainskih-partij-analiz-355928/>

⁵⁷⁸ Треть украинцев считает, что вмешательство государства в экономические процессы должно быть минимальным//Экономическая Правда, 16.06.2021. URL: <https://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/news/2021/06/16/675062/>

all, we are talking about draft law No. 9081 "On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine"⁵⁷⁹ (on restricting the participation of persons associated with political parties, whose activities are prohibited, in the government). An alternative to it is Draft Law No. 9081-1⁵⁸⁰ "On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Restricting Participation in State Government of Persons Associated with Political Parties, the Activities of Which are Prohibited by Law." It prohibits not only running for office, but also holding any positions of category "A" (the highest category of civil servants) for persons who were members of parties or factions of banned parties not as of 24 February 2022, but as of 19 February 2014, when, according to the authors, Russia's aggression against Ukraine began.

These two bills violate two basic principles of democratic law. The first is the denial of the principle of collective punishment. According to democratic law, it is forbidden to punish collectives. Any punishment must be individual and must relate to specific actions and specific people. That is, one cannot punish all members of any party at once. The second legal problem is that it is proposed to punish people for actions they committed before the criminalisation of the act. As we know, the law is not retroactive. That is, it is proposed to punish people for being members of once legal parties. Experts believe that in this case all officials and institutions of different levels, which provided and recognised the functioning of these parties in the period before they were banned by the court, should be punished. At the same time, these laws may be adopted in the future against the background of radicalisation of public sentiments. But it is most likely that, like the previous lustration laws on "purification of power," they will be challenged in the ECHR or will not be properly implemented.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The COVID-19 pandemic, contrary to expectations, has not led to either a drop in the level of Xenophobia or a reduction in hate crimes in the OSCE countries. Moreover, it became a trigger for a significant increase in Hate crime, including violent crime, by an average of 25-30%.

2. Unlike the European migration crisis of 2015/16 that preceded it, the new crisis associated with war refugees from Ukraine, which is several times larger in scale, is being successfully overcome thanks to the coordinated actions of EU countries. At the same time, a

⁵⁷⁹ Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законів України (щодо обмеження участі осіб, пов'язаних з політичними партіями, діяльність яких заборонена, в управлінні державою) //GOV.UA. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/41482>

⁵⁸⁰ Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законів України (щодо обмеження участі осіб, пов'язаних з політичними партіями, діяльність яких заборонена, в управлінні державою) //GOV.UA. URL: <https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/41482>

differentiated approach to refugees from different regions of the world in Western countries shows that modern migration processes are a product of political decisions, based not least on the sentiments of citizens.

3. The war in Ukraine has increased the level of Xenophobia towards the Russian-speaking population of European countries, although in Ukraine itself the social distance between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens remains the shortest after the start of the war.

4. More and more OSCE countries prefer security interests to democratic values, primarily freedom of speech and expression, abandoning the model of violent extremism in favor of the model of hateful extremism, which criminalizes not only violence, but also the spread of hatred, incl. via the Internet.

5. The process of legislative counteraction to discrimination in the OSCE area, including against migrants, continues, with the exception of a few countries. The exception was representatives of the LGBTQI+ group, primarily transgender people. Attempts to legislatively secure their right to self-determination of gender became an obstacle to the further development of the process of emancipation of this group as a whole. Masy be we are dealing with the beginning of a new, this time reverse, trend associated with the legal support of this minority.
